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The thesis has a period of focus of the ‘long eighteenth century’. This phrase is coined 
from that in use by historians when discussing the period from 1688-1832 and has been 
chosen given the number of key contractual developments which took place in this era. 
The primary purpose of this research is to understand the basis and motivations behind 
the creation of important rules under which some contracts were made void. It is 
conceded that ‘voidness’ of contracts is an extremely wide area of law and as a 
consequence of this, three areas of contract law in particular have been chosen to be 
explored, these being illegality, immorality and incapacity. These three topics are linked 
by the way in which they concern the intervention of the law on private relationships 
and personal lives, which is the chosen theme throughout this thesis.  
 
Ultimately, the thesis will arrive at a point whereby the underlying motivations behind 
the eighteenth century legal developments which held certain contracts concerning 
illegality, immorality, and incapacity to be void will be discovered. The means of doing 
this will be to analyse and interpret the social history and the legal history concurrently. 
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It will be determined whether these developments were underpinned by a law which 
sought to protect or control and thus the tension between control and protection interests 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 ENGLAND IN THE LONG EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
1688 marked a significant turning point in English history. Following the Glorious 
Revolution, the Catholic King James II was ousted and replaced by a Protestant monarch, 
William III. Alongside this change in sovereign, the culture of England was also to 
undergo significant development. Indeed, over a period of more than one hundred years 
and under the reign of seven monarchs, England saw the rise of party politics, the 
continued growth of the Empire, and the Industrial Revolution. Culminating in the 
enactment of the Great Reform Act in 1832, the long eighteenth century is a particularly 
tumultuous period of English social history, given the degree of change that occurred at 
this time. 
 
The law too was to undergo a period of development as legal doctrine sought to align 
itself with changing commercial and social norms. In the realm of contract law, Slade’s 
Case1 in 1602 consolidated the rules that were to persist throughout the long eighteenth 
century concerning assumpsit actions.2 Prior to this, depending on the nature of the 
contract, a party could pursue a writ of covenant or a writ of debt. A covenant and a debt 
were distinguished as a covenant was akin to what we would today hold as a contract 
and thus concerned breach of a promise, whilst debts were treated as an action 
                                                          
1 Slade v Morley (1602) 4 Co Rep 91; 76 ER 1072 
2 An action of assumpsit (‘an undertaking’), was the primary mode of recourse for contractual breaches 
at this time 
2 
 
concerning property.3 The former was actionable in the central courts,4 only if evidenced 
by a deed, although Baker acknowledges that ‘local courts were quite competent to deal 
with informal agreements’5 not in writing. For a writ of debt, if not evidenced in a deed, 
a plaintiff could pursue an action of ‘debt sur contract’, to which the defendant could 
respond by waging his law6 that he did not owe any money. For those debts evidenced in 
writing, the action of ‘debt sur obligation’ was available, and by the long eighteenth 
century, this became the most common way to bring an action for the repayment of a 
debt.7 Slade’s Case arose from shortcomings in the law concerning the recovery of a debt 
on an obligation; the option for the defendant to wage his law exposed the process to 
abuse by deceitful oath-helpers,8 furthermore, executors could not wage the law of the 
deceased and so death resulted in the debt being unrecoverable. Assumpsit was seen as 
a way of avoiding these shortcomings,9 and so from the sixteenth century, began to be 
used as a means of recovering debt. The question in Slade’s Case concerned whether this 
was a permissible cause of action and it was held that it was. The outcome was that by 
the beginning of the long eighteenth century, claims in contract law were pursued 
through the action of assumpsit, which was divided between breach of covenant, ‘special 
assumpsit’ and the recovery of a debt, ‘indebitatus assumpsit’. This change in procedure 
was to become increasingly important to assist with the growing number of commercial 
                                                          
3 A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1975) 6  
4 The central courts refer to those of the King’s Bench and Common Pleas  
5 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, Fourth Ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2011) 
320 
6 In a wager of law, a defendant swore on oath that he was not liable; this was then supported by a fixed 
number of persons who swore their belief in the truth of the defendant’s oath. It was intended that this 
would compensate for the lack of written evidence   
7 Baker (n5) 324 
8 Oath-helpers being those persons brought by the defendant to swear to their belief in his oath. 
9 Baker (n5) 342 
3 
 
contracts as the long eighteenth century progressed, and England transitioned from a 
nation of agriculture to industry.  
 
Prior to 1760, Britain was an agricultural nation. 90 per cent of the population of Britain 
was engaged in agriculture in 1688, but by 1760, this figure had fallen to under 50 per 
cent.10 This was the year that saw the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.11 Towns 
such as Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, and Birmingham grew as new industries were 
created in cotton, steel, coal, and shipbuilding.12 This Revolution was assisted by 
improvements in transport; Turnpike trusts were created to maintain roads whilst 
George Stephenson tested the first steam locomotive, The Rocket, in 1829, which was the 
first step towards the eventual creation of the railways. Despite the sharp population 
increase in major cities as a consequence of greater job prospects and higher wages, 
industrialisation was not welcomed by everyone. The Swing Riots in 1830 saw 
agricultural workers destroy threshing machines over their dissatisfaction at the 
machines replacing manual labourers. Indeed, the transition from agriculture to industry 
was tumultuous, as the period from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution to the end 
of the long eighteenth century saw discontent in the form of food riots, notably in 1766 
and 1791, as poor harvests increased wheat prices. Alongside this, rapid industrialisation 
meant that social welfare had yet to catch up, and so housing and sanitation in cities were 
poor,13 whilst this period also saw the evolution of workhouses; in 1783 over £2 million 
                                                          
10 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1979) 24 
11 ibid 224 
12 R. Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century, (Penguin Books, London: 1990) 314 
13 M. D. George, London Life in the Eighteenth Century, (Peregrine Books, Middlesex: 1985) 111 
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was paid annually for maintenance of the poor in England and Wales.14 The image of 
industrial Britain in the long eighteenth century, then, with historic roots in agriculture 
but emerging power in industry, is thus perhaps typified by William Blake in his 1804 
poem, Jerusalem,15 in which ‘England’s pleasant pastures’16 are juxtaposed in the 
following stanza with the (newly established) ‘dark Satanic Mills’.17  
 
Greater commercialisation saw a concurrent change not only in the law concerning 
assumpsit, but also in the formulation of new rules of contracting. The doctrine of caveat 
emptor ‘gained a foothold…[alongside] freedom of enterprise’18 during this period, whilst 
the promissory note arose alongside the newly emerging credit economy. Originating 
from a goldsmith’s note, it became necessary in the eighteenth century for merchants to 
have the ability to transfer the note to third parties whilst retaining its validity; in this 
way, the notes could be used as currency.19 Thus, the goldsmith’s note evolved to include 
on the receipt a promise to pay, and it is from this that the promissory note came into 
being. It is Lord Mansfield who has traditionally been credited with formulating much of 
the commercial law that evolved in this era,20 driven by pressure from merchants to 
establish clear rules for contracting in new industries, such as railways. The speed with 
which industrialisation took place often meant huge sums were at stake for contracting 
                                                          
14 Anon, Abstract of the Returns made by the Overseers of the Poor, in Pursuance of An Act; passed in the 
Twenty-Sixth Year of His Present Majesty’s Reign, intituled “An Act for obliging Overseers of the Poor to 
make Returns upon Oath to certain Questions specified therein, relative to the State of the Poor”, (1787) 
309  
15 W. Blake, Jerusalem, (1804)  
16 ibid Line 4 
17 ibid Line 8  
18 Atiyah (n10) 179 
19 Atiyah (n10) 154 
20 Baker (n5) 351 
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parties seeking maximum gain from new ventures; ‘risks were concentrated and not 
spread’21 and thus clear rules were required to protect individual financial interests but 
also to protect against any consequent losses triggered by a failed commercial enterprise. 
The most notable failure in this period in which this triggering effect was apparent, was 
in the burst of the South Sea Bubble in 1720. Founded in 1711, the South Sea Company 
was created to trade with South America. The Company was formed at the height of 
Britain’s colonial power. Despite losing colonies in North America in the War of 
Independence in 1783, Britain’s Empire incorporated land across Europe, Africa, 
Australasia, and Asia. The initial success that the South Sea Company experienced did 
not last; in 1720 the Company took over the national debt, and this, in conjunction with 
the directors’ unscrupulous representation of company profits, saw the inflation of stock 
prices, followed by an inevitable collapse. A key figure in overcoming this crisis was Sir 
Robert Walpole,22 who was consequently given the position of First Lord of the Treasury; 
as a result, by 1721 Britain had its first Prime Minister.  
 
It was not only in the creation of this new role that British politics was to change in the 
long eighteenth century. The party-political system too was to evolve concurrently with 
growing industrialisation which had created new commercial interests and new social 
groups with a growing desire to influence policy-making. Politically, a two-party system 
existed throughout the long eighteenth century, divided between the Whigs and the 
Tories. The origins of these two parties was founded in religion. The Whigs supported 
                                                          
21 Atiyah (n10) 229 
22 See further J. H. Plumb, England in the Eighteenth Century, (Penguin Books, London: 1990) 59 
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the replacement of the Catholic King James in 1688, and protested Protestant 
persecution.23 Their ideology of political power vesting in the people was supported by 
Lockean social contract theory, which provided that the power of a monarch derived 
from a contract with his people. Therefore, should a monarch abandon the protection of 
his people and break this contract, rebellion was justified;24 the Whigs thus supported 
the Glorious Revolution and the ousting of the Catholic King. The Tories, on the other 
hand, were the traditional supporters of monarchy and the established church25 and had 
supported the Catholic King James II. Their belief in the supremacy of monarchy aligned 
much more with a Hobbesian ideology of the surrendering of each man’s individual will 
to a sovereign; only in this way could man achieve true freedom. These conflicting beliefs 
concerning the role of monarchy and where power ought to be vested resulted in the 
respective parties drawing support from differing social classes. The Whigs attracted 
‘new monied interests’26 whilst the Tories traditionally drew support from local squires. 
Indeed, it was the Whigs, with their liberal notion of power deriving from the people, 
who pushed for the reform of the electoral system, which was to culminate in the 1832 
Reform Act.27  
 
It is important at this juncture to note that the notion of ‘class’ in the long eighteenth 
century is something that has been formed retrospectively. Indeed, the notion of a 
                                                          
23 F. O’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century: British Political and Social History 1688-1832, (Arnold, 
London: 1997) 45  
24 Atiyah (n10) 48 
25 O’Gorman (n23) 45 
26 ibid 48 
27 2 & 3 Wm IV c45 
7 
 
distinct system, of a working, a middle, and an upper class, did not exist for those in the 
eighteenth century, and, as argued by E. P. Thompson, this classification only came about 
following the industrial revolution.28 It is during this period of ‘class-consciousness’29 
that we see the emergence of the ‘middling sort’ or what we would deem today to be the 
middle class. This group grew from the new industries which emerged as a consequence 
of industrialisation, as the population moved away from poorer-paid agricultural work 
towards towns, where greater opportunities and wealth emerged. The middling sort 
incorporated professions such as artisans, shop keepers, and civil servants.30 The 
formation of these new social groups, with their own distinct interests, drove the desire 
for political reform in the long eighteenth century from a system in which only those 
with a landed interest could vote.31 Groups such as the Birmingham Political Union (BPU) 
petitioned for the widening of the franchise, and, influenced by writers such as Thomas 
Paine, speakers such as Robert Macaulay travelled the country postulating the view that 
it was not only the landed aristocracy who ought to have a say in politics. Mass political 
movements such as the BPU were aided in their pursuit by the very industrialisation that 
also created the professions from which they drew their support. The colour printing 
press invented in 1710 allowed for the production of pamphlets which could be 
distributed to educate a wider audience. Indeed, pamphlets were not only used for the 
promotion of political reform, but were also used to describe legal proceedings. For those 
pursuing breach of promise actions, it was common for pamphlets to be produced which 
                                                          
28 E. P. Thompson, ‘Eighteenth Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?’, (1978) 3:2 Social 
History 133, 134  
29 ibid 149  
30 M.R. Hunt, The Middling Sort: Commerce, Gender, and the Family in England 1680-1780, (University of 
California Press, London: 1996), 39 
31 O’Gorman (n23) 360  
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depicted the trial as well as the background of the parties to it. From the beginning of the 
eighteenth century then, there thus emerged the means by which to communicate 
political views, moral teachings, and even legal proceedings, to the masses, cheaply.  
 
Yet moral teachings were also promoted heavily in popular culture. The works of Defoe 
in novels such as Moll Flanders32 and Roxana33 warned against the temptations of 
prostitution, whilst engravings by Hogarth in The Harlots Progress34 and Industry and 
Idleness35 portrayed the destructive outcome of a life of vice. As the period progressed, it 
is clear that this moral agenda pursued most ardently after the accession of William III 
to the throne, conflicted with the rise of prostitution in London, and the seeming 
acceptance of it in society; prostitutes were often the muse of artists at this time, and 
indeed, Joshua Reynolds painted the courtesan Kitty Fisher on a number of occasions. 
Added to this, the fact that these working women often performed on stage at Covent 
Garden elevated them to something of a celebrity status, and this was only cemented by 
publications such as Harris’s List which promoted the women and their prices. As noted 
by Atiyah, during this period, ‘the law of contract was being profoundly influenced by 
moral ideals’;36 the civil law concerning prostitution thus had to compete with a society 
that increasingly saw the profession as an incidence of everyday life. However, this social 
shift was not isolated to prostitution. The rise of sensibility in literature, perhaps typified 
                                                          
32 D. Defoe, Moll Flanders, (William Rufus Chetwood, London: 1722)  
33 D. Defoe, Roxana; or A Fortunate Mistress, (T. Warner, London: 1724)  
34 W. Hogarth, The Harlots Progress, (1733)  
35 W. Hogarth, Industry and Idleness, (1747)  
36 Atiyah (n10) 147 
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by the works of Samuel Richardson, saw a move towards a ‘emotional’37 notion of 
marriage. This social consideration conflicted with the protections imposed by the civil 
law towards ensuring that wealth was maintained within the appropriate channels 
through marriage, and so the law thus had to strike a balance between upholding 
contractual principles and reflecting emerging social ideals. Alongside this, women 
continued to be viewed as homemakers and subservient to their husbands, and this was 
reflected in their legal status upon marriage, whereupon their legal rights were 
subsumed into those of their husband. Yet for those left widowed, the law permitted 
them the same rights as men. It is perhaps for this disruption of established social norms, 
that depictions of widows in eighteenth century literature carried negative 
connotations.38   
   
A further reflection of how women were viewed in the long eighteenth century is that 
their legal position upon marriage was akin to that of a child. Whilst an infant39 was 
generally unable to contract, he could do so should the contract be one for necessaries. 
‘Necessary’ items were also the only goods for which a married woman could contract. 
Furthermore, an infant could enter an apprenticeship contract, provided he obtained 
permission from his father or guardian. Towards the end of the long eighteenth century, 
with industrialisation, greater apprenticeship opportunities emerged;40 these ranged 
                                                          
37 L. Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London: 
1979) 239 
38 See Lady Booby in H. Fielding, Joseph Andrews, (A Millar, London: 1742); Clara Lennox in M. Lee, 
Clara Lennox, (J. Adlard, London: 1797); and Mrs Jervis in D. Defoe, Moll Flanders, (William Rufus 
Chetwood, London: 1722)  
39 At this time, the age of majority was twenty-one 
40 J. H. Plumb, England in the Eighteenth Century, (Penguin Books, London: 1990) 87 
10 
 
from the lowly climbing-boy apprentice – a profession so inherently dangerous that 
conversely to tradition, the master would often pay the family of the apprentice to take 
the child – to opportunities with apothecaries, lawyers, and bankers. Whilst children 
were by no means afforded the same level of rights as today, the long eighteenth century 
saw a move towards greater protection for those children undertaking apprenticeships.  
 
Given this considerable social change, the period of the long eighteenth century therefore 
makes for an equally insightful study of legal history. As stated by Colley, the period 
‘contains so much that was important and paradoxical at the same time’,41 and it is for 
this reason that this is the chosen period of study for this thesis. The response of the law 
to these changes in society is explicitly apparent in judgments concerning the voidability 
of contracts, which refer to the public policy factors which were taken into consideration, 
but what has received less attention is the general social context in which the law was 
operating.42 By taking these two strands of history simultaneously, this thesis will 
provide an original contribution to the law of void contracts, suggesting that a combined 
legal and social history methodology can assist in further understanding the rationale of 
the law in rendering certain contracts to be void or voidable.  
 
 
                                                          
41 L. Colley, ‘The Politics of Eighteenth Century British History’, (1986) 25 Journal of British Studies 359, 
360 
42 ibid 361  
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1.2 VOID(ABLE) CONTRACTS 
When speaking of factors which ‘defeat contractual liability’43 the distinction is drawn 
between a contract which is rendered completely void (void ab initio) and is thus treated 
by the law as if it has never existed, and one which is rendered voidable. The difference 
is that this latter classification of contract has the potential to be affirmed or invalidated 
by one of the parties to it. Common factors which defeat contractual liability are: the 
incapacity of the parties, mistake by one or both parties as to the nature or subject matter 
of the contract, duress or undue influence, and a contract that has at its heart an illegal 
purpose. Within these factors, a contract will be declared void if the operation of it is 
made an impossibility. This will be so where the contract is for an illegal purpose, or 
where the law prohibits it as being contrary to public policy. On the other hand, as 
mentioned, a voidable contract can be valid if it is ratified by one contracting party, but 
this same actor also has the potential to avoid the contract. This will be the case when 
the contract was entered with a minor, or a person suffering mental incapacity, or it has 
been entered under duress. Occasionally, as in the area of mistake, it is not possible to 
state generally that contracts invalidated for this reason will be void or voidable, as the 
‘voidability’ is dependent upon the nature of the mistake itself. For instance, a mutual 
mistake has the potential to be valid if, despite the crossed purposes, the contract can still 
be interpreted and executed as intended. In contrast, regarding common mistake, the 
mistake is usually so fundamental to the nature of the contract that it will be declared 
void.  
                                                          
43 J. Beatson, A. Burrows & J. Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract 29th Ed., (Oxford University Press, 




These general principles being said, the policy of the law in finding contracts to be void 
or voidable has been said to promote one of two opposing motivations.44 The law seeks 
either to protect contracting parties, as is the case concerning infants and those entering 
a contract under duress, or it controls persons or behaviour, such as the practice of 
prostitution within the area of illegality. Just as E. P. Thompson postulated an assessment 
of social history ‘from below’ as a means of determining exactly how the ordinary 
population, as distinct from the landed classes, conducted their lives and reacted to social 
changes, this thesis will address void(able) contracts which are deemed ‘personal’ in 
nature. Popular perception would perhaps categorise contract law as a purely 
commercial discipline, concerned with the sale of goods, or regulating the conduct of 
corporations, for instance. However, less attention is given to the everyday instances of 
contract. This thesis will attempt to give light to these contractual uses and will focus on 
contracts concerning marriage, prostitution, and the individual contractual actors of 
women and children. In this way, by placing legal principles in their social context, the 
thesis explores how the law impacted everyday contractual parties and challenges the 
extent to which the motivations of the law to protect or control held true. 
 
Public policy is cited repeatedly by the judges as the reasoning as to why contracts were 
rendered void or deemed to be voidable when analysing the cases across the three 
substantive areas covered in this thesis. It is this which makes this area of study 
                                                          
44 ‘The civil law afforded…both a set of defences…and those rules of the game’ in E. P. Thompson, 
‘Eighteenth English Society: Class Struggle without Class?’, (1978) 3:2 Social History 133, 144  
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particularly necessary; in those contracts discussed above, which are rendered void for 
mistake, or voidable for misrepresentation, the basis of this is that these contracts 
undermine the will of the parties. In other words, such agreements are not upheld as 
they are not entered freely and with full knowledge of the facts. Conversely, in the chosen 
areas of study for this thesis, the voidability of these contracts cannot be explained in this 
way. Instead, they reflect policy choices. Consequently, a thorough analysis of this legal 
reasoning cannot be undertaken without an understanding of what social norms the law 
was reacting to in citing public policy as the rationale for rendering these contracts as 
void or voidable, and to this end one cannot present an exploration of the law in isolation 
of its social context. This is all the more necessary in order to accurately understand how 
ordinary people utilised contract in their everyday lives, and how the law regulated this 
activity. It cannot truly be said that persons and behaviour were either controlled or 
protected through a law that cited public policy as its rationale for rendering such 
contracts as void, without consideration being given to the social context – and thus the 
‘public’ sphere – in which these judgments were made. For this reason, this thesis will 
take an original approach to address the extent of the control-protection agenda within 
the area of void and voidable contracts by pursuing an interdisciplinary analysis of the 
law that combines both law and social history.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
It is taken as trite that the law seeks either to control or to protect individuals and 
behaviour. It is further undisputed that law is responsive to society and changing social 
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norms, and yet despite this, legal and social history continue to be treated as distinct 
disciplines. This thesis argues that one cannot fully understand the motivations of the 
law without also considering the social context in which these rules were operating. The 
research question of this thesis is to question why the law developed to render certain 
contracts as void or voidable. In order to fully address this, a secondary question will be 
posed that determines the extent to which the control-protection agenda can be seen as 
a rigid interpretation of the motivations of the law in this area. The originality of the 
thesis lies in dispelling with common misconceptions regarding the control-protection 
agenda of the law in the area of void and voidable contracts, by analysing the law in 
concurrence with social history. In this way, the law is placed in its social context and 
this in turn challenges the binary control-protection categorisation that a purely legal 
analysis of the law has produced. Ultimately, throughout this thesis it is demonstrated 
that greater interaction between law and social history would enhance our 
understanding of legal rules.  
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
It has been said that the methodology of a legal historian addresses either the ‘internal 
(essentially legal or doctrinal) developments’45 concerning the law, or instead focuses on 
how the law is influenced by ‘external factors’.46 What is also clear, however, is that short 
                                                          
45 A. Musson and C. Stebbings, Making Legal History: Approaches and Methodologies, (Cambridge 




of this distinction, there is no ‘right’ way to ‘do’ legal history.47 Consequently, adopting 
the latter approach, this thesis employs an interdisciplinary methodology, which 
attempts to bridge the gap between traditional legal doctrine and social history. 
 
1.4.1 Legal Methodology 
The traditional methodology of legal doctrine is hermeneutic; cases are read and analysed 
with the interpretation, and fitting this into the wider sphere of the law, being the overall 
aim of an academic lawyer.48 This methodology is employed within this thesis to explain 
the legal principles surrounding the voidability of contracts. A range of primary sources 
will be accessed including case law and statute, whilst academic journal articles and 
monographs shall consist of the secondary sources for use in this thesis. By analysing 
these sources, the legal rules concerning void and voidable contracts in the long 
eighteenth century will be stated. Only with this solid foundation of an understanding of 
the law can the thesis then begin to answer the research question to determine the extent 
to which the control-protection interests explicitly cited in the case law, held true. 
However, in order to do this effectively, the hermeneutic methodology is limited; it does 
not tell us why such a law is valid. The aim of this thesis is to pose this very question, in 
order to determine why certain rules concerning the voidability of contracts existed, and 
to this extent this thesis can be said to reflect what Van Hoecke deems an ‘explanatory’49 
discipline. The explanatory methodology derives from an analysis of social history; it is 
                                                          
47 J. Baker, ‘Reflections on ‘doing’ legal history’, in A. Musson and C. Stebbings, Making Legal History: 
Approaches and Methodologies, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2012) 7 
48 M. Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research: Which kind of Method for What kind of Discipline? 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2011) 4 
49 ibid 8  
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evident that an effective explanatory approach must take into account other academic 
disciplines,50 and it is for this reason that the question of the validity of contracts is 
answered alongside an exploration of socio-historical factors.  
 
1.4.2 Historical Methodology 
Historical method consists of a three-stage process of evaluation; firstly, the source must 
be located,51 secondly, it must be analysed,52 and finally, it must be interpreted.53 The 
effectiveness of individual sources will be discussed in detail below, and so turning firstly 
to the effective analysis of a source, according to Howell and Prevenier, this addresses 
the ‘“genealogy of the document’,54 the ‘“genesis” of the document’,55 and the 
‘originality’56 of the source. In other words, it must be questioned if the source was an 
original (‘genealogy’), where it was produced (‘genesis’), and whether the document 
consisted of the first instance of such a source (‘originality’). The interpretation of the 
source can be understood by comparing the document to other sources; for the purpose 
of this thesis, this comparison will be undertaken alongside not only other historical 
sources but also legal principles, therein consisting of the interdisciplinary methodology 
to the thesis.   
                                                          
50 See M. Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research: Which kind of Method for What kind of 
Discipline? (Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2011) 8 – ‘in order to simply understand law…one needs this law-
in-context approach’ 
51 M. Howell and W. Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods, (Cornell 
University Press, New York: 2001) 2 
52 ibid 
53 ibid  
54 ibid 61 
55 ibid 62 




Regarding locating the source, Marwick championed what he deemed ‘documents of 
record’57 over and above reliance on mere ‘records’.58 The former includes sources such 
as Acts of Parliament and treaties, whilst the latter refers to court transcripts and 
pamphlets. Both categories have been included in this thesis. Whilst ‘documents of 
record’ reveal the unbiased fact of how the law was, it is in the court records and the 
explanatory pamphlets that the subjectivity is revealed and thus we can understand why 
the law came to be. It is argued here that these ‘record’ sources are indeed written under 
the subjectivity of the writer, but this informs us of their ideals and thus the social norms 
of the time. A combination of legal fact and an understanding of social norms is integral 
to answering the research question of this thesis as to the motivations of the law 
surrounding void contracts. Beyond these legal sources, the thesis relies significantly on 
visual primary sources 59 as well as written sources such as literary texts and newspapers. 
There is a danger that historians view novels in a solely ‘illustrative way’,60 but literature 
also embodies a level of subjectivity; as stated by Reinfandt, ‘language is constitutive of 
human dealings with reality’.61 Thus, this thesis employs the use of literary sources such 
as poetry, pamphlets, and novels, not only for explanatory purposes, but also in order to 
further understand how social norms were interpreted by those in society. This is 
                                                          
57 A. Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language, (Palgrave, Houndmills: 2001) 
26-7 cited in S. Barber and C. M. Peniston-Bird, History Beyond the Text, (Routledge, London: 2013) 2 
58 ibid 
59 ‘Visual primary sources’ includes sources such as fine art, photographs and cartoons 
60 J. Reid, ‘Novels’ in M. Dobson and B. Ziemann, Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts 
from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History, (Routledge, London: 2009) 164 
61 C. Reinfandt, ‘Reading texts after the linguistic turn: approaches from literary studies and their 
implications’ in M. Dobson and B. Ziemann, Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History, (Routledge, London: 2009) 46  
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particularly evident in the moral teachings of novels by Defoe and the poetry of 
Rochester. Newspapers, on the other hand, much like today, inform us not only of factual 
events but also reveal much about the political, social, and moral stance62 of the journalist 
as well as the publication in which it is printed. It is for this reason that the thesis 
references newspaper articles; in this way it is possible to understand not only the effect 
of the law, but how it was received. Regarding artwork, Barber and Peniston-Bird 
postulate that ‘all media are extensions of human expression’63 but it is in the delivery of 
these, in the circumstances surrounding their publication, that the ‘implicit elements of 
human expression’64 are apparent. By using visual primary sources, the historian can 
greater understand not only the subject-matter of the source itself, but an examination 
of the timing and circumstances surrounding its release can often tell us more of the 
context in which it was published.65 Thus, the importance of visual primary sources, 
extends far beyond the subject-matter that they depict. It is for this reason, that a range 
of visual primary sources have been included in this thesis; they assist not only in 
illustrating a specific moment in time, but can also reveal the social context of the period 
and they thus assist the research question of this thesis to question why the law 
developed as it did regarding void and voidable contracts.  
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1.4.3 Justifications for the Interdisciplinary Method 
In this thesis, then, the methodology is one which combines ‘lawyers’ legal history with 
social history. Lawyers legal history has traditionally disregarded a layman’s experience 
of the law, confining this to the realm of social history, and has focused instead on a 
history that ‘uncritically celebrated the common law… emphasized continuity and de-
emphasized change… privileged early history and “origins” over modern history and 
effects” [and] judged legal success in terms of narrow, self-serving technical 
categories’.66 The resultant shortcomings of this legal historical approach are stated by 
Van Hoecke, ‘legal doctrine [is] too descriptive, too autopoietic, without taking the 
context of the law sufficiently into account’.67 It is submitted in agreement that an 
analysis of the law that employs only one of these traditional methodologies restricts the 
conclusions that one can reach, it forces the historian – and by extension the reader – to 
view the law through a narrow perspective; a rethinking of traditional methodologies is 
required. A potential alternative, as employed throughout this thesis, is that which 
combines social history and legal doctrine. The benefit of this ‘cross-fertilization’68 
methodology is that legal principles are opened to a much broader way of thinking and 
the legal historian can understand the ‘practical as well as theoretical operation of the 
law’.69 Primary historical sources such as literature, artwork and pamphlets provide the 
‘colour’ alongside legal judgments and statutory provisions to ultimately bring a period 
                                                          
66 D. Sugarman, ‘From Legal Biography to Legal Life Writing: Broadening Conceptions of Legal History 
and Socio-legal Scholarship’, in L. Mulcahy and D. Sugarman, Legal Life Writing: Marginalized Subjects 
and Sources, (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford: 2013) 11 
67 Van Hoecke (n48) 3 
68 D. Sugarman, ‘Promoting Dialogue Between History and Socio-legal Studies: the Contribution of 
Christopher W. Brooks and the ‘Legal Turn’ in Early Modern English History’, 2017 44 Journal of Law 
and Society 37, 41 
69 Musson and Stebbings (n45) 5 
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of legal history to life. The product of placing the law within this social context is that 
common notions regarding the motivations and subsequent impact of the law can be 
questioned and in some cases dispelled almost entirely; ‘what has frequently been 
surmised may be little more than a dusty cliché’.70 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The use of this interdisciplinary approach is not without complication. As a legal scholar, 
handling historical sources correctly was a challenge and has required an understanding 
of historical methodology. In order to counter this, a range of literature addressing 
varying approaches to historical methodology have been accessed. Leading from this, 
most pressing was striking the correct balance between social and legal history and 
producing a piece which combined these two disciplines equally. In order to do this, 
again, a wide range of historical sources have been used; only with this breadth of 
knowledge could common themes be drawn between eighteenth century social norms 
and the judgments concerning void and voidable contracts. Redrafting chapters as 
further knowledge was gained greatly enhanced the ability of the present author to 
provide an account structured in this way, giving equal treatment to both law and history.  
 
Within this combined methodology, a further difficulty was providing an unbiased 
account of social history. This has been overcome by drawing on information from a 
                                                          
70 ibid 42 
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range of historians as well as relying significantly on primary sources to illustrate 
arguments. This has meant that areas which would perhaps lend themselves to a 
particular school of thought, for instance, one could easily approach the subject of 
married women from a feminist perspective, have not been analysed in this way. This 
thesis seeks a balanced interpretation of both history and the law. R. W. Ireland posited 
that ‘as lawyers, we often lose the people behind the law, the circumstances and 
personalities in the intensely personal dramas’;71 ‘cross-fertilization’ allows us to reclaim 
the people behind the law and gives light to the personal dramas that a purely legal 
historical approach has overlooked. In order to do this effectively, this thesis aims to 
present both disciplines in an unbiased way.  
 
1.6 SCOPE OF THESIS 
The thesis is divided into three distinct areas concerning the ‘voidability’ of contracts: 
illegality, immorality, and incapacity.  
Following the introduction contained in Chapter One, Chapters Two and Three address 
illegality. Given the emphasis of this thesis on ‘personal’ contracts, the focus here will be 
on contracts concerning marriage rights. Chapter Two will deal with contracts for the 
procurement of marriage. Here, restraint of marriage and marriage brokerage will be 
discussed. The following chapter will present the other side of the coin; Chapter Three 
turns to contracts concerning the breakdown of marital relations, notably breach of 
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promise actions and separation agreements. Breach of promise actions have been 
included in this thesis as a point of comparison to the voidability of restraint of marriage 
contracts in the preceding chapter. It will be questioned why breach of promise was 
permitted whilst restraint of marriage was not.  
 
An analysis of contracts rendered void for immorality will then be undertaken in Chapter 
Four. The sale of goods to a prostitute, and the rent of premises, will be discussed 
alongside a demonstration of the frequency of the practice of prostitution in the long 
eighteenth century. An original contribution is made here as the thesis addresses 
prostitution from a civil law perspective, this is contrary to the issue typically being 
approached within the realm of criminal law.72  
 
The final substantive topic is discussed in Chapters Five and Six in which incapacity is 
addressed. Chapter Five focuses on married women and widows. It is demonstrated how 
social norms circumvented the operation of coverture. The lot of married women is then 
compared to that of widows, who, it is argued, disrupted the eighteenth century ideal of 
a male-dependent woman and thus further weakened the notion of women in the long 
eighteenth century lacking any legal autonomy. The contractual capacity of infants is 
explored in the final substantive chapter of the thesis. In Chapter Six, contracts for the 
                                                          
72 See for instance, T. Henderson, Disorderly Women in Eighteenth Century London: Prostitution and 
Control in the Metropolis 1730 – 1830, (Addison Wesley Longman, New York: 1999); H. Self, Prostitution, 
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sale of goods, and ‘necessaries’ are first analysed and the balance between protecting the 
infant and protecting the interests of the traders with whom they contracted is 
determined. Apprenticeship contracts are then discussed, with an emphasis on the 
development of statutory protections for both apprentice and master.  
 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis and summarises the main arguments of each chapter. 
The case will be made for a rethinking of the treatment of legal principles in isolation of 
the social context. It will be demonstrated that addressing both the law and social history 
concurrently presents a different understanding of the motivations of the law, and, 
regarding the voidability of contracts, ultimately disrupts the rigid control-protection 
analysis that has been so ardently postulated.   
 





Illegality: Marriage Rights I 
‘I have made you a woman of fashion, of fortune, of rank; in short, I have made you my 
wife’ – Sir Peter Teazle, Act II, Scene II, School for Scandal 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will address contracts rendered void for illegality. Within this, the focus will 
be on contracts concerning marriage rights; the control and protection interests of the 
law are significantly apparent here and the imposition of the law on private relationships 
is an overarching theme of this thesis. This theme will be explored further in later 
chapters pertaining to immorality and incapacity. To begin, chapter one will address 
contracts relating to the procurement of marriage; specifically, marriage brokerage 
contracts and contracts in restraint of marriage.  
 
Prior to any legal discussion, it is important for the reader to understand the significance 
of marriage in the long eighteenth century. Motivations to secure a desirable match 
stretched beyond merely possessing similar interests and a personal connection; rather 
instead, particularly for those from wealthier families, marriage was seen as a means for 
both social and economic progression, as evidenced in the above quote taken from the 
1777 play, School for Scandal. The ability to attach your family name to one of greater 
social standing carried with it certain social and economic benefits, of which parents of 
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potential spouses were only too aware. The London Season played a key role in assisting 
in finding a suitably wealthy spouse for those from the upper classes, as shall be 
demonstrated. Yet in the contracting landscape of the long eighteenth century the notion 
of class was markedly different, there was little of a notable class system such as we 
would recognise today. Instead of the lower, middle, and upper distinctions, there was a 
simple separation between those of the landed class and gentry and those of the working 
class, or to put it more bluntly, persons who possessed wealth and assets and persons 
who did not. Only as we begin to move into the latter half of the long eighteenth century 
and into an era of greater trade and industry does what we would deem today to be the 
middle class emerge. The creation of the ‘middling sort’ arose as a consequence of greater 
international commerce and the concurrent population shift away from the country and 
into the cities as new industry was created. Just who constituted this new class of person 
will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
With this social context in mind, in this chapter an attempt will be made to determine 
exactly why contracts relating to the procurement of marriage were held to be void; it 
will be determined whether the law sought to protect individuals and their interests, or 







2.2 FORMALITIES OF MARRIAGE 
In the long eighteenth century, the formalities of marriage were grounded in consent; 
this had to be given in the present tense but there was no requirement of consummation 
or even a formal church ceremony.73 People typically married in their early twenties,74 
with the marriage itself being entered into ‘at the church door’.75 Much like today, there 
was an exchanging of rings, but there was the added formality of the receival of the dowry 
before the wedding party entered the church to hear mass. A dowry was a sum of money 
given by the father of the bride to his new son-in-law; the size of this gift was relative to 
the wealth of the bride’s family and the payment was intended to assist the new couple 
as they embarked on their new life together. Given the relationship between the size of 
the dowry and the wealth of the family of the bride, women from families of great fortune 
were the most aspirational matches for young men. The provision of a dowry and what 
a wife received in reciprocity will be discussed further in the fifth chapter of this thesis 
concerning women’s contractual capacity.  
 
As well as the requirement of a dowry, for a woman, perhaps the most significant impact 
of marriage was that her legal rights were subsumed into those of her husband. Again, 
chapter five of this thesis will explore this in greater depth, but for now, it is important 
to note that the notion of a husband and wife joining to become one was reflected in the 
marriage ceremony itself. The Book of Common Prayer in 1662 stated that, ‘for this cause 
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shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife; and they two 
shall be one flesh’.76 Thus, a husband effectively became the guardian of his wife, 
permitted even to inflict corporal punishment on her.77 The words of the marriage 
ceremony also had to take place in public, and there was an additional requirement that 
banns were called in church each week for three weeks before the marriage was due to 
take place. However, despite these customs, marriage without these formalities 
continued to take place.  
 
2.2.1 Clandestine Marriage 
A clandestine marriage took place outside of the traditional practices associated with 
marriage, as noted above; the clandestine nature came from the fact that these 
ceremonies took place outside of the parish of the couple and without the traditional 
reading of banns. These marriages were presided over by an ordained vicar, and despite 
the Marriage Duty Act78 of 1695 introducing penalties against those clergymen caught 
conducting such a ceremony, they continued to grow in popularity throughout the 
eighteenth century. To state that those who entered into clandestine marriage did so as 
a means of avoiding parents, or as a consequence of unwanted pregnancy, is too broad a 
generalisation, as such motivations are ‘not borne out by the facts’.79 There were a myriad 
of reasons as to why couples opted for a clandestine marriage, with ceremonies 
conducted in rural towns differing in their motivations from those in larger industrial 
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cities, and particularly in the capital. Conflicting arguments have been advanced as to the 
reason behind the spike in clandestine marriage in the eighteenth century, from couples 
wishing to avoid the public humiliation that came with a public wedding, to being unable 
to marry due to lack of parental consent.80  
 
Clandestine marriage grew in popularity throughout the eighteenth century despite the 
best intentions of the law in attempting to quash such practices with the introduction of 
the Marriage Duty Act. Short of enduring the impracticality of crossing the border and 
marrying in Scotland at places such as Gretna Green, the most notorious venue in 
England for these weddings to occur was that of the Fleet Prison in London. Ceremonies 
continued here even after 1695 and contributed to the continuing popularity of 
clandestine marriages given that as a prison, and thus private property, the Fleet did not 
fall under the jurisdiction of the 1695 Act, and so clergymen could operate relatively free 
from judicial interference. It was not until 171281 that fines were imposed on prison 
keepers for permitting clandestine marriages to take place within prison grounds, but 
even then, the effectiveness of this legislation is dubious given that marriage conducted 
within and around the Fleet continued until the enactment of the Marriage Act82 in 1754. 
Despite the relatively low cost, those who married at the Fleet were not only from the 
lower classes of society. A combination of factors, including parental disapproval, the 
desire for privacy, ease and speed of the ceremony and the increase in those who did not 
identify with a specific religion, it is argued here, would have resulted in clandestine 
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marriage appealing to a cross-section of society. Indeed, Henry Fox who petitioned so 
ardently against the introduction of the Marriage Act in 1754 had been married 
clandestinely himself to Georgiana Caroline Lennox, the daughter of the Duke of 
Richmond, in 1744 as her parents had disapproved of the match. Further to this, whilst 
the ceremony itself cost very little, there was a range of facilities available at the prison 
and so provision of entertainment may also have been a contributing factor as to why 
couples opted to be married at the Fleet. Figure 1 portrays the renowned engraving by 
M. Cooper from 1747, depicting a caricature of a Fleet marriage, and the entertainments 






So popular were the services available at the Fleet that ceremonies quickly spread beyond 
the prison walls; soon, marriages were even being conducted in public houses, in 
designated rooms called ‘the chapel’.83 This is not to say that Fleet marriages were not 
without their difficulties, rather quite the opposite; despite the appeal of such marriages 
it is somewhat ironic that the very same clandestine nature which enhanced their appeal 
also came to be one of the greatest weaknesses of this marriage ceremony. The lack of 
strict guidelines surrounding maintaining a register and the ability to marry without 
notice resulted in clandestine marriages being open to abuse.  
 
Perhaps the greatest abusers of these ceremonies, however, were the couples themselves. 
To illustrate, in the case of Hill v Turner,84 the court was asked to decide upon the matter 
of an infant who was forced into a clandestine marriage after having been taken to the 
Fleet and plied with alcohol until intoxicated. The Lord Chancellor proclaimed his disdain 
for the case and notwithstanding his inability to reverse the decision of the ecclesiastical 
court in finding this to be a valid marriage, his Lordship nonetheless restrained the wife 
of the infant from bringing any further action for payment of alimony. It was this abuse 
of the marriage process that rendered parliamentary intervention necessary. This desire 
for reform was not sudden, however; there was a constant stream of legislation 
throughout the long eighteenth century, with a total of nine bills being presented to 
Parliament between 1689 and 1740 which aimed to prevent clandestine marriage. It was 
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not until 1753 however, that parliament successfully intervened in the enactment of the 
Marriage Act.   
 
The Passage of the Marriage Bill 
Despite earlier efforts for reform, the immediate impetus in 1753 resulted from the case 
of Cochran v Campbell in which the House of Lords were asked to decide upon the validity 
of a 30 year marriage which had been called into question due to the existence of a prior 
clandestine marriage.85 The dominant incentive seems to have been mounting 
frustration that such clandestine ceremonies had the ability to disrupt family life in such 
a way. The need to uphold the sanctity of marriage thus appears to have been a common 
driver in the need to regulate against clandestine marriage in 1753. Ultimately, the 
greatest assistance in determining just why these contracts warranted parliamentary 
regulation comes from an analysis of debates from both the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords throughout the passage of the Marriage Bill in 1753.  
 
The Bill introduced by Lord Hardwicke, and soon to be coined, ‘Hardwicke’s Act’, was 
given its first reading in Parliament on 19th March 1753. Unfortunately, little information 
regarding the initial debates survive and so instead, for an insight into the motivations 
for the Bill and the arguments surrounding it, we are forced to rely upon later readings, 
notably that of the 14th May and the 4th June, for which much more documentation 
survives and consequently from which much more information can be gleaned. Having 
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reviewed both reports, for those in support of the Bill, two key arguments emerge, these 
being that the Act would prevent abuses of marriage and also that it would prevent 
bigamy and legitimise children. Conversely, opponents of the Bill argued that the Act 
would discourage the poorer in society from marrying, and would also lead to an 
accumulation of wealth amongst the wealthier classes.  
 
The second reading took place on the 14th May and we can clearly see references to the 
immediate impetus for introducing the Bill in 1753. Attorney General Ryder, arguing in 
support, stated that, ‘sometimes a clandestine marriage is set up after a man’s death 
which was never heard of in his lifetime, and… his whole effects are carried away from 
his relations by the children of a woman whom he never acknowledged to be his wife’.86 
No doubt the case of Cochran v Campbell was present in the mind of the Attorney General 
when he delivered his speech, but this case was not isolated, and indeed accounts of 
hidden marriages resulting in the loss of property to unknown relatives were 
commonplace. In fact, such was the frequency of this, that although dismissing the appeal 
in Cochran, the House of Lords directly addressed Parliament and explicitly invited them 
to ‘bring in a Bill, for the better preventing of Clandestine Marriages’.87 Whilst it is easy 
to see this as the motivation for the introduction of the Bill in 1753, and of course, it was 
the instance that reignited the clamour for regulation in this area, there were numerous 
issues regarding clandestine marriage that had been prevalent throughout the century 
which accounted for the desire to legislate, and which came to the fore during the debates 
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in the House. One such issue was that of bigamy – whether intentional or not – which 
had been a consequence of clandestine marriages. Questions as to whether children born 
into a marriage where one parent had been previously married clandestinely raised 
issues regarding the legitimacy of the child. Of course, financial motivations are again 
apparent here; the courts were not willing to burden a parish with the upkeep of a single 
woman and her child should the birth be deemed illegitimate as a consequence of a 
previous marriage. As such, it was hoped that these practical issues would be remedied 
by the introduction of Hardwicke’s Act and would ‘put an end to all disputes about 
marriage or… legitimacy’.88  
 
Overarching all of the arguments in support of the Bill however, was the notion that 
clandestine marriage in general, which did not abide by the strict formalities of a 
traditional marriage, led to ‘the ruin of young persons and the distress of families’89 and 
was consequently an abuse of marriage. The desire to uphold the sanctity of marriage 
and to ensure that matches were controlled so as to be both socially and economically 
viable was a key consideration, and subsequently anything that could potentially disrupt 
this would be challenged. Some saw clandestine marriage, without the reading of banns 
and without an appropriate licence, as being an abuse of the formalities of a traditional 
ceremony also; the often quoted and colourful speech of Earl Hillsborough is perhaps 
best illustrative of this:  
                                                          




Does he think that the vulgar can believe that there is anything sacred in a ceremony performed 
in a little room of an ale house in the Fleet, and by a profligate clergyman whom they see all in 
rags, swearing like a trooper and haggling about what he is to have for his trouble, and half-drunk 
perhaps at the very time he is performing the ceremony?90  
Formalities aside, however, there was a greater concern that those from the wealthier 
classes may be naively seduced into a clandestine marriage and thus unintentionally 
forfeit their wealth, ‘we shall leave our young gentlemen of fortune, whilst underage, a 
prey to bawds and prostitutes, and our young ladies of fortune, whilst underage, a prey 
to sharpers and fortune hunters’.91 This financial loss was also alluded to by the Attorney 
General when he spoke of the ‘ruin of young persons’.92 It is interesting that there is a 
clear financial motivation amongst those in support of the Bill, which is perhaps not 
surprising given that marriage during the eighteenth century, for those of the upper 
classes, came with considerable financial considerations.93 The advancement of the 
family name and successive generations depended on wealth being allocated and 
maintained in the correct channels; clandestine marriage was an obvious disruption to 
this allocation.    
 
Nonetheless, the same argument concerning the advancement of wealth was used by 
opponents of the Bill as to why clandestine marriage had its advantages. This argument 
was advanced most fervently by Nugent, but also by others such as Henry Fox, who as 
we know, had married clandestinely himself, and Sir Charles Townshend. The substance 
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of their argument was that clandestine marriage gave those who, because of differences 
in social status and family wealth, would ordinarily not have permission or consent from 
their families to marry. Nugent stated the danger that ‘our quality and rich families will 
daily accumulate riches by marrying only one another’,94 and as a consequence the Act 
would ensure that wealth remained within the same families to the detriment of social 
advancement. Clandestine marriage had given those from different social classes the 
opportunity to wed, which would have otherwise been impossible following traditional 
marriage arrangements given that the marriage would have undoubtedly been objected 
to, or refused by lack of parental consent. As noted earlier in this chapter, a marriage was 
accompanied by the payment of a dowry to the husband of the bride from her family. 
This sum varied depending on the wealth of each family, but often this payment would 
be relied upon to sustain the couple during their marriage, particularly during the first 
few years. Clandestine marriage avoided the possibility of the refusal of parents to 
consent, until it was too late, and it therefore came without the financial considerations 
that rendered marriage an exercise in family advancement and the maintenance of 
wealth within families.  
 
Consequently, clandestine marriages, which involved the union of two people of unequal 
wealth, ‘so far from being a public evil… [were] a public benefit, because they serve[d] 
to disperse the wealth of the kingdom through the whole body of the people and to 
prevent the accumulating and monopolizing it into a few hands’.95 With a marriage 
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between persons of unequal wealth, property did not remain within the same families 
and such a union ensured a distribution of wealth throughout society; to what extent this 
argument was true in practice is debatable, how many inter-marriages like this actually 
took place, and whether they did so to any meaningful extent so as to even begin to 
distribute wealth in such a way is also uncertain, but the theory, nonetheless, is credible.   
 
It was not just the wealthier classes who were the subject of the debates, marriage 
between the poorest in society was also a common theme, particularly for those opposing 
the Bill. One argument advanced was that the poor would not be able to marry at all if 
the Bill was to become law, given the costs of a traditional marriage ceremony. Nugent 
argued that the Bill would ‘render marriage almost impossible’96 for the poorest in 
society, whilst George Haldane expressed concern that the proposed Act would ‘render 
the solemnisation of that ceremony so tedious and troublesome, or so expensive’97 that 
the poor would restrain from marrying. Such arguments attempted to counter that which 
was advanced in defence of the Bill, that it would prevent abuses of the marriage 
ceremony. Indeed, Fox argued conversely, that rather than preventing an abuse of the 
marriage system, and the bigamy and illegitimacy that seemingly coincided with it, the 
Marriage Act would only serve to further increase these problems, ‘if this Bill passes into 
law, no couple can ever be married by proclamation of banns in less than a month after 
they have agreed upon it, in which time it is a great chance but one of them repents, very 
probably the man, after having prevailed upon the credulous wench to admit him to her 
                                                          
96 HC Deb 14 May 1753, vol 14, col 19 
97 HC Deb 4 June 1753, vol 14, col 39 
37 
 
bed’.98 The overall concern was that in regulating marriage in such a way as proposed by 
the Bill, the poorer in society would not be able to afford a traditional ceremony.  
 
Further to this, whereas prior to the Bill a couple could be married almost 
instantaneously, if the Bill were to pass there would be a requisite delay period whilst 
banns were called and the like, in the meantime, any fornication which was conducted 
on the promise of marriage and which could potentially lead to pregnancy and the ruin 
of a girl, would already take place and would give the male a chance to abscond prior to 
the ceremony. Thus, the girl and her child would return a burden upon the parish – 
something which the Bill directly sought to prevent.  
 
What is interesting to note is that throughout both debates on clandestine marriage, and 
on both sides of the argument, the overriding theme is economic grounds. Whether it 
was to protect the single mother and her child for being a burden on the parish, to 
prevent abuses of marriage by socially unequal unions, or even to ensure that socially 
unequal marriages could continue, all of these arguments were based on the financial 
implications that would be consequent. Whilst opponents such as Fox and Nugent took a 
more humanitarian approach and framed their argument in terms of protecting the 
interests of the poor, their underlying rationale remained the same as those advocating 
the Bill, in that it was financial interests that remained at the heart of their motives. 
Whilst it is not disputed that opponents such as Fox and Nugent aimed to protect the 
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poorest in society, it is argued further that this seeming agenda of protection was 
underpinned ultimately by an awareness of the financial consequences of marriage. It 
would seem therefore, that marriage was inexplicably tied up with economic 
considerations, used either as a vehicle to ensure the continuation of wealth or its suitable 
distribution. Thus the 1753 Marriage Bill, and the need to regulate against clandestine 
marriage by declaring such contracts void, was driven by economic motivations and a 
desire to control private relationships through such means. Property and wealth formed 
the key basis of the desire of the law to regulate marriage contracts, and ultimately, this 
regulation took the form of declaring void those which did not conform to the correct 
formalities and thus impeded the correct financial allocation.  
 
The Marriage Act 1753 
The Marriage Act,99 or to give its full title, An Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine 
Marriages, achieved royal assent on the 7th June 1753, the provisions of which were to 
come into force from 25th March 1754. Out of the nineteen provisions in the Act, most 
related to the formalities of the ceremony, for instance, there was now a legal 
requirement that banns must be called in the parish of residence three Sundays prior to 
the marriage,100 there must be two witnesses present at the marriage,101 and a four week 
residency requirement was imposed.102 As well as this, the couple wishing to marry were 
required to provide full names and addresses one week prior to the reading of banns.103 
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It is evident that these provisions sought to prevent fraudulent and rash marriages, and 
returned a regulatory aspect to marriage as the reading of banns allowed for objections 
to be made against the union. Further regulation on the ceremony itself came with the 
provision that no marriage was permitted to those under 21 without parental consent.104 
Provisions five to seven effectively returned the monopoly on marriages to the church,105 
whilst article 8 rendered any clergymen who failed to be abide by the Act guilty of a felony 
and liable for 14 years deportation to America.106 Further formalities imposed upon 
clergymen surrounded the upkeep of registers,107 any falsification or abuse of which 
rendered the cleric guilty of a felony and was punishable by death.108 It was also stated 
that the Act did not apply to the royal family,109 or to Scotland, Quakers, Jews or any 
marriages taking place overseas.110 One slightly bizarre addition was the requirement in 
article 19 that the Act must be read aloud in Church every Sunday following Morning 
Prayer,111 although it has since been noted that the fulfilment of this requirement was 
often accompanied by an exodus of the congregation out of the church door.112 Most 
integral to this thesis, however, was article 11 which rendered any marriage contract that 
did not prescribe to the formalities as stipulated in the Act as null and void.113 These were 
the provisions as to be enacted from 25th March 1754. 
 
                                                          
104 ibid article 3 
105 ibid articles 5-7 
106 ibid article 8 
107 ibid article 14 
108 ibid article 16 
109 ibid article 17 
110 ibid article 18 
111 ibid article 19 
112 Outhwaite (n59) 124 
113 26 Geo II c32 (n99) article 11 
40 
 
Contrary to what was intended, the Act did not come to represent any seismic change. 
Rather, it is argued that it merely placed original formalities into statutory form and as 
such the extent of its impact is debatable. This is particularly shown to be the case when 
statistics regarding marriage are analysed. There is not the great increase in church 
marriages as one would expect, nor is there any significant change in the age or location 
of where persons chose to be married.114 What we do see, however, is that marriages at 
places such as the Fleet prison ceased almost instantaneously or dropped so dramatically 
so as to be of little significant value. The conclusion that we can take from this then is 
perhaps that whilst the Act returned the monopoly on marriage to the church, it did not 
do anything to attempt to increase the numbers of those marrying there. Indeed, the Act 
itself does not include anything to positively encourage an increase in church marriages, 
it merely confirmed pre-existing formalities and thus it can be said that rather than 
altering practices to any significant extent, the Act instead simply reinforced pre-existing 
social norms. Probert supports this contention in finding that, ‘the Marriage Act should 
be seen as part of a gradual progression towards regularity and formality rather than an 
abrupt shift in the regulation of marriage’.115 Consequently, the aim of the Act to eradicate 
clandestine marriage was achieved given that such marriages all but ceased in England 
in the years following its introduction, whilst traditional practices continued and were 
supported and encouraged through this legislative intervention.116 Thus, it is clear that 
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the 1753 did little to dramatically change the marriage landscape, rather instead it sought 
to legitimise existing practices.   
 
It is evident that clandestine marriage disrupted the traditional formalities associated 
with matrimony, and for this reason the practice was legislated against. The decision that 
such contracts were to be declared void not only protected the wealth of families whose 
children may have entered into such unions without parental approval, but the passing 
of Hardwicke’s Act also allowed the established church to regain control of the marital 
process. Clive Field states that in the long eighteenth century, ‘Church and State were 
indivisible’,117 it is therefore not difficult to see why legislation concerning clandestine 
marriage – a practice which explicitly ran counter to the marriage process monopolised 
by the established church - was to be rendered void. Given the dominance of religion on 
marriage in the long eighteenth century, some understanding of religion in England at 
this time may be useful to the reader at this juncture.  
 
Following the accession of William to the throne in 1688, the dominant faith in England 
was that of the Protestant religion, commonly referred to as the Church of England. In 
1689, however, the Toleration Act118 was passed, which permitted non-Conformist 
religions to practice without restriction. It was clear that this Act was to apply only to 
Protestant Non-Conformists, thus Presbyterians, Baptists, and Quakers, to name but 
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three,119 were permitted to practice their faith free from interference, however these 
protections did not apply to Catholicism. Following the Revolution of 1688 and the 
ousting of James II, Catholicism was seen as a threat, Catholics themselves were not to 
be trusted, and so their active exclusion from public life was sought.120 The extent of 
popular distrust of Catholics in this period is perhaps typified by the Gordon Riots in 
1780, which occurred as a consequence of Parliament passing the Papists Act of 1778,121 
which granted greater rights to Catholics. Thus, by the middle of the long eighteenth 
century, whilst legislative reform was open to the acceptance of Catholicism and to 
permitting greater freedoms for those practicing the faith, the change in popular opinion 
was slower to occur. Nevertheless, a further Catholic Relief Act122 was passed in 1792, 
this time without the popular discord caused by the Act of 1778.  
 
Towards the end of the long eighteenth century, then, there appeared to be greater 
acceptance of religions outside of traditional Protestantism. This is reflected in the 
legislation enacted at this time, such as the Roman Catholic Relief Act123 in 1829 which 
permitted Catholics to hold public office, something previously prohibited since the 
Corporation124 and Test125 Acts in 1661 and 1673 respectively. The 1829 Act can be seen 
as a significant step towards mending the tension that had existed between Protestantism 
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and Catholicism since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, yet it is telling that non-
Conformist Protestant religions were granted the freedom to practice their faith freely in 
1689, but it took much longer to lift the restrictions applied to the Catholic faith. The 
figures attributed to these non-conformist religions (excluding Catholicism) also reveal 
much about the increased tolerance of other religions which took place towards the end 
of the long eighteenth century. At the beginning of the period, the number of Non-
Conformists in England is estimated to be 225,000,126 but by the 1830’s this figure stood 
at 2,750,000.127 Population growth must of course be factored into this, but this 
nonetheless is a considerable increase.  
 
The disruption that occurred as a consequence of clandestine marriage and the offence 
it caused to the established Church and by extension the State, was not unique. Indeed, 
in the long eighteenth century traditional marriage practices were at risk of manipulation 
not only by sons and daughters themselves, but also by families who sought a socially 
and financially advantageous match.  
 
2.3 FROM FINANCIAL GAIN TO ROMANTIC LOVE 
The conventions attached to marriage, such as the provision of a dowry, noted above, 
made financial considerations inevitable during the long eighteenth century. For the 
higher social classes, however, economic considerations began even before courtship.  
                                                          





Money and status had always been a concern of the aristocracy when seeking a match 
for eligible sons and daughters, and by the middle of the long eighteenth century, with 
growing industrialisation, this also came to be a concern for the merchant class. Marriage 
was used as a tool for both social and economic advancement and the formalities of 
marriage, such as the provision of a dowry, assisted in this. As acknowledged by Baker, 
‘inheritance of property was always predicated on relationships brought about by 
marriage’,128 and so it was important that a financially advantageous match could be 
secured. This was often assured as a consequence of the guidance of parents, and their 
involvement in seeking a suitor. Yet, as shall be noted below in a discussion of marriage 
brokerage, this interest could often be at risk being deemed a manipulation of the 
marriage process by the courts. Furthermore, the dangers of pursuing a marriage 
motivated purely by financial considerations were made evident in a series of artwork, 
Marriage a la Mode, completed by Hogarth in 1745, which have been annexed to this 
chapter (Appendix 1). In the paintings, an economically motivated marriage causes only 
unhappiness, resulting in financial ruin, adultery and, eventually, death. By the middle 
of the period, then, perhaps as a consequence of growing dissatisfaction with parental 
interference as well as the influence of popular culture, social attitudes towards marriage 
were changing, and, as noted by Stone, ‘public opinion in landed and bourgeois circles… 
was turning decisively against parental dictation of a marriage partner’.129  
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The same economic concerns were not apparent for those of the lower class. Such 
families lacked the financial means to exercise leverage over sons and daughters with 
regards to the marriage process and so parental control was ‘severely limited’.130 These 
limitations also applied to the poorest in society; their lack of disposable income to 
provide a dowry meant that whilst parental consent was sometimes sought, they were 
not able to control the marriage process in the same way as wealthier families. Indeed, a 
popular tale concerning Saint Nicholas was that he dropped three bags of gold through a 
window of the house of a pauper, to enable him to offer a dowry for his three daughters, 
thus providing him with the means to present them for marriage and not become a 
burden on their parish.131  
Whilst attitudes were slowly changing towards the end of the period, it is undeniable that 
in the long eighteenth century marriage was closely connected with economic gain. These 
financial motivations are no more apparent than in the practice of marriage brokerage.   
 
2.3.1 Marriage Brokerage 
Marriage brokerage featured often in literature and dramatics in the long eighteenth 
century and even prior to that; plays such as The Marriage Broker (1662) and The Relapse 
(1696) by Vanburgh, portrayed marriage brokerage as a deceitful exercise yet despite 
this, the practice was commonplace amongst the wealthier classes of society in the 
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eighteenth century. An example of a typical marriage brokerage scenario would perhaps 
assist here to greater inform the reader of that which this chapter will be referring:  
Lord Green wishes for his niece, Sarah, to be married to the son of the Earl of Dukesbury. To 
affect this marriage, Lord Green, unbeknownst to the Earl of Dukesbury, approaches the sister 
and brother-in-law of the Earl and offers £1000 if they succeed in persuading the Earl to get his 
son to marry Sarah. 
In the scenario above, Lord Green is deceiving the Earl as to his intentions in order to 
bring about a marriage that he desires. This was typically undertaken as it was felt that 
engineering a match in this way would allow a spouse to be chosen who would provide 
the family not only with the optimum social advancement, but often with financial 
progression also. Mingay gives an impression of the amount of wealth that was 
commonly earned, ‘in 1790 the wealthy gentry had incomes of £3000 or £4000 a year… 
the lesser gentry, [had] incomes rising from near £1000 up to £3000’.132 Consequently, 
the following discussion will be with reference to those who possessed such large 
incomes and the wealth which they sought to protect.  
 
Those from the wealthier classes used marriage brokerage as a means of achieving a 
suitable marital match and of securing all the advantages that came with it; the ‘brokers’ 
of these relationships were commonly family members and in particular, women, as their 
perceived compassionate nature was deemed to be advantageous in arranging a suitable 
match.133 O’Day provides a useful account of the Duke and Duchess of Chandos, who 
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together orchestrated the marriage of several members of their family.134 Evidently, as it 
was within the interests of a family to ensure the protection of their property, it seems 
sensible that they themselves would act as marriage broker to ensure that the potential 
union was suitable and prescribed to their wishes from both an economic as well as social 
perspective. However, such arrangements were not viewed positively by the courts who 
sought to uphold the sanctity of marriage; such contracts were thus declared void on 
grounds of public policy. This line of reasoning is apparent in the case of Cole v Gieson,135 
in which an annuity of £100 along with a bond of £1000 was contested. The facts of this 
case warrant some discussion to fully understand the rationale of the court. 
 
In 1733, as part of a marriage agreement between Mr Bennet and Miss Hallam, it was 
agreed that an annuity of £100 be paid to the defendant, Ms Gieson, along with a bond 
for £1000. The annuity was paid to Ms Gieson even after the death of Miss Hallam, and 
so by 1750 an action was brought for the cancellation of the annuity. The defendant was 
a nursery maid in Miss Hallam’s family; she was therefore employed by Miss Hallam but 
the court heard how the defendant ‘got so absolute a power and control over her…and so 
entirely into her confidence, that she could put a negative upon any match, and had the 
government and disposal of her’.136 An instance of the control the servant exercised over 
her mistress was cited by counsel for the plaintiff; it was stated that she would deliver 
the letters of potential suitors to her mistress and would voice her opinion over which 
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gentlemen would be a viable match. Given this information, it was argued that the 
provision of the annuity was ‘a bribe on the marriage’,137 rendering the agreement akin 
to a brokerage contract. Counsel for the defendant argued in the alternative, that the 
annuity did not amount to a brokerage contract as no money was paid in direct 
procurement of the marriage. Furthermore, it was argued that the transaction was not 
‘clandestine’138 but one in which both husband and wife entered together. The privity of 
the husband to the contract thus dispelled with any notion of a brokerage.  
 
In delivering judgment, Lord Hardwicke began with a general overview of the rationale 
of the law in finding brokerage contracts to be void. His Lordship stated that in declaring 
the contract to be void, this was ‘not for the sake of the particular instance or the person, 
but of the public, and that marriages may be on a proper foundation’.139 However, it was 
further stated that where agreements were made between a husband and wife ‘with their 
eyes open’140 an annuity granted to a servant would not be set aside by the court as it was 
the lack of privity on the part of one party and the inherent deceit therein that rendered 
such contracts void. Yet the fact that the agreement in the current case was between 
husband and wife gave cause for concern for the court. Reflecting on the legal status of a 
wife upon marriage, Lord Hardwicke reasoned that the annuity gave rise to suspicion as 
the agreement was not ‘subject to power of revocation’.141 Given that upon marriage, a 
wife’s legal rights were subsumed into those of her husband, along with her estate and 
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property, whilst the annuity was made by both husband and wife, the proceeds were to 
come from her sole estate. This money was therefore ring-fenced from use by her 
husband and thus made for a ‘precarious way of settling an estate’142 as it left part of Miss 
Hallam’s estate in her power.  
 
The bond of £1000 also caused concern. The defendant represented that she did not 
remember the consideration that she had provided for receiving payment of this upon 
the marriage of Miss Hallam, and the court therefore reasoned that if the annuity was 
granted upon the bond being delivered up, this ‘would be strong evidence of this being a 
marriage-brocage bond’.143 Added to the fact that there was ‘strong proof of the general 
influence’ of the defendant over her mistress, Lord Hardwicke thus ordered that further 
inquiry be made into the consideration of the bond. Only if the jury were to find some 
consideration for the bond or annuity would the payment be held valid, otherwise the 
agreement would be declared void, being an instance of a marriage brokerage contract.  
 
It is clear from this case that the court gave considerable attention to the balancing of 
individual interests in determining what amounted to a marriage brokerage contract. 
The potential negative influence of a party was weighed against the legitimate delivery 
of a payment for services rendered and so the decision over the validity of such a contract 
ultimately rested on the provision of consideration. What is further evident is that the 
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rationale of the courts in finding brokerage contracts to be void was that they sought to 
protect against the abuse of the marriage process, ensuring that ‘marriages maybe on a 
proper foundation’.144 It is interesting that Lord Hardwicke in Cole further cited the legal 
status of a woman upon marriage, and expressed dissatisfaction with the annuity in this 
case interrupting the norm of her status as a feme covert.145 Therefore, even where public 
policy reasoning is cited to be the rationale of the law, there is an underlying recognition 
of property rights and the preservation of wealth.  
 
These public policy grounds echo that which was held in the earlier case of Hall and Keene 
v Potter146 in which £1000 to be paid upon marriage was held to be void, given that ‘such 
contracts for procuring of marriages are of dangerous consequence, and tend to the ruin 
of families’.147 Hall and Keene also tells us much of the social status of the parties who 
commonly entered brokerage contracts. In this case, Thomas Thinne agreed to pay £500 
to Mrs Potter three months after his marriage to Lady Ogle, a widow,148 and daughter to 
the Earl of Northumberland. She therefore possessed a sizeable fortune, but Thomas 
Thinne was not without social standing; although he was not nobility, Thomas 
maintained an estate worth £10,000 a year. The pair were never married, however, as 
Thomas died before the marriage could take place. The action in the case was thus 
brought by Thomas’s executors, Hall and Keene, who argued that the contract to provide 
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£500 to Mrs Potter was void, as it was a brokerage contract. It was cited that as Lady 
Ogle was ‘a person of such great honour and fortune’,149 this motivated Thomas to 
procure the marriage.  
 
The argument of the plaintiffs was based on two grounds. Firstly, as was paramount in 
Cole, they submitted that there was no consideration on the part of Mrs Potter for the 
payment. Secondly, if it were found that there was consideration, such a contract would 
be void regardless, as it was one of marriage brokerage, and therefore ‘of dangerous 
consequence and… the ruin of families’.150 Counsel for Mrs Potter argued that the 
contract was not illegal as there was ‘no fraud, circumvention, or ill-practice’,151 instead 
all Mrs Potter had provided was advice. Furthermore, the marriage was one of equality, 
given the respective wealth of the two estates; as the advantage would have been to 
Thomas, who would have married into nobility, his executors ought not to complain. At 
first instance, it was held that there had been fraud on the part of Mrs Potter and so the 
agreement was rendered void for illegality. This decision was reversed by the Lord-
Keeper in Chancery who found in favour of Mrs Potter and therefore held the contract to 
be valid. Hall and Keene then appealed to the House of Lords, who by a majority found 
the contract to void, reiterating the argument made by the plaintiffs that ‘all such 
contracts concerning marriages are of dangerous consequence’.152  
 
                                                          






Just why these contracts were found to be void is evident; the courts were seemingly 
careful to avoid marriages of inequality created by unions that were open to influence. 
Despite the common desire to arrange a marriage that was economically beneficial for 
both parties, the courts were also clearly adamant that this was not to be at the expense 
of inducing parties into a union on the premise of dishonourable motivations, and 
anything that may undermine the sanctity of marriage itself, such as monetary payments 
in anticipation of inducing marriage, was thus discredited. There was a difference, of 
course, between a marriage settlement and marriage brokerage; the former being a 
device frequently employed with good intentions upon a marriage, whilst the latter 
attempted to procure the marriage itself, often by the enticement of large sums of money. 
A key feature of marriage brokerage was the inequality that was often inherent in the 
amount of money to be exchanged. This distinction is evinced in Duke of Hamilton v Lord 
Mohun,153 where, again, the social class of persons entering into brokerage contracts is 
evident. In this case, a promise to discharge the debts of the parent of a future wife was 
held to be void.  
 
In Duke of Hamilton, the Duke of Hamilton married the daughter of Lord Gerrard. As 
part of the agreement, it was stated that the Duke should release to his mother-in-law, 
Lady Gerrard, ‘all accounts of the… profits of the estate’.154 This was done in 
consideration of the provision of education of the Duke’s wife by her mother, as well as 
the interest paid by Lady Gerrard on a mortgage for part of the estate. The Duke further 
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bound himself to pay a penalty of £10,000 to Lady Gerrard if this transaction did not go 
ahead. When the obligation on the part of the Duke was not fulfilled, the Duke brought 
an action to cancel the agreement for payment of the profits of the estate and thus release 
him from also having to pay the £10,000 penalty. Counsel for the executor of Lady 
Gerrard argued three points. Firstly, it was argued that there ‘was no surprise or 
misrepresentation’155 to render the agreement akin to a brokerage contract. Secondly, 
had the agreement arisen after the marriage, there would be no legal recourse and so the 
court ought not to relieve against the present contract which was entered into without 
fraud. Finally, the ‘floodgates’ argument was advanced, that if such agreements, 
supported by consideration, were to be deemed invalid, no parent would enter such 
marriage agreements, for fear of legal action.  
 
The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cowper,156 in delivering judgment on the case, held that 
although there had been ‘no concealment’157 such as generally required in order to render 
a brokerage contract void, the contract ought to be declared void regardless. This was as 
a consequence of the agreement effectively being ‘extorted from the Duke by one who 
had a power over the young lady courted by him; by one who had a power over her as 
her parent; which ought not to have been made use of in this manner’.158 The court stated 
that ‘it was as if the mother should say, you shall not have my daughter, unless you will 
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release all accounts’.159 It was held that as such an agreement embodied similar 
motivations to that of a marriage brokerage contract, it ought to be judged in accordance 
with the same rationale, and was thus void. This decision was further supported by the 
court reasoning that as a marriage brokerage contract was rendered void by the 
‘giv[ing]’160 of money, a contract which concerned ‘a bond to forgive a sum of money 
must be ill also’.161 Despite the apparent consideration, his Lordship disagreed that the 
agreement was entered in to freely as ‘the Duke might reasonably apprehend he must 
have lost the young lady, had he refused the covenant’.162 In this case, the court is 
evidently protecting the sanctity of marriage but the judgment of Lord Cowper also 
clearly advanced an agenda of protection towards sons and daughters whose parents, 
much like Lady Gerrard, sought to take advantage of a prospective union and pursued 
individual financial gain from the procurement of the marriage.  
 
It is clear that marriage brokerage contracts were found to be void as a consequence of 
an inherent attitude of protection employed by the courts, who sought to restrict those 
agreements which were open to negative influence and abuse of power. However, despite 
this legal concern with ensuring fairness regarding the economics of a match, by the 
beginning of the long eighteenth century, social attitudes towards marriage were 
changing. Across all social classes, it is clear, as Lawrence Stone states, that, “the 
importance of money was far less generally accepted as a crucial factor in marriage than 
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it had been in the seventeenth [century]”.163 It is argued here that this social change was 
bolstered by developments in popular culture, notably, the rise of sensibility in literature. 
Sensibility was associated with a new mode of feeling. It was a sentiment based on 
morality, reason, and both an acknowledgment and sensitivity to human emotion.164 This 
concept was seized upon by literature and, given the popularity of novels addressing this 
concept, it is it argued here that this would have had a significant effect on challenging 
the traditional ideal of marriage based on economic advancement. Sensibility was 
addressed by Samuel Richardson in Pamela165 and Clarissa;166 these works in particular 
are synonymous with a literary account of sensibility that portrayed the concept through 
a ‘figure of “virtue in distress”’167 -  a woman who is virtuous but victimised, often by a 
male, and who seeks her rescue from her turbulent life. This idea is also exemplified in 
the works of Jane Austen. Whilst the novel Pride and Prejudice168 adopts the typically 
romantic notion of sensibility, Austen also advocated a more realist approach in her 
earlier work, Sense and Sensibility.169 In this novel, Austen promotes the idea that whilst 
romantic notions must not be completely disregarded, some acknowledgement is needed 
of the importance of a practical approach to marriage, which addresses the wealth and 
status to be gained from a union. The male too was not exempt from characterisation 
within the culture of sensibility. Just as a woman typified virtue and subordination, 
equally a man was more emotionally astute, open to feeling, and ‘goodness’170 - even the 
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notorious Mr B in Richardson’s novel Pamela is a reformed man upon marriage to 
Pamela. It is of course impossible to state to what extent sensibility alone altered popular 
opinion of marriage, but what can be argued is that sensibility placed these romantic 
notions of marriage in the consciousness of the public and by extension in the minds of 
families seeking suitable spouses for their sons and daughters as well as the sons and 
daughters themselves.  
 
It was not only literature that provided the impetus for change in this period. The 
beginning of the long eighteenth century also saw the creation of events at which 
unmarried sons and daughters could meet free of the formalities of a traditional 
courtship. Whilst occasions such as balls and fairs were not created with the intention of 
providing this service, it is recognised that it was an unforeseen consequence; ‘the 
development of the London Season… provided the necessary facilities for the 
development of acquaintances’.171 However, these parties simultaneously created legal 
issues. One such example of this is the case of King v Burr172 which was erroneously 
defended by counsel for the defendant on the grounds of being an instance of marriage 
brokerage. In King, a series of parties were held by the plaintiff at the direction of Burr 
to attempt to introduce the defendant to ladies ‘of fortune’.173 When an action was 
brought for the recovery of money expended for hosting these gatherings, the argument 
by the defendant that such a contract amounted to a marriage brokerage contract and 
was thus void, was dismissed by the court, and so Burr was liable to repay the expenses. 
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It is clear that in this instance, there was no direct exchange of money in expectation of 
marriage; the sums expended were done so in anticipation of hosting an event, there was 
no single person, or future spouse, to which the money was directly intended and as a 
consequence, such an agreement could not possibly be deemed to fall within the same 
category as those contracts relating to marriage brokerage. Further to this, to find that 
such a contract was indeed a marriage brokerage contract would surely extend the law 
beyond any sensible parameter. Such parties, as that arranged in King v Burr, were 
common place, particularly during the London Season, and although presenting an ideal 
opportunity to meet and court the opposite sex, cannot be said to be remotely akin to a 
brokerage contract. 
 
Further, the London Season coincided with the sitting of Parliament as so began from 
any time after Christmas, although usually around February-April, and ran until late 
August.174 During this time the social calendar was filled with dinners, concerts, parties, 
and events at which meeting a potential partner was possible. Although some of these 
occasions were not held with the specific aim of inducing romantic relationships, as in 
King v Burr, it was well known that, particularly for persons of a higher social class, these 
entertainments provided an opportunity to mingle with those from the uppermost 
echelons of society and so were an excellent means by which to procure social 
advancement, should a match be secured in this way. Some occasions, however, were 
very much an explicit means by which to secure a marital partner. None the more evident 
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is this than in the presentation of debutants whereby eligible daughters of landed classes 
were launched into society. Until this point, which involved the presentation of a girl to 
the monarch, she could not be considered for marriage.175 It was not uncommon for 
eligible girls to attend numerous parties and dinners across several Seasons.176 There is, 
no doubt, a stark difference between a party such as this and the example of marriage 
brokerage given in King v Burr. Other glamorous balls, such as that depicted in the 
painting, The Dance (1745) by Hogarth in Figure 2, were also held at the height of the 
Season whereby ladies dressed in the highest fashion and sumptuous banquets were held 
daily at various exclusive dinners.  
Figure 2 
 
                                                          
175 F. M. Moghaddam, The Individual and Society: A Cultural Integration, (Worth Publishers, New York: 
2002) 229 




These events were typified in literature and popular culture from the time; the London 
Season features extensively in the novels of Jane Austen,177 and Oscar Wilde also pays 
homage to the London social scene and concurrent marriage customs in the respective 
relationships of Jack and Cecily in The Importance of Being Earnest.178 Even royalty were 
not exempt from the allure of the Season, rather conversely, they enjoyed a key position 
in it; events, notably Royal Ascot and the Henley Regatta, continue to this day, and were 
key events in the eighteenth, and moving into the nineteenth century, social scene. 
Occasions such as these increased in popularity in the latter part of the long eighteenth 
century, as the introduction of the Marriage Act in 1754 meant that parents could allow 
their children to attend such occasions free of the worry that they may bind themselves 
in a clandestine marriage.   
 
However, such behaviour, in the hosting of a party, was not at all in-keeping with 
marriage brokerage as if the reasoning of counsel for the defendant in King was to 
succeed, any party at which there was a potential to meet a partner may be deduced to 
be amount to a brokerage contract and thus money expended on the occasion would be 
irrecoverable, regardless of who paid for the event, and through what means. It is this 
factor also, that distinguishes King from traditional marriage brokerage contracts. 
Within marriage brokerage contracts, then, there continued to be an attachment of 
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economic considerations to marriage, especially for those of the upper classes and 
aristocracy. Yet, there was an apparent tension between the seemingly moral 
motivations, found in the courts keenness to uphold the sanctity of marriage and enforce 
public policy grounds, and the overall desire of law to ensure that marriages that were 
in-keeping with social norms regarding the allocation of wealth. Given this, it would be 
very easy to question why marriage brokerage was not permitted as it would seem that 
such an arrangement could potentially increase the likelihood of a financially desirous 
match, however, the answer seems to be that anything which could be open to abuse was 
not to be upheld by the courts. Marriage brokerage effectively involved the payment of 
money to induce two persons into marriage; monetary payment for something that 
involved personal relationships has always been discouraged by courts, as we shall see 
in the fourth chapter of this thesis pertaining to immorality. The idea, therefore, that a 
sum could be paid in relation to personal commitments was one which the courts were 
not willing to uphold, and which even financial considerations and the protection of 
wealth could not outweigh.  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the courts in the long eighteenth century were 
faced with a tension between adhering to social practices that saw marriage used as a 
means of furthering wealth, and the general policy of the law which sought to uphold the 
sanctity of marriage. With regard to marriage brokerage, the desire to prohibit such an 
explicit manipulation of the marriage process was a greater concern than economic 
motivations. The very formalities surrounding marriage, such as the provision of a dowry 
and the creation of the marriage settlement, allowed for the consideration of financial 
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gain, but the courts were also keen to protect the parties themselves from manipulation 
by those seeking to broker a marriage, such as that in the Duke of Hamilton. Ultimately, 
the law rendered brokerage contracts void to not only protect contractual actors, but also 
to control the marriage process, to ultimately prevent its abuse.  
 
2.3.2 Restraint of Marriage 
The final group of contracts to be discussed in this chapter are those concerning restraint 
of marriage. Whilst marriage brokerage took place unknown to one or both of the future 
spouses, restraint of marriage contracts were entered by the parties themselves. The 
considerations for the court thus differed, and so whilst there remained a need to uphold 
the sanctity of marriage, the economic motivations, and the consideration of these, are 
much more prevalent in the judgments of the court in these cases. 
 
Contracts in restraint of marriage were created for a variety of reasons. Such contracts 
sought to restrict one party, or both, from marrying another, but what is helpful to an 
inquiry into these contracts is a brief discussion of the parties who sought to uphold 
them. Like clandestine marriage, the most usual of these agreements were those between 
couples; disapproval by parents or one party being already married, are just two of the 
motives behind such contracts.179 Often, parents sought to restrict the marriage of a son 
or daughter as a means of ensuring a more desirable match with regard to financial 
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considerations and the advancement of the family name. It is this reasoning which is 
explicitly mentioned in the cases, where reference is made to ‘the misfortune’180 of 
families, but it is otherwise implicit when examining the facts of the case, particularly 
when it is clear that there is some disparity between the potential annual income of each 
party.  
 
The Case of Lowe v Peers 
The case of Lowe v Peers181 provides a useful illustration of the sort of circumstances 
which frequently surrounded contracts in restraint of marriage. The dispute centred on 
a deed executed in 1757 by Newsham Peers to Miss Catherine Lowe. In it, Peers stated, ‘I 
do hereby promise Mrs Catherine Lowe, that I will not marry with any person besides 
herself: If I do, I agree to pay to the said Catherine Lowe 1,000l. within three months next 
after I shall marry anybody else’.182 When Peers remarried in 1768, to a Miss Elizabeth 
Gardiner, Lowe sought to invoke the deed and brought an action for the recovery of the 
1000l. under it. In order to give further detail to these facts, it is perhaps advantageous 
as an aside to familiarise the reader with the Peers family of Alveston, and the wealth 
that was at stake by way of marriage. 
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Alveston is a small village in Warwickshire; to give an impression of its size, there were 
465 inhabitants in the census of 1801.183 The Peers family first sought an interest in the 
village in 1570, when numerous properties were conveyed to Edmund Peers. These 
consisted of two watermills, a fishery, a farm, and a manor house, which was purchased 
for £576 9s 2d.184 It seems that the Peers family were of some notoriety in the area, with 
Lieut. Colonel Newsham Peers, a descendant of Edmund, having had a monument 
erected in his memory in the churchyard of St James’ Church in Alveston – this Newsham 
Peers dying in 1743 at Dettingen.185 The estate and assets passed through the Peers family 
until Newsham Peers – the defendant in this case – inherited the estate in 1766. Leaving 
no male heir, upon his death, the estate was passed to his only surviving children, his 
daughters Amelia and Louisa. Although Louisa went on to marry a Captain Richard 
Adams of Wainsford in 1806, Amelia remained unmarried until her death in 1837. The 
estate, however, was sold under the will of Newsham in 1810 to a Henry Roberts of 
Stratford; by this time, it was worth £39,500.186 
 
Given the difference in price and the accumulation of wealth that had accrued since the 
initial purchase of the estate by Edmund Peers in 1570, it is not difficult to envisage just 
what Catherine Lowe sought to gain from marrying Newsham Peers. Granted, she would 
not have had access to deal with any property herself, given that all assets, except those 
                                                          
183 W. B. Stephens, Victoria History of the County of Warwick: Volume III (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 1955) 283 
184 ibid 284 
185 ibid 286 
186 ibid.  
64 
 
expressly granted to a wife under trust, were vested in the husband upon marriage,187 
but she would have certainly been placed in a standard of living that was extremely 
comfortable for the day – as, of course, would any children to result from the union. 
Perhaps, then, knowing just what Lowe missed out on, the reader is now better able to 
understand just why she sought to obtain damages with regard to the deed, and likewise, 
why Peers was keen to have the very same declared void.  
 
At the first trial, the judge gave the direction to the jury ‘to find for the plaintiff, with 
damages 1000l. if they thought the deed to be a good deed’.188 Leave for a new trial was 
granted if this was contested, which of course, it subsequently was; counsel for Peers 
contended that the jury ought to be able to award less, should they see fit. Consequently, 
at the retrial, two questions were sought to be determined. The first of these concerned 
whether the original direction to the jury to award 1000l. was correct, and the second 
question was whether the deed was valid at all. Under the first ground, the court held 
that given that a precise sum was stated in the deed, ‘the jury are confined to it’.189 This 
part of the judgment is clear; however, it is the judgment of the court with regard to the 
second ground that is of greatest interest to this thesis. In determining the validity of the 
deed, Lord Mansfield discussed several points, but began by stating his disapproval of 
such contracts, and the policy reasons behind restricting such agreements: 
                                                          
187 Despite marriage settlements often providing a portion to the wife, given the nature of this supposed 
arrangement between Lowe and Peers, it is not too ambitious to assume that such a settlement was 
absent here, as parents were unlikely to have been informed of this arrangement 
188 Lowe (n181) 2226 
189 ibid 2229 
65 
 
When persons of different sexes, attached to each other, and thus contracting to marry each other, 
do not marry immediately, there is always some reason or other against it; as disapprobation of 
friends and relations, inequality of circumstances, or the like. Both sides ought to continue free: 
otherwise, such contracts may be greatly abused; as, by putting women’s virtue in danger, by too 
much confidence in men; or by young men living with women without being married190 
Evidently, Lord Mansfield had in mind social considerations in his denouncing of 
contracts in restraint of marriage. It must also be remembered that social attitudes were 
markedly different from those of today with regard to cohabitees. Indeed, such was the 
disdain for unmarried couples cohabiting together that Colquhoun even included the 
women of such relationships in his survey of the number of prostitutes residing in 
London in 1806.191 As will be common throughout this thesis, the reader is thus asked to 
view such contracts with an eighteenth-century eye.  
 
Having remarked on this class of contracts, Lord Mansfield then turned to the 
construction of the deed itself. It was put to the court, by counsel for Peers, that such 
contracts lacked the requisite consideration, given that there was no reciprocity or 
mutuality. However, this was disregarded, given that the agreement was by deed, and 
therefore did not require the consideration element.192 Therefore, where such contracts 
were not made by deed, this lack of mutuality would render the contract void on technical 
grounds, for want of consideration. His Lordship found further that: 
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It does not follow from her acceptance of the deed, that she either understood he meant to bind 
himself to marry her; or that she engaged to marry him. Possibly, he might not mean to marry 
her, though he bound himself not to marry anyone else. They are two quite different things; one 
does not follow from the other193  
This is an application of the earlier reasoning as to why such contracts may put ‘women’s 
virtue in danger’.194 Given that in executing the deed, all Peers agreed was not to marry 
anyone else, this did not by implication mean that he would marry Catherine Lowe. Had 
there been a breach of promise, this would have been actionable,195 but as it was not, the 
contract was clearly one of restraint and was thus held to be illegal and void. 
 
The judgment of Lowe v Peers was founded upon policy reasons and social 
considerations. The overt reasoning of the court in this case involved the explicit 
application of an agenda promoting protection, specifically that contracts such as that 
between Lowe and Peers ought to be void to guard against negative interference with a 
woman’s virtue and to in turn uphold traditional marriage values. Other cases discussed 
in the judgment also embody similar policy reasoning, notably that of Woodhouse v 
Shepley196 which will be discussed later in this chapter. Woodhouse provides an 
interesting example of the variety of contracts in restraint of marriage that were entered 
into; we shall see that whilst some contracts included a penalty should the marriage not 
take place, others did not. This distinction may be indicative of how seriously the parties 
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took their commitments under the contract, but also provides a good illustration of the 
variation in the form of such contracts.  
 
Policy considerations were reiterated in the later case of Hartley v Rice,197 which 
concerned an action brought to recover 50 guineas which had been promised in 
consideration of the plaintiff remaining unmarried for a period of six years, which he 
consequently did. In delivering judgment, the court agreed that such a contract to 
restrain marriage was illegal and therefore void. Bayley J further suggested the reason as 
to why such a contract ought not to be valid, ‘this wager is calculated to operate against 
marriage’.198 Contracts like this, in restraint of marriage, undermined the sanctity of 
marriage in that they prohibited persons from being free to marry, but what is 
interesting is that whilst it was stated that persons ought to be free to marry who they 
so wished, the reality of this was frequently different. What is clear is that, as has been 
noted in the previous section of this chapter, for those of a higher social class, the need 
to maintain the correct allocation of property and to uphold such rights to property and 
land was a key consideration in seeking a partner, and was consequently a union in which 
parents often had a considerable say. The history of the Peers family, and the extent of 
the wealth that had accumulated coupled with their high social standing in Alveston 
perhaps gives some indication as to why Newsham Peers wished to ensure that the 1757 
contract was declared void. Payment of the £1000 penalty is unlikely to have been the 
greatest concern, but rather, a family who held such high social standing would not take 
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kindly to agreements such as that between Newsham and Catherine, which would not 
only disrupt the allocation of their wealth but could potentially have an adverse effect on 
their social status. With this knowledge of the social history of the Peers family, this 
chapter can thus offer an alternative argument to the legal reasoning for the motivations 
behind rendering the contract in Lowe to be void. It is submitted that a combination of 
social and financial factors was the motivation in seeking to have this contract declared 
void. Ensuring that such property stayed within the correct channels was paramount to 
safeguard future generations, with eighteenth-century marriage being used as a method 
of property maintenance amongst wealthier families; Lowe v Peers exemplifies this.  
 
The Middling Sort 
Whilst the above case concerns an upper class restraint of marriage contract, the practice 
was not limited to those who possessed such sizeable wealth. As noted above by Stone, 
financial considerations were also prevalent for those who would be deemed to be the 
‘middle’ class in society and the case of Woodhouse v Shepley exemplifies such parental 
influence on marriage arrangements. In Woodhouse, the daughter of ‘a person of 
substance’199 was forbidden from continuing a relationship with a tailor to whom she had 
been courting, as her father disapproved of the match. Given the information presented 
in the judgment it is likely right to assume that Mr. Woodhouse was what would be 
deemed the middle class. This class of persons grew in the eighteenth century to coincide 
with the population boom and growth of industry; as the population moved away from 
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villages and into larger towns and cities, new industry was created whilst existing 
professions expanded considerably. The ‘middling sort’ possessed occupations which 
were very much centred on commerce and trade, examples of the occupations of those 
of the middling sort include artisans, journalists and civil servants.200 This group were 
above that of the working class but were not quite as affluent as those from the landed 
classes. It would seem inevitable, noting the phrase used to describe Mr. Woodhouse in 
this case, as well as the £500 fortune held by his daughter, that the family was of this 
class.  
 
In an attempted compromise to her father’s objections, yet unbeknown to him, Hannah 
Woodhouse executed a bond promising not to marry any other man ‘on or before the 
expiration of 13 months after the decease of her father Robert Woodhouse’,201 lest she 
would be liable to pay her lover, Ralph Shepley, £500. A similar bond was executed on 
behalf of Shepley, restraining his marriage to another in the same manner, or else he 
would forfeit his estate to her. A further endorsement on the back of the bond executed 
by Shepley provided for a yearly dower to Woodhouse. In ruling upon the validity of the 
bonds, Lord Hardwicke gave two reasons as to why such contracts in restraint of 
marriage ought to be void. The first of these rested on monetary grounds: 
That bonds of this sort, where parents are living, are liable to great fraud and abuse; to decree in 
favour of such a bond would be a great encouragement to persons to lie upon the catch to procure 
unequal marriages, against the consent of parents… and draw the unfortunate person into a bond 
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to forfeit their whole fortune, as is the case here, yet it is of very dangerous consequence, and 
tends to bring great misfortune into families202 
Here, Lord Hardwicke makes explicit reference to the financial implications of entering 
such agreements, which in this case had resulted in Shepley promising to surrender his 
property to Woodhouse. Given the concern of Mr. Woodhouse in forbidding the marriage 
based on what appears to be the notion that such a union would make for an unequal 
match, it is somewhat ironic that Hannah Woodhouse and Shepley were actually of 
relatively equal wealth.  
 
When we take into account that Hannah Woodhouse had a fortune of £500, if this were 
to be invested in the most popular gilt treasury stock, which in 1742 had a rate of 3.5% 
per annum, Hannah Woodhouse would bring an average of £17/10s annually to the 
marriage, in comparison to Shepley’s £14 a year from his land. Clearly then, financially, 
although Hannah’s investment would have potentially brought a slightly higher sum than 
Shepley’s income, this marriage would be founded upon somewhat equal contributions. 
This was not such a great instance of inequality as Mr. Woodhouse would have made out. 
What rather seems to be the true underlying rationale of this case, harks back to that 
which was stated in the introduction to this chapter, being that Mr. Woodhouse did not 
merely desire an equal match for his daughter but rather embodied loftier aspirations 
for her, which would ultimately result in the increased social advancement of his family 
name. The fact that his daughter had a slightly higher income than her intended match 
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was no doubt used by Mr. Woodhouse to his advantage and provided the ammunition in 
support of his contention when the case came before the courts. The connection to a 
wealthier family was perhaps desired by Mr Woodhouse and knowing of the financial 
compatibility of Hannah and Ralph, we can thus assume that this social advancement 
was the true motivation behind the disapproval of Mr. Woodhouse.  
 
This effect on families comprised the second point of reasoning advanced by Lord 
Hardwicke as to the motive behind finding such contracts to be void. This centred on a 
more personal, yet overtly financial factor, namely that contracts in restraint of marriage 
were ‘a fraud and imposition on the parent’.203 This was as a consequence of the 
ignorance of the family to such contracts who would proceed to arrange marriage and 
allocate wealth regardless. Subsequently, these agreements amounted to a ‘fraud of the 
father’s right of disposing of his fortune among his children according to their deserts’.204 
This is a clear example of the courts ensuring an agenda of protection concerning family 
wealth. Upon marriage, property distributed to a daughter became vested in her 
husband; it was therefore important to ensure a suitable and equal match to guarantee 
the continuation of family wealth. Evidently, Mr Woodhouse would not have deemed a 
tailor to be a suitable match for his daughter, as it would not have advanced her wealth, 
given that Shepley would have brought no extra financial or social advancement to the 
marriage by comparison. Shepley would have made an adequate, but not an aspirational, 
match.   







The formalities of marriage in the long eighteenth century, such as the provision of a 
dowry and the like, rendered financial considerations inevitable, but this did not prevent 
abuses of the traditional marital process monopolised by the established Church. 
Clandestine marriage was commonplace in England at the beginning of the period and 
motivations to prohibit the practice ranged from preserving the religious attachment to 
marriage to preventing a disruption to the allocation of wealth intended by families. It 
was the interference of families keen to ensure the most economically desirable match 
that resulted in marriage brokerage. Yet this meant that the same law that prohibited 
clandestine marriage as a consequence of its interference in the sanctity of marriage, 
when determining the validity of brokerage contracts, had to balance this public policy 
reasoning with social norms which encouraged the consideration of financial gains upon 
marriage. Cases such as Cole v Gieson and Hall v Potter confirm that greater weight was 
attributed to the public policy rationale, to ensure that marriages took place on a ‘proper 
foundation’.205 The agenda that emerges from this is thus one of control, to ensure that 
the marriage process was not open to abuse.  
 
Conversely, the case of Woodhouse v Shepley, similar to that of Lowe v Peers, suggests 
that there was a clear protection interest at play in the courts treatment of contracts in 
restraint of marriage but Woodhouse also demonstrates that this protection was not 
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restricted solely to those of the upper class in society. Whilst the judgment in Lowe v 
Peers referred to the social considerations and the potential ruin of a young woman,206 
placing the legal judgement alongside the social context of the Peers family reveals and 
alternative reasoning based on protecting the wealth at stake in the marriage. It is in 
Woodhouse that the protection of family wealth is given explicit consideration by Lord 
Hardwicke, who refers to the ‘forfeit [of] fortune’ and ‘misfortune…[of] families’.207 
Taking these judgments concurrently, and reflecting upon the social history concerning 
economic motivations for marriage, as discussed by Stone, this supports the contention 
that in rendering restraint of marriage contracts as void, a motivation for the courts in 
the long eighteenth century was the protection of wealth.  
 
Ultimately, this chapter has demonstrated that an understanding of the social context in 
which legal judgments took place can greatly assist in recognising the true motivations 
of the law. The interdisciplinary analysis employed in this chapter has disrupted the 
belief that a purely legal interpretation of the case law has produced: that the law 
rendered contracts for the procurement of marriage – restraint of marriage and marriage 
brokerage contracts – void as being contrary to public policy and the sanctity of marriage. 
A combined methodology incorporating social history has revealed an alternative agenda 
of control and protection. Regarding marriage brokerage, the law sought to control the 
marriage process and thus prevent its abuse whilst with regard to restraint of marriage, 
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an underlying desire to protect wealth was pursued by families and ultimately supported 
by the courts.  
 
The procurement of marriage having been addressed, the following chapter will now 
address the other side of the coin, and shall focus on contracts concerning the 







Appendix 1: W. Hogarth, Marriage a la Mode (1745)  
Plate 1 
 

















Illegality: Marriage Rights II 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will provide a continuation from the issues discussed in chapter two, but 
rather than a focus upon the procurement of marriage, chapter three will present issues 
in relation to the termination of marriage arrangements. This chapter will focus upon 
two areas specifically; actions relating to breach of promise will first be discussed before 
the chapter will move on to address the law surrounding separation agreements. Whilst 
the overarching purpose of this thesis continues to be discovering the motivations of the 
law in declaring certain contracts to be void, actions for breach of promise have been 
included in this chapter as they provide a direct contrast to contracts in restraint of 
marriage, discussed in chapter two. In exploring the disparity between these two areas 
of law, and in determining just why these actions were permitted whilst actions in 
restraint of marriage were not, this will only further reinforce arguments as to the 
underlying rationale of the law in finding certain contracts to be void.  
 
As is the recurring theme throughout this thesis, this chapter will portray a rich social 
context alongside a discussion of the law. In this section, although touched upon in the 
previous chapter, greater emphasis will be upon eighteenth century notions of 
womanhood. In particular, the role of women will be important to a thorough exploration 
of actions for breach of promise, given that these actions were more commonly brought 
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by women against men. What shall become apparent, however, is that there have been 
common misconceptions surrounding these actions, particularly when it is recognised 
that, although not as common, a noteworthy portion of breach of promise actions were 
brought by men. The response of the law in these instances is particularly revealing of 
eighteenth century ideas of masculinity. This can be contrasted to the role of women 
which throughout the long eighteenth century remained very much a class of person who 
it was felt needed protection. Given this tension, the control-protection argument of this 
thesis will be particularly revealing in this section of the chapter.  
 
With regard to contracts involving separation agreements, eighteenth century notions of 
sex and parenting will be discussed. Moralistic attitudes towards sex and the importance 
of the family unit will provide the contextual background to a legal discussion of the 
motivations of the law in finding that agreements for separation were void in certain 
circumstances. Further, an in-depth examination of individual separation cases will 
provide an interesting contextual aside to the legal questions posed in this chapter and 
will offer greater insight into eighteenth century practices regarding personal 
relationships.  
 
3.2 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WOMANHOOD AND MASCULINITY 
Men in the long eighteenth century were to be strong, virile, and chivalrous, yet this did 
not infer brutishness; the focus in the eighteenth century was instead on ‘polite and 
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refined masculinity’.208 Women, on the other hand, were to embody ‘beauty, simplicity… 
trustfulness and affectionateness’.209 Such qualities were given a visual representation in 
portraiture from the period. Artists such as Allan Ramsay and Joshua Reynolds painted 
women in soft hues; their blushing cheeks and pale skin drawing immediate comparisons 
with Botticelli’s The Birth of Venus210 – womanhood personified. Portraits by these artists 
have been annexed to this chapter (Appendices 2-4) to allow for comparison. Men, in 
contrast, were painted displaying an obvious show of strength, commonly depicted with 
the head aloft, looking away from the artist in apparent contemplation. One hand placed 
on the hip physically increased the stature of the male subject and thus signified his 
dominance. A typical portrait of a male, painted by Joshua Reynolds, has been annexed 
to this chapter (Appendix 5). These opposing characteristics resulted in men and women 
adopting alternative roles in society. The stronger – and supposedly more intelligent – 
male was to obtain work, and depending on his social class, roles ranged from manual 
labour and farming, to professions such as lawyers and surgeons. The woman was a 
homemaker, whose purpose was to care for the children and maintain the household. 
For those women who did pursue an occupation, this most often involved more domestic 
disciplines, such as needlework or working as a servant in a household. The man was 
clearly the more dominant sex, as a poem from 1763 posited: 
The gen’ral order since the whole began, 
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Is not in woman, but is kept in man.211   
 
The same poem goes on to explain the conflict between the sexes, regarding their 
interactions with each other: 
The girls uneasy and confin’d, will run 
From dear mamma to us, to be undone.212 
Barclay develops this notion further, arguing that women ‘were increasingly imagined 
as sexually passive and “innocent” (until corrupted by men)’.213 Indeed, primary sources 
from the time also support this contention. The infamous publication by Martin Madan, 
Thelypthora; or, a Treatise on Female Ruin, cited the subversion of religion as the cause 
of men’s seduction of women, ‘God’s laws are laid aside… which permits men, with 
impunity, first to seduce, and then to betray… thousands of unhappy women’.214 Whilst 
the work of Madan was heavily criticised at the time – notably as a result of his suggestion 
that the immorality abundant in society could be alleviated by polygamy – the notion of 
women falling victim to male seduction is reflected in literary depictions of sexual 
relationships in the eighteenth century. In David Copperfield,215 Emily is seduced by 
David’s friend Steerforth and is left ruined when he abandons her following a promise of 
marriage. Additionally, in The Heart of Midlothian,216 Sir Walter Scott contrasts the 
seduction and tumultuous life of Effie Deans with that of her wholesome sister, Jeanie. 
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These seduced but virtuous women are distinguished from those such as Roxana in the 
novel of the same name by Defoe,217 as well as Fanny in Fanny Hill218 by John Cleland. 
This latter group of women, being too readily complicit in their seduction, lack the 
innocence required of the ideal of an eighteenth century woman.  
 
What emerges from this, as argued by Staves, is that literary depictions of women in the 
long eighteenth century are often thought of as falling into two categories, ‘good and bad, 
maiden and whore’.219 Concurrent to this categorisation, it is argued here, is confirmation 
of the ideal that a woman in the long eighteenth century was by nature chaste and 
virtuous. Indeed, it was because of her embodiment of these eighteenth century ideals, 
notably her trusting and affectionate nature, that she became a victim; her downfall was 
her association with an unscrupulous man, a man who, like Roxana and Fanny Hill 
regarding femininity, did not embody his eighteenth century ideal of ‘refined 
masculinity’. Thus, it is submitted here that men could likewise be categorised into two 
groups: an eighteenth century man could either take advantage of a woman’s naivety 
and innocence, as Lovelace does to Clarissa in the novel by Samuel Richardson,220 or, he 
could adopt the role of protector, as does Mr Knightley in Jane Austen’s Emma,221 and 
rescue a woman from the dangers attributed to her by way of her sex. One also cannot 
refrain to remark on the name ‘Mr Knightley’, being an obvious allusion to the symbolism 
of a knight in shining armour. These two categories of men were frequently juxtaposed 
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in the same novel, exaggerating their behaviour and thus highlighting the obvious 
disparity between a male seducer and a moral eighteenth century gentleman. For 
instance, in David Copperfield, Mr Peggotty assists Emily to begin a new life after her 
abandonment by Steerforth. Mr Peggotty’s overtly chivalrous act serves to heighten the 
negative behaviour of Steerforth in contrast, and thus reinforces the eighteenth century 
masculine ideal. These literary notions naturally reflected and to some extent influenced 
society; as stated by Barclay, the chaste woman became integral to a morally-conscious 
British society, ‘female virtue became the mark of British superiority’ thus requiring 
British men to be ‘the moral protectors of female virtue’.222 Women, ultimately, were a 
class of person who required protection; by men, but by extension, by the law.  
 
3.2.1 Breach of Promise 
Breach of promise was very much grounded in contract law as an obligation that had not 
been fulfilled and was thus a broken contract; the action was accordingly economically 
motivated and damages were therefore recoverable. Yet as we shall see, this economic 
foundation also provided recourse for harm caused to a more social concept, this being 
the loss of reputation. A case regarding breach of promise was brought by a plaintiff who 
sought damages from the other party who had reneged on their promise of marriage. 
The humiliation surrounding a breach of promise action meant that these were usually 
not brought before the courts unless absolutely necessary. Proceedings were often 
heavily publicised, with pamphlets being distributed depicting the trial and the private 
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lives of both parties, usually in excruciatingly minute detail. It was accordingly this 
importance attached to reputation that motivated a party into bringing an action,223 
particularly if a woman had been left pregnant by her lover; pregnancy could be used to 
play upon the sentiments of the jury and resulted in increased damages. Commonly, a 
claim was brought as a consequence of a woman having lost her reputation or, perhaps 
of increasing importance, a number of years in which she could have been courting other 
potential spouses to a more successful and perhaps lucrative conclusion. This harks back 
to the point made in the previous chapter that marriage was used as a means of social 
and financial advancement, and so finding oneself jilted, and even worse, jilted whilst 
expecting, was ruinous from both a social as well as economic perspective; damages were 
therefore awarded as a reflection of this.  
 
As mentioned, breach of promise has been included in this thesis as a direct contrast to 
those contracts in restraint of marriage. It would seem that breach of promise was very 
similar to restraint of marriage with regard to the incentive of those entering these 
respective contracts. Indeed, superficially, both appear to concern the notion that a party 
was promising themselves in marriage to another, just why one was permitted whilst 
the other was not will therefore provide further understanding of the motivations of the 
courts in declaring certain contracts to be void.  
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Female Breach of Promise Actions  
Given what has been discussed above with regard to womanhood, it is clear why a such 
a breach of promise action would be deemed to be necessary for a woman left humiliated 
and potentially ruined by a broken promise of marriage. A woman was always under the 
protection – or control – of a male, whether it was her father or later, upon marriage, 
her husband. It was therefore almost impossible for a woman to recover from her 
damaged reputation in the same way as her male counterpart. Indeed, the 1827 novel 
The Father and Daughter224 portrays this very situation. The young female protagonist, 
Agnes, having been seduced and left ruined by her lover, returns with her child to her 
father only to find he has been driven insane by the shame caused by the damage to his 
daughter’s reputation. The remainder of the story focuses on Agnes’ struggle to re-
establish herself in society whilst being an abandoned single mother. The reality was not 
dissimilar to this literary depiction; a woman could not simply move away as women 
lacked the financial independence to do this, and should a girl, based on a promise of 
future marriage, associate herself with a man in a way that was unbecoming of her 
virtuous eighteenth century ideal, other potential marriage prospects could be ruined if 
the wedding did not go ahead. As Bates explains, ‘it was considered very unlikely that a 
woman who had been courted and then abandoned would receive another offer of 
marriage; unless her honour and reputation were vindicated in public’.225 With this in 
mind, this section shall explore female breach of promise actions, before moving on to a 
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discussion of the same actions brought by men; the response of the law will be analysed 
concurrently.  
 
Foote v Hayne 
A case of breach of promise which at the time it was heard received much publicity, is 
that of Foote v Hayne,226 which concerns a young woman raised by callous parents and 
twice abandoned by cruel men. The background to this case provides a detailed insight 
into the circumstances surrounding breach of promise actions.  
The plaintiff, Maria Foote, was of some fame on the London theatre scene, performing 
regularly at the Covent Garden theatre. Maria had reached such a position as a 
consequence of the influence of her parents; her father had owned the Plymouth Theatre 
where Maria grew up, whilst her mother was an actress. Her family had not been 
received well in Plymouth as performers were viewed with distaste in the eighteenth 
century,227 and bad was made worse when Mr Foote married a girl who was 25 years his 
junior.228 In 1811, her father lost the family fortune after having bought a public house 
and Maria took to the stage in Covent Garden, her first performance taking place in May 
1814.  
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From the descriptions of Maria, it would seem that she had inherited her mother’s refined 
looks and was presented as beautiful and graceful on the stage,229 it was perhaps this 
that attracted the attention of Colonel Berkeley, by whom Maria bore two children. The 
relationship with Berkeley ended in June 1824, whilst Maria was pregnant with his 
second child. These facts are significant in that they provide the context to the 
circumstances surrounding how Maria found herself associated with Mr Hayne, the 
defendant in this breach of promise case.  A year prior to the cessation of the relationship 
between herself and Berkeley, Maria became known to Mr Hayne, after having performed 
in a show at which he was present.230 Mr Hayne made his intentions known to Maria’s 
father, who, aware of Maria’s current condition, sent her away to the country until after 
her child was born.  
 
Upon their return, Hayne addressed his intentions of marriage to Mrs Foote, who 
informed him that Maria was engaged to Berkeley and so could not accept his invitation. 
What passed between Maria Foote and Mr Hayne following this was a series of 
correspondence in which he confessed his love to her and wished to follow through with 
his promise of marriage. Yet Hayne repeatedly reneged on his promise, and so an action 
for breach of promise was brought by Maria on 21st December 1824. The facts as noted 
above were described extensively at trial before Abbott CJ. Pamphlets were printed 
depicting the circumstances leading up to the case and described the background and 
personal lives of both parties, and, as was common of the time, a feature was also 
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published in the Gentleman’s Magazine.231 We must be wary when reviewing the sources 
surrounding breach of promise cases, as pamphlets and articles written at this time 
regarding such actions brought by women in particular, were especially biased in 
presenting the woman as ruined by the man. For instance, the case report taken from a 
pamphlet regarding this trial begins by describing Maria Foote as the daughter of a ‘very 
respectable gentleman’232 and suggests that Maria was from an up-standing family. Of 
course, from biographies of Maria’s life,233 we know that this was not how the family was 
received in Plymouth, and so this illustrates the way in which breach of promise actions 
were often manipulated to appeal to the sentiments of both the jury as well as society. 
The rest of the pamphlet leading up to the trial is similarly pitying in its exposition of the 
relationship between Maria and Berkeley, portraying the image of a beautiful young girl 
who was seduced, a girl who was ‘a victim to his artifice’234. Likewise, Maria’s 
relationship with Mr Hayne is depicted in equally sympathetic terms. 
 
The claim at trial is particularly telling of the reasoning of the court in permitting breach 
of promise actions to succeed. Indeed, it was put to the jury by counsel for Maria that 
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despite her expending money in anticipation of the marriage - she had forfeited her 
acting career at the wishes of Mr Hayne, which had brought her £1000 a year and had 
also purchased various items with the expectation of marriage – all that Maria sought to 
claim was the non-pecuniary loss that had been endured from this breach of promise. 
Counsel for Maria stated this to be ‘the rank and station which she would have acquired 
by marriage’.235 However, it must also be remembered that although the behaviour of 
Hayne was unreasonable, Maria had deceived him as to her condition when he made his 
initial proposal to her. Although Maria may have been under the influence of her parents 
here, indeed it was admitted at the trial that ‘she knew that her father, who remained in 
London, wrote letters to the defendant respecting her, though it did not appear that she 
knew the exact contents of any of these letters’,236  it must be borne in mind that such 
cases very often portrayed the woman as a figure of misfortune who had been taken 
advantage of by men.  
 
In addition to this, at trial Abbott CJ reminded the jury that 'when a man proposed 
marriage to a woman, in ignorance of her having had children by another man, and 
afterwards discovered such a circumstance, he was not bound to perform his promise’.237 
Evidently, his Lordship did not look well upon the actions of Maria at the beginning of 
her relations with Mr Hayne, yet fortunately for her case, this action could arise but only 
because of the renewed proposals of marriage. Since Mr Hayne had renewed his proposal 
after he became aware of Maria and her pregnancy, the action could arise, but only in 
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relation to this later proposal. Had Mr Hayne not renewed his offer of marriage following 
this revelation, the action for breach of promise would not be permitted. As stated by 
Abbott CJ, Maria’s deceitful actions in refraining to inform her suitor of her pregnancy 
would be sufficient to release Mr Hayne from performing any further obligations to her.  
 
In directing the jury, eighteenth century attitudes regarding the role of women are 
particularly evident; indeed, Abbott CJ stated that, ‘the jury were to reflect, that a woman, 
who had the misfortune to be seduced, and had lived with another man, could never 
come into a Court of Justice to ask the same compensation as a woman of unblemished 
reputation’.238 This was as a consequence of Maria having continued to live with Berkeley 
following Mr Hayne’s first proposal of marriage. Clearly, we see notions of virtue and 
chastity here. Maria had not been entirely innocent in her conduct; it was not becoming 
of a woman to entertain two men in such a way. The trial itself lasted eleven hours, and 
the jury returned a verdict in favour of Maria. She was to be awarded £3000 in damages.  
 
The Importance of Reputation 
The trial of Foote v Hayne is illustrative of the motivations of the court in providing 
recourse to injured parties through breach of promise actions. It was not to be permitted 
that someone could renege on their proposal at a whim, particularly when so much was 
at stake not only by way of money expended but with regard to social status also. The 
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concept of reputation was referred to explicitly in the case of Orford v Cole.239 The highest 
award of damages to date was given to Miss Alice Orford in recognition of Thomas Butler 
Cole breaking his engagement with her. She was awarded £7000 by the court, who were 
directed by Bailey J to determine the sum based on ‘her conduct throughout the 
transaction’.240 As was common in such cases, the plaintiff was presented by her counsel 
as an upstanding woman, whilst counsel for Mr Cole portrayed her as ‘calculating’.241  
There was no evidence that Mr Cole was abusive towards Miss Orford, in fact, the 
engagement lasted only three months, and the couple met only three times in this period. 
Despite this, Alice was awarded ‘the equivalent of Cole’s annual income’.242  
 
At trial, Mr Topping, acting for Orford, began by immediately referring to the standing 
of the family from which Alice heralded. He stated that, ‘a family more respectable I never 
knew’,243 and went on to detail how Miss Orford was the daughter of a surgeon at 
Warrington, and was ‘well-educated, highly accomplished, sensible and certainly not 
without beauty’.244 Mr Topping in making explicit reference to the characteristics 
becoming of a virtuous woman, would evidently have sought to appeal to the sympathies 
of the jury. The court heard how the relationship between Orford and Cole began when 
Miss Orford visited the home of Mrs Butler, Cole’s mother. It was not long after meeting 
Miss Orford that Mr Cole proposed marriage to her, following the acceptance of his 
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proposal, letters passed between the pair and arrangements were made for the nuptials, 
with clothes and other articles being ordered at the request of Mr Cole, in anticipation. 
However, on 14th June 1818, Cole sent Alice Orford a final letter, postponing the marriage. 
This was the last communication between the pair before it was announced that Mr Cole 
had married another woman, Miss Grimshaw, on 29th August, thus breaking his promise 
with Orford.  
 
Throughout the speech of Mr Topping, it is clear that he is pandering to the sympathies 
of the jury on several occasions. When speaking of Cole, the language used borders on 
theatrical: 
There was no want of intellect; but unfortunately he wanted that, without which man was the 
vilest reptile that crawls the earth – a heart245 
Likewise, when calling witnesses to attest to the character of Alice Orford, the word 
‘respectable’246 is used consistently in their testimony. Reference to the character of Miss 
Orford was also made by counsel for Cole. Mr Scarlett argued that lesser damages should 
be rewarded as no loss to Miss Orford’s social standing had been sustained, ‘her character 
stood unimpeached and unimpeachable’.247 Counsel further argued that the feelings of 
Miss Orford could not possibly have been hurt to any great extent as the couple had only 
known each other for a few months. Rather incredulously, in making his final 
submissions to the court, Mr Scarlett stated that the behaviour of Cole throughout the 






marriage negotiations and in abruptly ending the engagement, showed that the marriage 
would have been an unhappy one anyway, and so Miss Orford ought to have been happy 
that it was brought to an end. The jury were evidently left unconvinced by Mr Scarlett’s 
arguments as they retired for only fifteen minutes before finding in favour of Orford and 
awarding her £7000 in damages.  
 
What is clear throughout Orford v Cole, is that the argument presented by counsel on 
both sides was based on the concept of reputation. Orford was portrayed as a virtuous 
woman who had been wrongfully abandoned by a ‘cruel, careless and dishonourable’248 
man. Even counsel for Cole appeared to concede that his behaviour throughout the 
engagement was unbecoming of a gentleman. Nonetheless, in attempting to mitigate the 
level of damages, Mr Scarlett refers to the ‘unimpeachable’ character of Miss Orford even 
after her ordeal. Orford v Cole therefore demonstrates that breach of promise cases were 
undoubtedly seeking to protect the social standing of the parties involved and the 
language used throughout Orford reflects this clearly.  
 
What is also clear is that in permitting these actions, the courts were not saying that two 
parties ought to have married regardless and were thus not effectively forcing marriage; 
in fact, this was the opposite of what was intended, as stated by Lord Mansfield in 
Atcheson v Baker who held that ‘it would be most mischievous to compel parties to marry 




who could never happily live together’.249 Instead, what the courts were attempting to do 
with breach of promise actions, as with any contract, was to provide a remedy for breach 
of an agreement in which some loss had occurred. The loss in this instance was socially 
as well as economically motivated. The statement by Lord Mansfield in Atcheson can be 
compared to the language used in restraint of marriage cases in the previous chapter. In 
cases such as Hartley v Rice,250 marriage was encouraged, and accordingly a contract 
which was found to be in contradiction of this policy was void as being ‘calculated to 
operate against marriage’.251 Breaching a promise of marriage not only countered the 
motivation of the law to uphold the sanctity of marriage, but furthermore, wilfully 
reneging on a promise of marriage undermined the institution of marriage, and equally, 
the law would not permit this to occur. Therefore, ultimately, the courts applied similar 
motivations across both restraint of marriage cases as well as actions for breach of 
promise; they just found different means to do this.  
 
The agenda of protection applied by the law is particularly evident in the judgments 
regarding breach of promise. Eighteenth century notions that a woman ought to remain 
virtuous until marriage influenced this protection; any trouble in which a woman may 
have found herself as a consequence of a promise of marriage that was not forthcoming 
was taken seriously by the courts and sought to be remedied by the payment of damages. 
As acknowledged by Lettmaier, breach of promise actions were based upon an image of 
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‘the dependent child woman… against whom a… plaintiff… fell to be judged’.252 Loss of 
reputation was something an eighteenth century single woman could not afford to lose, 
particularly if her family had loftier social ambitions for her. Indeed, in Foote v Hayne, 
we are told of Mr Hayne that ‘he was possessed of large property in the West Indies, and 
that he had 46,000l. in the Funds’253 and thus the family had no objection to him courting 
their daughter. Furthermore, it is clear that counsel for Maria stated her claim in terms 
of the damage to her reputation that she had undertaken as a consequence of Mr Haynes 
refusal of marriage. As has been noted above by Barclay, protecting the virtue of women 
became the hallmark of a morally upright British society, this by extension required the 
law to employ the same protective agenda. Thus, similarly to restraint of marriage 
contracts as discussed in the previous chapter, the courts were seeking to ensure the 
protection of social status. In cases such as Lowe v Peers, whilst the protection of wealth 
was a clear motivation of the courts prohibiting a contract that restrained Catherine 
Lowe from marrying another man, it was also noted that implicit in this was the 
protection of the social standing of each party. Wealth and social status were inexplicably 
linked, and so whilst money expended in anticipation of marriage was sometimes 
claimed in breach of promise actions, it was the preservation of reputation and 
constituent social standing that were both sought to be protected by the courts in these 
cases. As with restraint of marriage, it was simply that breach of promise involved 
upholding a contract to ensure that this protection was achieved, whilst restraint of 
marriage involved finding a contract void to achieve this same protection.  
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In essence, breach of promise and restraint of marriage were merely different modes of 
achieving the same outcome; both were concerned with upholding the sanctity of 
marriage and both sought to protect social status. As has been noted, it was simply that 
in order to do this, one group of contracts was upheld, whilst the other was rendered 
void by the courts.  
 
Male Breach of Promise Actions 
Whilst it is perhaps assumed that breach of promise actions were brought by women 
against men, although not as common,254 cases involving a male plaintiff did occur.  
This kind of breach of promise action is represented in literature as being rather pitiful. 
Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility255 is illustrative of this, where Lucy Steele leaves 
Edward Ferrars to elope instead with his younger brother. This attitude is perhaps 
illustrative of the way in which, despite the damage to a woman’s reputation, a jilted man 
cut a much more pathetic figure than a subdued female, who of course could not expect 
too much from a virile male to maintain his promise. Such was the infrequency of actions 
brought by men, that there was some a question of whether a man could even bring an 
action of breach of promise. This is what was argued in Harrison v Cage256 which 
involved the plaintiff bringing an action against a woman who had promised to marry 
him, but had instead married another. Holt CJ was sensible in his reasoning that there 
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was nothing that ought to restrain a man from bringing a case when a woman could do 
the same. In summing up, his Lordship reasoned, ‘why should not a woman be bound by 
her promise as well as a man is bound by his?’257 The plaintiff was therefore awarded 
£400 which was felt to be in keeping with the fact that the woman was worth £3000 
when he courted her.  
 
Equally, in much the same way as the reputation of a jilted bride was held to be 
paramount, the character of the plaintiff was scrutinised in male breach of promise 
actions too. In Baddeley v Mortlock and Wife,258 an action was brought by Baddeley 
against the husband of a woman who had broken her promise of marriage to him. In the 
case, counsel for Mortlock scrutinised the behaviour of Baddeley and it was put to the 
court that the now Mrs Mortlock had rightly broken her promise of marriage to Baddeley 
when his negative character had become known to her. It emerged that during the 
marriage negotiations, Baddeley had been accused of ‘dishonesty in some pecuniary 
concerns, and… perjury’259 but he could not vindicate himself to his potential future 
spouse. As a consequence of this, the now Mrs Mortlock broke of her engagement to 
Baddeley. The court agreed with the reasoning of counsel for the defendant. Gibbs CJ 
stated that, ‘if a woman improvidently promise to marry a man, who turns out upon 
inquiry to be of bad character, she is not bound to perform her promise’.260 Thus, it was 
perfectly permissible for Mrs Mortlock to end her engagement to Baddeley, however, 
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Gibbs CJ followed this with the caveat that ‘she must shew that the plaintiff is a man of 
bad character. The accusation is not enough’.261 Consequently, some evidence was 
required to be produced which confirmed the ill-character of the plaintiff. In this case, 
there was no proof that the charges of which Baddeley was accused were legitimate and 
so Mrs Mortlock was not absolved from the action for breach of promise. It was 
acknowledged, however, that the information concerning the behaviour of the plaintiff 
did affect the level of damages that could be awarded.262 In delivering judgment, whilst 
the action for breach of promise was upheld, Baddeley was awarded a mere one shilling. 
Given the level of damages that have been noted in cases such as Foote v Hayne and 
Harrison v Cage, it is evident that this award was a nominal sum for the recognition of a 
breach of contract. Thus, the importance attached to reputation in breach of promise 
cases is clear, just as the character of a defendant could be scrutinised to pander to the 
sympathies of the jury to seek a higher level of damages, the same could be done to reduce 
the level awarded to a plaintiff for ill-behaviour. The morally upright society in which 
these cases were being decided is reflected in the judgments themselves, and in the 
subsequent protection of a much more social concept, this being the reputation of the 
parties.  
 
It was this focus on protecting the social concept of reputation that meant that awards of 
damages for breach of promise actions were not relative to the size of the fortune of the 
respective parties. This was so despite the financial considerations attached to marriage 
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explored in the previous chapter of this thesis. The disparity between wealth and the size 
of damages is evident in the case of Foster v Mellish263 in which Foster received only £200 
in damages in comparison to the fortune of Mellish standing at approximately £13,900. 
As was common with all breach of promise cases, the plaintiff was presented as an 
upstanding member of society, who had been a victim of the cruel actions of the 
defendant. Indeed, Foster was described as ‘a young gentleman in a most respectable 
situation of life’264 whilst Mellish was ‘a young lady of exquisite beauty’,265 who had made 
Foster ‘a puppet to her caprice’.266  
 
The report of the case reveals how Foster, a surgeon, had first met Mellish when he had 
taken up practice in London. After their initial meeting Foster proposed marriage which 
was accepted by Mellish and although her family were at first reluctant, their consent 
was soon obtained. Several letters passed between the couple from the 28th September 
1801 when the agreement to marry took place, to the 12th December, which was the date 
set for the marriage. During this time, we are told that Foster spent £500 preparing his 
home, although it was not proved definitively that this was in anticipation of the arrival 
of the defendant. It was during the intermediate correspondence however that Mellish 
appears to become averse to the idea of the marriage, breaking off the connection and 
then reaffirming it on more than one occasion. This was argued by counsel for Mellish to 
be as a consequence of her brothers’ lack of consent to the proposal, yet in a letter dated 
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the 27th November, Mellish ended the engagement completely at which point Foster 
sought recourse and brought the case to trial.  
 
What is particularly revealing is that which was claimed by counsel for the plaintiff; it 
was put to the jury that the whole ordeal had taken its toll on Foster to such an extent 
that ‘his mind was disturbed’267 and ‘his health materially impaired’.268 Although Foster 
may have felt aggrieved as a result of his treatment - and rightly so - to say that his mind 
has been disturbed by the relationship is perhaps something of an exaggeration, but it is 
indicative of counsel in such trials attempting to pander to the sympathies of the jury by 
presenting clients as a severely injured victim. Clearly it was not only female plaintiffs 
who were presented in such a pitiable manner. Foster was depicted as a genuine man, 
who was motivated only by his love for the defendant, yet opposing counsel portrayed a 
different image, and it was argued that Foster was motivated greatly by monetary 
concerns. It was revealed that he had borrowed sums of money, around £1000 at a time, 
from various persons and marriage to Mellish and obtaining her fortune was the only 
way in which he could repay these debts. The jury were also shown a letter purporting 
to be from an anonymous source encouraging Mellish to marry Foster immediately lest 
her reputation be damaged from having had numerous clandestine meetings with him. 
Counsel for Mellish argued that this was actually forged by Foster himself.  
 





In summing up, Le Blanc J directed that there were two points to be decided by the jury. 
The first of these he believed to be of little doubt, this being whether there had been a 
promise made in respect of marriage. The second point to be decided by the jury was of 
greater contention and was whether the anonymous letter had been written by the 
plaintiff. If the jury felt that the letter had been forged by Foster, verdict was to be for the 
defendant, but if they found in the alternative, verdict was to be for the plaintiff. It was 
noted in the report that the trial lasted a whole day but the jury took only a few moments 
to return a verdict for the plaintiff. The sum to be awarded was £200.  
 
Given the behaviour of Foster, as well as Mellish, throughout their courtship in him 
repeatedly calling off the wedding, it is likely that damages were awarded as a reflection 
of this. However, it is clear that there was a significant difference between the sum 
awarded to Foster and the fortune of Mellish. This reinforces the notion that actions for 
breach of promise, although contractual and resulting in an award of monetary damages, 
were based on moral grounds. Thus, the level of damages was not to be awarded in 
proportion with the fortune lost from the prospective marriage but was instead awarded 
as a reflection of much more personal factors, this being the loss of reputation. This 
argument is only furthered when it was stated that the couple in Foster v Mellish were 
an adequate match financially, and so the same issues with regard to inequality as those 
that have been noted in the previous chapter as a reason for holding restraint of marriage 
cases to be void were not apparent here. Instead, whilst still applying a protection 
interest, breach of promise cases were upheld to protect that which had been lost in 
102 
 
anticipation of what would have been a suitable match, sometimes this was money 
expended, but as was more often the case, damage to reputation.  
 
Ultimately, courts permitted an action breach of promise brought by a man for the same 
reason as for women - to uphold the protection of social status. This outcome was 
ultimately grounded firmly in typical eighteenth century ideals regarding the social 
position of the respective sexes. The attitude of society with respect to a man was that he 
ought to be strong, virile, and able to provide for a family. Women, on the other hand, 
were weaker both physically and with regard to their societal position. Whilst higher 
class women often took instruction in painting, playing music, or learning French, this 
was not at the expense of their traditional role which was to be in the home and to care 
for their husband and children. Although women became much more vocal with regard 
to their traditional roles towards the end of the long eighteenth century, it was not until 
much later that we see a substantial change in this position. As such, during the period 
which is the focus of this thesis, we continue to have the concept of the male ‘provider’ 
and the female ‘homemaker’. With these ideals in mind, it therefore becomes easier to 
understand just why an action for breach of promise against a man could potentially be 
damaging to his reputation, but also correspondingly, why this was much more so for 
women who lacked the financial independence to begin a new life elsewhere, and further, 
why a jilted woman could take advantage of her traditionally submissive role to play the 




3.2.2 Breach of Promise vs. Restraint of Marriage  
This section began by proposing to show just why breach of promise actions were 
permitted whilst restraint of marriage cases were not. Within breach of promise there 
was an agenda of protection employed by the courts and it is within this that we can 
draw parallels between the motivations with respect to breach of promise and restraint 
of marriage. At first glance, it would seem that there was little difference between a 
promise to marry a specific individual and a promise refraining from marrying anyone 
else. It has been revealed in this section that this contention proves to be partly true, in 
that there was little difference, as both actions involved the same motivations, this being 
to uphold the sanctity of marriage as well as to protect social status. The overall motive 
of the courts was that marriage ought to be encouraged; the language of the judgments 
with regard to restraint of marriage cases reaffirmed that marriage was for the public 
good, ‘such that marriage be made on the proper foundation’269 and it was therefore 
against public policy to uphold a contract that restrained marriage and ran counter to 
this ideology. Following this line of reasoning, breach of promise was actionable as 
breaking a promise of marriage equally did not align with this motivation of the law. 
Thus, in permitting breach of promise and finding the restraint of marriage contracts to 
be void, the courts were merely doing the same thing; they were simply employing 
different means to achieve this same result.  
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3.3 SEX AND PARENTING 
As has been mentioned, breach of promise was potentially so harmful to a woman 
because of the damage to her reputation that could be caused should she court a man 
who later abandoned her. However, this social harm was only heightened should she find 
herself pregnant and alone. This resulted in higher damages being awarded by the jury 
in breach of promise cases where a woman had been left pregnant by an absconded 
future husband.270 These damages were intended to compensate for the lack of financial 
aid provided by the father of the child as it was important that single mothers could be 
supported to ensure that they did not become a burden on the parish. Beyond these 
financial consequences, the social stigma of being pregnant and unmarried tells us much 
of attitudes to sex and parenting in the long eighteenth century. It is clear that notions of 
sex and marriage were informed significantly by the moral era in which these cases took 
place. The link between sex and morality will be addressed in greater depth in the 
following chapter concerning contracts which were rendered void for immorality, 
however some knowledge of this is helpful in this chapter to inform a discussion on 
marriage.  
 
As has been noted, in the long eighteenth century, parenting was inexplicably tied to 
marriage. This reflected the notion that sex, too, was only to take place within the binds 
of matrimony; an evidently religious teaching typical of the moral Protestant era 
following the succession of William to the throne. Yet as shall be explored in chapter four, 
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the prevalence of prostitution demonstrated that this was not adhered to in practice. 
Furthermore, by the middle of the period, as recognised by Dabhoiwala, ‘consensual sex 
outside marriage had drifted beyond the reach of the law’.271 This was despite Societies, 
such as that of the Reformation of Manners, attempting to police immoral behaviour at 
the beginning of long eighteenth century.272 Indeed, such Reformers were viewed as 
objects of ridicule by the middle of the period, represented in plays such as The Different 
Widows,273 by Mary Pix as pathetic characters. Mr Drawle in Pix’s 1703 play is presented 
as a hypocrite, who is hated by his wife.274 The notion that sex ought to be confined to 
marriage, whilst ardently defended by such Reformation Societies, was not reflective of 
the reality of society. Indeed, whilst moral novelists such as Defoe warned of the dangers 
of sex outside of marriage in novels such as Moll Flanders,275 this can be contrasted with 
the writings of diarists such as Boswell, who, as well as recording the happenings in the 
Capital, also documented his extensive sexual exploits in his London Journal.276  
 
Indeed, confirmation of what has been deemed ‘the rise of sexual freedom’277 is 
demonstrated in the creation of social remedies for the consequences of such free sexual 
relationships. As Waugh has acknowledged, ‘by the mid-eighteenth century there was… 
an upsurge of interest in the venereal diseases’.278 The London Lock Hospital was 
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established in 1747 with the specific aim of treating venereal disease, yet only nine years 
previously Westminster Hospital had refused to admit patients exhibiting such 
symptoms – in response to public protest.279 Thus, whilst sex outside of marriage may 
have been much freer, this was not to say that it was excepted by all of society. The 
writings of moralists such as Defoe are illustrative of this, but equally, public disapproval 
of the treatment of venereal disease is an indication that whilst there may have been a 
rise in sexual freedom in the long eighteenth century, this was not welcomed by all. This 
further reflects social attitudes towards pregnancy outside of marriage, which as has 
been noted, still carried a social stigma. 
 
However, in defence of St. Thomas’s Hospital, another London institution which, like the 
Lock, treated venereal disease, Benjamin Golding stated in 1819 that ‘many innocent 
women of irreproachable characters themselves have received infection from the 
profligacy of their husbands’.280 This statement served to reinforce the ideal of the 
innocent but ruined woman in the eighteenth century, as has been discussed earlier in 
this chapter. Golding therefore asserted that such hospitals were integral to society to 
redeem and protect ruined women. Perhaps in an attempt to remedy that which had 
caused the patients to be inflicted with disease, it was further noted that ‘morality is 
apparent throughout the construction of this noble institution’.281 Men and women were 
separated, and those most severely infected were located away from the general hospital 
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population. The social class of many of those admitted to St. Thomas’s Hospital is evident 
in Golding’s description of the Hospital seeking to provide a solution to the ‘anguish of 
affliction… conjoined with poverty and pain’.282 The solution that was provided at 
Hospitals treating venereal disease was not simply a cure to the physical illness, but the 
morality of the project was evident in the focus on redemption attributed to patients. 
Regular sermons were delivered, one such published in 1797, by Thomas Scott, Chaplain 
of the Lock Hospital, reminded patients of their responsibilities to God: 
You should consider that affliction is not a thing which comes of course, or by chance; but springs 
from the wholly and righteous abhorrence with which God beholds iniquity; and is under his 
immediate direction and appointment283  
Therefore, by the middle of the period, sexual freedom had increased and social remedies 
such as the Lock Hospital were established as a consequence. Yet, whilst the response of 
society towards those inflicted with venereal disease was one of seeming disgust, as 
evident in the public protest at Westminster Hospital, this did not transfer itself to the 
provision of a punitive solution. Rather, the focus was on redemption. Thus, the moral 
focus of the long eighteenth century remained dominant, and it was this same morality 
that maintained that sex outside of marriage was wrong.  
 
Consequently, the correct mode of parenting was for a child to be born in wedlock. 
Perhaps the most famous study of the eighteenth century family is that published by 
Lawrence Stone. Stone’s seminal argument was that the period of the long eighteenth 
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century saw a move away from a patriarchal family, which was public, often repressive, 
and controlling, towards a nuclear family, which focused on the pursuit of individualistic 
pleasure and domesticity.284 This was in line with changes in the ideal of courtship too, 
as literary movements such as sensibility saw a shift in social attitudes towards romantic 
notions of love. The rise of the nuclear family resulted in women adopting a role in 
society, this is in contrast to their submissive position within the patriarchal family; 
within this new structure, women were ‘homemakers’.285 This position therefore 
adhered very much to eighteenth century ideals of womanhood but did not release a 
woman from her legal dependence on a male guardian, as shall be discussed in chapter 
five.  
 
Of course, there were social class divisions in parenting. Lawrence Stone remarks that 
the aristocracy were ‘the negligent mode’,286 with mother and father having political and 
social distractions to keep them from their children. This resulted in the use of wet nurses 
to breastfeed the babies of wealthier parents, although it is acknowledged that preventing 
a mother from breastfeeding also permitted her to retain her figure as well as have sex 
with her husband.287 The children of aristocratic families were also commonly sent to 
boarding school and subsequently to the armed forces or university, a practice which did 
not lend itself to an affectionate parental relationship. Those of the middle class were 
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conversely ‘child-orientated’.288 This was divided between those who pursued an 
affectionate relationship with their children and those who chose a more authoritarian 
approach. Regardless of the tact pursued, however, the middle class distinguished 
themselves from their upper class counterparts by way of their interest in their children. 
Finally, for the working class, children were seen as an ‘economic asset’,289 which 
resulted in them being sent to work at a young age, with apprenticeships often 
commencing when a child was seven years old.290 However, for those living in absolute 
poverty, parents were often ‘indifferent [and] cruel’291 to their children, who were a drain 
on already scarce resources.  
 
What cut across the social class divide, however, was that a child ought to be born within 
marriage. As well as the social stigma attached to being pregnant as an unmarried 
woman, ensuring that pregnancy occurred only within marriage was important for 
society financially too. The desire to protect wealth that we have seen in the previous 
chapter concerning why restraint of marriage contracts were rendered void was also a 
significant factor in seeking to confine pregnancy to within marriage. It was important 
that a family was certain of the paternity of a child to ensure that the correct heir 
inherited the family assets. It was for this same reason that it was paramount that the 
correct procedures were followed upon the breakdown of a marriage to protect the 
correct allocation of wealth and to thus ensure the future preservation of such.  
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3.3.1 Agreements for Separation 
Within the law regarding agreements for separation, the social position of the respective 
sexes remained a pertinent concern. Upon the breakdown of marriage, although 
provision was made for both parties, with regard to women, this usually took the form 
of a fixed sum settlement or regular maintenance, and so again, an eighteenth century 
woman continued to be dependent upon her male counterpart. In these agreements, 
women were entitled to ‘necessaries’, which accounted for items necessary to her 
everyday life, such as food and clothing, although this notion will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter five of this thesis regarding the contractual capacity of women. The trials 
surrounding agreements for separation provide an insight into marriages troubled by 
adultery, abuse, and deceit; in this section, individual cases will be discussed in detail in 
order to present a fuller picture of the law regarding these contracts. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that separation and divorce were still very much discouraged 
in eighteenth century England and were viewed as rather shameful; for instance, in a 
study for the parish of Colyton in Devon only 10% of marriages ended in separation.292 
Such agreements were valid provided that they were followed by an immediate 
separation, yet what are of interest to this thesis are those occasions in which agreements 
for separation were held to be void. This was usually in instances when the agreement 
had been prepared in anticipation of a future separation that may or may not occur and 
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where the parties had made provisions accordingly. These ‘just in case’ contracts were 
not permitted by the courts, for reasons that shall be explored. 
 
3.3.2 Separation in the Long Eighteenth Century 
Prior to any examination of the legal implications surrounding agreements for 
separation, eighteenth century attitudes to separation will be discussed. It must be 
remembered that at this time, whilst divorce and separation were discouraged, the 
ending of marital relations was made further difficult by the fact that divorce was only 
granted by way of an Act of Parliament. As a result of this, a full divorce was reserved for 
those who had the financial means to obtain it and so for those who could not, a 
separation agreement provided a means of allocating assets upon the breakdown of 
marriage that was relatively inexpensive, in comparison to pursuing a divorce. Whilst a 
separation did not permit the parties to remarry another unless explicitly provided for, 
it must be remembered that the average life expectancy at this time was around 40 years 
old and so it was likely mortality provided the option for remarriage following a 
separation.   
 
Another means of separation in the long eighteenth century that has been researched 
extensively by historians such as E.P. Thompson is that of the wife sale. The concept of 
wife sales was addressed in literature, perhaps most significantly in The Mayor of 
Casterbridge293 by Thomas Hardy. Although the novel was first published in 1886, and is 
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therefore outside of the period of focus for this thesis, it is arguably the most famous 
literary depiction of a custom that occurred throughout the long eighteenth century and 
is therefore included here as an example of how such customs were interpreted in 
literature, and thus informed popular culture. In the novel, Michael Henchard, a hay-
trusser, decides to sell his wife Susan, following an argument. Whilst at a village fair, 
Henchard becomes intoxicated having consumed furmety laced with rum and remarks 
that men who have become tired of their wives ought to simply sell them. This results in 
an auction taking place during which Susan agrees to the sale, given that Michael has 
shown her nothing but ill-temper throughout their marriage. She is sold for five guineas 
to a sailor, whose kind behaviour towards her contrasts starkly to the disrespect her 
lawful husband has exhibited during their time at the fair and indeed, accordingly to 
Susan, throughout their marriage. The first chapter of the novel ends with Henchard 
being presented with the money and Susan and her new husband leaving together with 
her child. However, this portrayal of a wife sale has been criticised by E.P Thompson who 
remarks that Hardy relied on newspaper sources to inform his description of the sale of 
Michael Henchard’s wife, Susan. Thompson submits that as Hardy did not observe the 
practice directly, his literary depiction lacks accuracy.294  
 
The most frequent method adopted for the wife sale was that which took place in a public 
market; a wife would be led wearing a halter, either around her neck or waist, before the 
rope was symbolically transferred to her new husband, the process taking place before 
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an auctioneer. Eighteenth century ideals of womanhood are apparent in the description 
of the wife at auction; Thompson notes that ‘the women, being wives, [were] described 
by their looks, deportment or supposed moral conduct, but very rarely by their 
occupation’.295 It is clear that this, alongside the custom of a halter, presented a wife as 
akin to a chattel, and whilst therefore somewhat in-keeping with legal doctrine at the 
time which, as mentioned, reduced a woman to the property of a male, subsuming her 
legal rights into those of her male guardian, the practice was not well received in general 
society. Indeed, the wife sale was most common amongst the lower classes, and viewed 
with ‘moral disapproval’296 by the middle and upper class. Yet Thompson cautions 
against viewing the wife sale as something which rendered a woman a chattel; a 
condition of the ritual was that the wife had to agree to the sale, just as Susan did in The 
Mayor of Casterbridge, and so he argues that this consent obviated the objectification of 
wives at auction.297  
 
The custom of a wife sale, then, was less of a ‘brutal chattel purchase’298 and should 
instead be seen as a means of separation. Further, whilst the upper classes regarded the 
wife sale with disdain, it should not be seen as a barbaric custom of an immoral lower 
class, argues Thompson, but instead as a ritual of a culture which lacked the means to 
readily divorce and so sought to remedy this with a process that paid ‘high regard to 
rituals and forms’299 but also to community and the maintenance of the family unit, hence 
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the requirement for the sale to be made public and the consent of the wife having to be 
obtained. These same conditions attached to the wife sale, short of creating a humiliating 
spectacle of a woman, ultimately rendered the custom an organised and empathetic 
means of pursuing a valid separation for the lower class.  
 
For those of the middle and upper class, however, a marriage was legally terminated by 
divorce or a deed for separation. It is the latter of these that appealed to a greater section 
of society, given the relative ease of obtaining such, and was therefore more commonly 
employed as means of ending marital relations. The validity of these separation 
agreements will now be examined.  
 
Requirement 1: Immediacy  
In order to effect a valid separation agreement it was held by the courts that this must 
be immediate; any contract in anticipation of a future separation was void. In the early 
case of Gawden v Draper,300 where an agreement of a £300 yearly maintenance to be 
paid quarterly was agreed between the parties, this could not be revoked by a later 
indenture which added the requirement that the plaintiff must not cohabit with another. 
Indeed, when the plaintiff in this case brought the action for an unfilled payment of £75 
for the previous quarter, the defendant sought to invoke this later indenture as the reason 
as to why the agreement was no longer valid. The court delivered its judgment based 
upon considerations regarding the formalities of the contract, notably that the ‘later 
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covenant cannot be pleaded in bar of a former’.301 In other words, the later requirement 
of no cohabitation, being additional to the initial agreement, could not therefore take 
precedence over the original separation agreement. The action in Gawden involved a 
separation agreement which had been drafted and carried out with immediate effect, but 
a later case demonstrated that this immediacy was crucial to the validity of such a 
contract. 
 
Cartwright v Cartwright302 concerned a deed executed by a father, which provided that 
should his son and daughter-in-law separate, the rent and profits obtained from the 
father’s freeholdings ought to be paid to his son. On the 10th July 1839, prior to the 
marriage of his son, Henry, Thomas Cartwright executed a settlement for the benefit of 
Henry and his future wife, Ellen, as well as any future children to be born from the 
marriage. The deed also contained a provision that should Henry and Ellen separate, the 
rent and profit from the freehold properties would pass solely to Henry. Henry and Ellen 
married and lived together until 1846, when Ellen left the home and the pair lived 
separately. The couple were living apart when Thomas Cartwright died in 1851 and 
Henry brought an action against the trustees for the payment of the rent and profits. At 
trial, the court was asked to determine the legality of the separation agreement contained 
in the deed.  
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Knight Bruce LJ found ‘the theory of the law to be, that a man and his wife cannot live in 
a state of separation from each other… without some failure on the part of one or both 
in the performance of duties in the fulfilment of which society has an interest’,303 as such 
the agreement had to be void as ‘such a proviso is against public policy’.304 Turner LJ 
then went on to discuss the case law which had been relied upon in the case, notably 
Brown v Peck305 and Westmeath v Westmeath,306 and came to the same conclusion, that 
the agreement ought to be void. It is evident here that the courts found such contracts to 
be void as they offended against the promotion of marriage and interfered in the 
performance of marital duties. Clearly, the courts were relying upon the very same public 
policy grounds as those noted in the previous chapter in relation to restraint of marriage 
and marriage brokerage. Marriage was important to a civilised society and the law 
wished to promote this, and so a contract which anticipated the breakdown of such 
marital relations, and furthermore, provided for payment of a large sum should this 
occur, was prohibited by the courts.  
 
Of the two cases discussed extensively in Cartwright, that of Westmeath v Westmeath 
will be discussed shortly in greater detail, given that the facts of this case are particularly 
telling of the circumstances surrounding separation in the long eighteenth century. 
Before that, however, it is acknowledged that the voidability of contracts based on 
grounds of public policy is further evidenced in a second case addressed in Cartwright, 
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namely Brown v Peck. In Brown, an uncle left a devise to his niece in his will of £2 per 
month should she continue to live with her husband, but £5 should she live apart from 
him. This was on the basis that she had married him without the consent of her mother. 
Upon the question of the validity of this provision, it was held that the condition was 
‘both impossible at the time of imposing it, and contra bonos mores’307 and was therefore 
void.  With the cases explored above, separation agreements which were made prior to 
the marriage occurring, such as in Cartwright, or in anticipation of the separation as in 
Brown, were held as void based upon public policy reasons. This rested on the notion 
that agreements made prior to marriage introduced a negative incentive on the parties 
to renege on their marital duties if they were aware that upon separation a sizeable sum 
had been settled to ensure their maintenance. Again, the law wished to uphold the 
sanctity of marriage, and so agreements such as these which countered this motivation 
were not upheld.   
 
Requirement 2: Animosity 
Immediacy was not the only condition that was required for a valid separation agreement 
however; alongside this there was a further caveat that the parties must be living apart 
and could not continue to live as husband and wife following the separation agreement. 
Should either one of these two requirements not be fulfilled, the contract was to be 
declared void. This second obligation is best illustrated by contrasting two cases, one 
which fulfilled this principle and was thus a valid contract, and the other which did not 
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and was thus void. The first of these cases that will be discussed is that which fell afoul 
of this rule, that being the case of Westmeath, which, as has been noted was one of the 
cases discussed in some detail in Cartwright. The facts of the trial of Westmeath are long 
and proceedings continued for almost a decade, but nonetheless they do demonstrate the 
often-seeming harshness of the law with regard to upholding a separation agreement. 
 
Lady Emily Cecil, the daughter of the Marquess of Salisbury, married George Nugent, the 
Marquess of Westmeath, on the 29th May 1812. However, from the time of the marriage 
until 1817, the Marchioness complained of cruelty and ill treatment against her at the 
hand of her husband.308 Nugent already had one illegitimate child prior to courting Emily 
and relations with this mistress continued even after his marriage as during this time he 
fathered yet another child to her. The Marchioness was not entirely innocent in her 
behaviour either, however, as we are told that she neglected her husband when he was 
ill to attend parties and consequently accumulated significant debts to pay for which trust 
money had to be advanced.309 The outcome of these tensions resulted in a deed for 
separation being executed on the 17th December 1817, which stipulated the level of 
maintenance for the Marchioness as well as that of the couple’s only daughter, Lady Rosa.  
 
Upon the intervention of friends, however, as well as the mother of Emily who was aware 
of the scandalous publicity attached to a separation, both parties continued to reside 
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together until 1818 when, as a consequence of her husband’s fiery temper, the 
Marchioness ceased to cohabit with her husband and so a second separation agreement 
was executed on 30th May of the same year. Again, however, it would seem that Nugent 
was not entirely to blame, as Emily is noted to have goaded her husband and provoked 
his anger several times.310 This second deed provided for £1300 per annum for the 
Marchioness with an additional £300 after 6 years, which was maintenance for Lady 
Rosa and the child with which the Marchioness was now pregnant. If one of the children 
should die, this was to be reduced to £250.311 The Marchioness was also permitted to 
dispose of her property as she so wished and was to live as if unmarried, free from 
interference of any sort by her husband. 
 
After the execution of this deed, the Marchioness permitted her estranged husband to 
occupy apartments in the house until he could seek appointment abroad. They did not 
cohabit as husband and wife, they occupied different quarters in the house and slept in 
different beds, but it was found that they did continue to dine and visit together.312 This 
living arrangement continued in January 1819 when the pair moved into a different house 
- that was until the 14th June when the Marchioness left after her husband was again 
violent to her and the children were placed in the care of her mother. A day later, the 
Marquis filed a bill alleging that the information contained in the separation agreement 
of 1818 had been obtained by false representations and thus sought all the provisions to 
be declared void, but his action was dismissed. On the 3rd September 1822 the Marquis 
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again petitioned for the deeds of 1817 and 1818 to be set aside as he alleged that both 
amounted to an agreement for future separation, and as the couple had continued to live 
together, they ought to be declared void. The Marchioness in turn pleaded for a 
separation on grounds of adultery and cruelty.  
 
At the first trial, it was held that adultery and cruelty had not been proved and so such a 
separation was not permitted, although this judgment was reversed upon appeal on 29th 
January 1827. From this decision, Lord Westmeath then appealed. The result of which 
was a trial which lasted 5 days and culminated in the 1817 deed being declared void. Upon 
the question of the validity of the second deed, the court found that the cause should be 
retained for 12 months. Consequently, the case concerning the validity of the deed of 1818 
was heard on 3rd April 1830 in House of Lords. 
 
The court looked at the behaviour of the parties after the execution of the deed in order 
to determine the validity of its provisions. In returning a verdict, the Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Lyndhurst, found that ‘they dined together at the same table, they visited together, 
and travelled together; and although they might possibly not cohabit as husband and 
wife, they appeared to the world as living together as husband and wife’.313 As a result, 
the provisions contained in the deed could not be realised as there had been no actual 
separation, given the living arrangements of the parties. Continuing to dine and visit 
together was in effect continuing the ‘marital duties’, as observed earlier, and 
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consequently the agreement was not immediate. A future separation agreement, such as 
this, was therefore void. The reasoning of the Earl of Eldon is more revealing as to the 
motivations of the court. Indeed, in holding that ‘the contract between husband and wife 
is of the most solemn and sacred nature’,314 the court was confirming that the sanctity of 
marriage was not something which was to be invalidated lightly.   
 
In Westmeath, the courts found that as the Marquis and Marchioness had continued to 
live together, effectively as husband and wife, this rendered the separation agreement 
akin to that of a future agreement and was thus void. With this, we again see the courts 
upholding the sanctity of marriage and thus protecting the fulfilment of marital duties. 
However, simply living together did not necessarily mean that the separation agreement 
was to be declared void, and as is common with these cases, each was to turn on its 
particular facts, and the courts would interpret this accordingly. Such was the case in 
Bateman v Countess of Ross,315 which provides a neat contrast to the judgment of 
Westmeath.  
 
Bateman concerned a separation agreement which had been executed in 1784 following 
the divorce of John Bateman and the Countess of Ross four years previously. At 
arbitration, maintenance was awarded to the Countess, but what is of foremost 
significance is the property and land which was also conveyed to her, provided that she 
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and Bateman lived apart. In 1795 Bateman sought to have the award set aside, which was 
rejected, however the court did remove the attached injunction by which the Countess 
had obtained possession of the house and land. Upon hearing this, Bateman moved back 
into the property, located at Castle Gore in Ireland, at which point the Countess also 
returned in an attempt to protect her land. This resulted in the couple now residing in 
the same property, and so the Countess filed a bill in 1797 to restore the land to her, 
which was awarded. As a consequence, Bateman appealed, stating that as the two had 
been cohabiting, the prior agreement with regard to the payment of maintenance as well 
as the allocation of property ought to be declared void.  
 
The matter was brought before the court on the 22nd March 1813. Lord Redesdale, in 
delivering his judgment, found in the alternative to the court in Westmeath, determining 
that it was not merely the form that ought to be examined but the substance of the 
renewed cohabitation. Accordingly, a distinction was drawn between cohabitation and 
reconciliation, the two not being mutual exclusive. In this case, although the parties had 
cohabited together, this had not been accompanied by any understanding between the 
two, and was in fact ‘not for the purpose of reconciliation, but to protect… property’.316 
The distinction can be drawn here between this case and that of Westmeath. The 
difference being that in the latter case, the parties had continued to live together, fulfilling 
all of their duties as husband and wife, and so to the outside world they appeared 
married, whereas here there was no apparent continuation of these martial duties, and 
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as recognised by Lord Eldon, the parties instead cohabited ‘in a state of the highest 
animosity’.317 As a result, the agreement for separation was upheld and Bateman was 
required to make an outstanding payment of £8333 11s. 9 1/2d to his ex-wife.  
 
Lord Eldon in Bateman also stated just why a separation agreement accompanied by a 
subsequent reconciliation rendered the agreement void. His Lordship held that ‘this 
rested upon the ground of public policy; as it must not be permitted to parties to make 
agreements for themselves, to hold good whenever they chose to live separate’.318 This is 
clear confirmation of that which was stated in Westmeath, that such contracts ought to 
be void on grounds of public policy. The law sought to protect marriage and uphold the 
sanctity of such, it was therefore not in-keeping with this notion that parties may enter 
into an agreement providing for their separation at some point in the future. This 
undermined marriage by effectively stating that the parties were prepared to accept that 
their marriage may not be for life; it must also be remembered that at this time the 
marriage ceremony which was conducted was that included in the Book of Common 
Prayer, which stated ‘for as long as ye both shall live’.319 Marriage was a lifelong contract 
and thus making provisions for separation not only countered this belief but such an 
agreement also risked the couple not being as invested in their respective duties as 
husband and wife and thus undermining the social conditions of marriage.  
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A key question posed at the beginning of this chapter was just why breach of promise 
actions were permitted whilst restraint of marriage contracts, as addressed in the 
previous chapter, were not. This question was particularly pertinent given that on the 
face of it, both of these classes of contract seemed to concern the promise of marriage to 
another. However, regarding restraint of marriage, as stated by Lord Mansfield in Lowe 
v Peers, refraining from marrying any other person did not necessitate that the defendant 
would marry the plaintiff320 and so the contract was one which purely restricted 
behaviour; such a restriction was accordingly contrary to public policy and therefore 
void. There was no actual promise of marriage to another party. On the other hand, an 
action for breach of promise was remedying a broken contract where a positive action – 
in other words, a promise of marriage – had occurred. This was the difference between 
these two classes of contract. Yet, it is clear that despite this difference, the motivation of 
the law was the same.  
 
In both of these instances, the law was seeking to uphold the sanctity of marriage and 
thus invoked an agenda of protection. However, this protection extended beyond this 
purely legal concept, and indeed, for breach of promise, it was the damaged reputation 
of the jilted party that sought to be remedied by an award of damages. As has been noted, 
recognition of the social harm that had been caused was particularly important for 
women, who, as a consequence of both their legal and social status in the eighteenth 
                                                          
320 Lowe (n181 in ch 2) 2232   
125 
 
century, stood to lose future marriage prospects concurrently to their reputation. 
Likewise, in rendering restraint of marriage contracts as void, it was not simply the 
protection of the institution of marriage that was sought by the courts. Cases such as 
Woodhouse v Shepley321 demonstrate that a contract which restrained marriage risked 
disrupting the correct allocation of family wealth, and so financial protection was also 
achieved in rendering these contracts void. Ultimately, it has been shown that whilst 
breach of promise actions were permitted and contracts in restraint of marriage were 
held to be void, the motivation of the law for both of these classes of contract was the 
same. It was merely that in order to invoke the protection interest for both the legal 
concept of the sanctity of marriage as well as for the social and financial consequences of 
these agreements, the nature of these respective contracts required the former to be 
permitted whilst the latter was declared void.  
 
In relation to agreements for separation, it is clear that these were permitted in some 
circumstances; however, the agreement had to precede an immediate separation. Any 
contract which provided for a separation at some point in the future, such as that in 
Cartwright v Cartwright, was deemed to be void by the courts. The reasoning here was 
similar to that noted above regarding restraint of marriage contracts and breach of 
promise actions, notably that the law sought to protect marriage, but in particular with 
regard to separation agreements, the fulfilment of marital duties. This is further 
demonstrated in instances where the parties cohabited following a separation, as should 
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the parties live together in a state akin to husband and wife, as in Westmeath v 
Westmeath, this rendered any prior separation agreement void on the basis that the law 
was wary of allowing couples to effectively decide themselves when they fulfilled their 
marital obligations and when they did not. In finding these contracts to be void, the law 
was hoping to prevent couples from reneging on their marital obligations. Consequently, 
it is clear that with regard to agreements for separation also, the law sought to invoke a 
protection interest by seeking to ensure that parties upheld their marital duties and thus 
subsequently the sanctity of marriage, which, as has been demonstrated, was held to be 
so important to an eighteenth century society which celebrated morality and the family 
unit.  
Morality has been addressed briefly in this chapter with regard to eighteenth century 
notions of sex and parenting; the following chapter will examine this notion more closely 
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The frequency of the practice of prostitution in London in the long eighteenth century is 
particularly telling of social attitudes towards sex and personal relationships and the 
corresponding numerous accounts of the profession therefore make for a particularly 
insightful discussion of the contractual position of the women. The Oxford English 
Dictionary acknowledges that the concept of immorality is ‘now often used specifically of 
sexual impurity’.322 This basis is only furthered when ‘prostitute’ is defined, this referring 
to persons ‘seeking personal gain or advantage by immoral or dishonourable means’.323 
Evidently, it is not simply within legal terminology that we see the establishment of a 
link between immorality and the practice of prostitution. Yet despite institutional 
disapproval, during the long eighteenth century a vast section of society did not regard 
prostitution as a considerable problem at all, though the common phrase, ‘the most 
ancient profession in the world’, was in fact not coined by Rudyard Kipling until 1889.324 
Rather conversely, it seems that the practice was something that was accepted as a 
necessary incidence, it being noted that landlords of public houses regularly permitted 
solicitation to occur on their premises, provided that it was not overt and did not attract 
the attention of the authorities.325 Clearly, there were economic gains to be made from 
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prostitution that were not simply for the women themselves. The lower class women 
who frequented taverns were not the only class of prostitute however and there were 
those, such as Kitty Fisher, who were courtesans, and who commonly accompanied 
upper class gentlemen and were represented in popular literature, such as Defoe’s 
depiction of Moll Flanders. Yet despite this seeming acceptance that the practice was to 
occur, for those who did regard it as inherently depraved and therefore in need of some 
regulation, the general social consensus as the period progressed was that the women 
involved required assistance as opposed to harsh punishment.  
 
Social remedies began in 1691 with the creation of the Society for the Reformation of 
Manners which sought, amongst other aims, to combat prostitution through religious 
teachings and the instigation of criminal proceedings against any person involved in the 
practice. The establishment of public stews and hospitals also further assisted in 
reforming the women involved in prostitution; these remedies will be discussed in 
greater depth in proceeding sections of this chapter. For now, what must be recognised 
is that as the long eighteenth century progressed, the social determination to solve the 
issues surrounding prostitution increased correspondingly with changes not only in who 
succeeded the throne and the religious changes therein, but also within politics. This 
became particularly prevalent with the growth of the ‘middling class’326 and their desire 
to establish some sort of political recognition; solving the ‘problem’ of prostitution thus 
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became a means by which to differentiate themselves politically from the debauched and 
immoral ruling classes, 327  a concept which will be discussed shortly.  
Determining exactly how, and to what extent, these social attitudes impacted upon the 
legal response to prostitution will be the objective of this chapter.  
 
4.2 MORALITY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT 
4.2.1 The War Against Vice 
The beginning of the long eighteenth century saw William and Mary on the throne and 
under their rule Britain underwent a seismic shift towards becoming a moral state. The 
recognition of morality as something that ought to be instilled into the lifeblood of the 
country was not something that William ever explicitly initiated himself. Rather, it came 
about as a consequence of the Glorious Revolution which had seen Catholicism and all of 
its conceived shortcomings ousted and replaced with the more wholesome 
Protestantism, which William had come to represent in abundance to a country still 
reeling from Catholic rule under James II. The dominance of the Church of England – and 
the concurrent hatred of Catholicism – as discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two of 
this thesis, prompted this drive for the instilment of morality to be pursued by William; 
it was a direct juxtaposition to the ‘untrustworthy’328 Catholic state under James II. Given 
the actions of the previous monarch, 329 the enactment of the Bill of Rights reduced the 
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ability of the regent to interfere in parliamentary matters, but although the powers of the 
King were seemingly reduced in this way, the effect of the monarchy on social attitudes 
remained constant. Whilst regulating morality had been something that was also 
attempted years earlier under the Commonwealth, as we shall see in the enactment of 
the Adultery Act,330 a by-product of the religious change after 1688 was the start of the 
drive in popular opinion for a dramatic reform of the values and principles of England, 
the need to establish and justify just what it meant to ‘be British.’ Further extensive moral 
reform was one key step towards achieving this.  
 
As early at 1690 William sought to invoke considerable reform, starting with the 
promotion of morality through the Church. In a letter addressed to the Lord Bishop of 
London, William encouraged the clergy to actively rally against acts of ‘vice and sin’, he 
stated: 
We therefore require you to Order all the Clergy to Preach frequently against those particular Sins 
and Vices which are most prevailing in this Realm; And that on every of those Lords Days on 
which any such Sermon is to be Preach'd, they do also Read to their People such Statute-Law or 
Laws as are provided against that Vice or Sin331 
Invoking moral reform through the teachings of the church became emblematic to the 
reign of William, and this was only furthered when in the same year a Bill was drafted 
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members of the clergy which aimed to explicitly counter immoral or sinful behaviour. 
Despite never actually making it into the statute book, An Act for the More Effectual 
Restraining and Suppressing of Divers Notorious Sins and the Reformation of the 
Manners of the People specifically addressed prostitution and provided that searches be 
undertaken to remove and punish as vagrants any prostitutes residing in parishes.332 
Throughout this period both the law and society reflected the notion that prostitution 
was best regulated by applying a particularly punitive control agenda. However, despite 
the punishment of prostitutes under the law as vagrants being something that was to 
continue, as we see the same definition evoked again more than one hundred years later 
under the Vagrancy Act,333 this was not with the same unwaveringly punitive attitude 
emblematic of the beginning of this period.  
 
Although this drive for morality was symbolic of the reign of William, the means by which 
this was to be achieved were considerably less severe than those used by the previous 
Catholic monarch to prevent vice. In 1650 the Commonwealth had introduced the 
Adultery Act, which, although a few years before the time period for this thesis, has been 
included as a point of comparison to this new system of regulation under William. The 
Adultery Act not only made adultery a felony punishable by death, but with regard to 
prostitution, any person caught as a prostitute or keeping a brothel was to be ‘openly 
whipped and set in the Pillory, and there marked with a hot Iron in the forehead with the 
Letter B and afterwards committed to Prison’334 for a period of three years. Despite the 
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Act never being used in practice, and eventually repealed 10 years later at the restoration 
of the monarchy, it is illustrative of attitudes towards morality in this era which were 
seized upon to a greater extent following the accession of William to the throne. The 
failure of the Act, however, must have been something of which William was conscious 
in seeking new modes of regulating immorality, it would be important not to repeat the 
mistakes of the previous establishment. 
 
This insistence on promoting virtue whilst punishing vice soon found its way into 
popular opinion. The Society for the Reformation of Manners was founded in 1691 and 
had at its heart a moral agenda. It sought to invoke this across London, with a key aim 
being the suppression of the practice of prostitution. Groups such as these were common 
across many industrial towns and cities in this period, but given the widespread nature 
of prostitution in the capital, London has been chosen as a classic example. Prosecutions 
were brought against women practicing as prostitutes and brothels were raided to 
punish all those involved in such an immoral occupation. Initially, Societies such as these 
garnered public support, such was popular feeling at the time in favour of the promotion 
of moral values; however, the fervour with which arrests were taking place soon turned 
popular opinion against them. This coincided with an increase in spurious claims which 
were a drain on the finances of the Society who themselves brought these actions. 
Support thus waned at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and as Dabhoiwala 
states, by 1730 ‘it had become...the general opinion that such matters were beyond the 
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reach of the criminal law’.335 Although the cause continued briefly in the creation of other 
groups later in the period, notably the Society for the Suppression of Vice, created in 1802 
and headed by William Wilberforce, the popularity of the original Society never reignited; 
it wasn’t long before it disappeared completely, subsumed instead into these new groups.    
 
Public Stews 
The concept of employing openly punitive measures to regulate prostitution was not an 
idea that was shared across society. Indeed, it was believed by some that controlling the 
practice of prostitution could be achieved through other means and with the succession 
of George I and the Hanoverian regime, we see a shift in attitudes, particularly towards 
sex and relationships. With this, social attitudes also became much more liberal than they 
had been under the rule of William and Mary at the beginning of the long eighteenth 
century, and even Anne following that. One rather radical proposal that exemplified this 
change was that advocated by Henry Mandeville in 1730, who, in his essay, A Modest 
Defence of Publick Stews,336 argued for the establishment of regulated houses wherein 
prostitution could be practiced legitimately. Mandeville’s idea centred on the creation of 
houses across London where prostitutes could be accommodated, with a commissioner 
to oversee the affairs conducted there. These houses would be further divided according 
to class, to appeal to men from all sections of society. It must be acknowledged, however, 
that Mandeville himself did not support those who advocated the protection and 
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redemption of prostitutes, rather conversely, he saw them as a threat to civilised society, 
and so the creation of public stews was less about protecting the women themselves so 
much as controlling their movements in order to protect society from this immoral 
occupation. 
 
The concept as envisaged by Mandeville was representative of the treatment of 
prostitutes by the law during this period. In seeking to rent premises, the law maintained 
the position throughout the long eighteenth century that should any room or building be 
leased to a prostitute, such a contract would be void, provided that the lessor was aware 
that the lessee was a prostitute, and further that prostitution was occurring there. This 
is illustrated in the judgment of Lord Kenyon in Girardy v Richardson,337 in which his 
Lordship held that under the circumstances of the case, the action was not maintainable, 
and as such the contract was void. This was based on the notion that the premises in 
question had been leased to a prostitute by the plaintiff, who knew of the profession of 
the woman, and also that she was conducting her business in the property. As a result of 
this knowledge of the lessor, an action to recover outstanding rent was not upheld, and 
verdict was returned for the defendant. Evidently, such a practice being ‘contra bones 
mores’338 could not be upheld by the courts. Creating a regulated area in which a 
prostitute could reside was therefore beneficial from this legal perspective also.  
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However, the law was not as staunchly punitive towards prostitutes with regard to the 
leasing of premises as has perhaps been conceived. Simply leasing a room to a prostitute 
was not in itself sufficient to render a contract void; there was a duality to the rule which 
was confirmed in the later case of Crisp v Churchill.339  In Crisp, it was held that ‘those 
circumstances were no bar to the action’,340 this being where a room is simply being 
rented by a prostitute. What must further be shown is that ‘the lodging was let to the 
Defendant for the purposes of prostitution, and with a knowledge on the part of the 
Plaintiff of that fact’.341  The law therefore did not embody a resolutely punitive attitude 
towards the women involved in prostitution, indeed, whilst the practice was in no way 
encouraged, it was recognised that the women ‘must have lodging’.342 It would seem, 
therefore, that whilst the law wished to condemn the practice and to regulate against it, 
this was alongside some recognition that prostitution did occur, and the women involved 
were members of society who possessed the same needs with regard to accommodation 
and their sustenance. Mandeville’s concept of a public stew is in-keeping with the notion 
that as the practice was likely to continue regardless, the women involved in the 
profession should therefore have a safe and regulated environment.  
 
Issues arose, however, when it was not known at the outset that a woman was a 
prostitute but these facts later came to the attention of the lessor; these were the 
circumstances in Jennings v Throgmorton343. In Jennings, a room was leased to Ms. 
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Throgmorton for her use. At the time of letting the room, the plaintiffs were not aware 
of Ms. Throgmorton’s occupation as a prostitute, and they only came to know of this two 
months later. The plaintiffs continued to let the room despite this knowledge and so when 
an action was brought for the recovery of outstanding rent, the question was whether 
this could be recovered. Abbott CJ directed the jury that they were to consider two 
questions, the first being whether the room was originally leased for the purpose of 
prostitution, and the second question was that if the jury were satisfied that the plaintiff 
did not know of the prostitution when he began letting the premises, whether, upon 
being made aware of the practice occurring there, he continued to allow Ms. 
Throgmorton to reside regardless. If the jury were to find in the affirmative with respect 
to the second question, then the court held that the plaintiffs ought not to be entitled to 
recover the outstanding rent. Verdict was subsequently returned for Ms. Throgmorton. 
Evidently, mere knowledge of the prostitution occurring on the premises, regardless of 
when it was brought to the attention of the lessor, was sufficient to render a contract 
void. Simply renting a property as a prostitute was not enough; for the court to find a 
contract void, what must also be shown was that at some point, whether it was when the 
contract was entered into or sometime during its execution, this knowledge was brought 
to the mind of the lessor.  
 
This attitude was affirmed in the case of Appleton v Campbell,344  in which it was held 
that knowing that a tenant is a prostitute is not sufficient, given that ‘she may be a woman 
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of the town… [but] persons of that description must have a place to lay their heads’.345 
Thus, a contract for the rent of premises was void but only if the lessor was aware that 
the premises were being rented to a prostitute and further that the prostitution was 
occurring there. The recognition that prostitutes ought, just like any other citizen, to have 
a place to rest, was endorsed from a legal perspective, however, given that the law 
continued to prohibit the rent of premises to a practicing prostitute, it is clear just why 
the concept of a public stew as evoked by Mandeville was felt to be necessary.  
 
Mandeville went further than stating these stews would simply provide a means to 
regulate prostitution, however, he also explained the rather personal effect on a 
gentleman visiting a house, ‘when a man has gained some experience by his commerce 
in the Stews he is able to form a pretty good comparative judgment of what he may 
expect from the highest gratification of love’.346 Mandeville suggested that by visiting a 
stew, this would in fact assist a gentleman in future courtships, as he would be aware of 
the features of a loving relationship –supposedly the opposite of what he would find in a 
public stew. On an even more personal level, Mandeville seemingly advocated his stews 
as being of benefit to the future spouses of the men also, who ‘have framed themselves 
such high extravagant notions of the raptures they expect to possess in the marriage bed 
that they are mightly shocked at the disappointment’347 – regular visits to these houses 
would surely assist with that problem. Despite these perhaps exaggerated benefits of 
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public stews,348 there was a rational basis to Mandeville’s idea, that the establishment of 
these houses would take prostitution from the streets and give the women a regulate 
place in which to work. To those who argued that Mandeville was encouraging immoral 
behaviour, his response was that ‘the public stews will not encourage men to be lewd, 
but they will encourage them to exercise their lewdness in a proper place, without 
disturbing the peace of society’.349 Such an idea undoubtedly had its advantages, and 
indeed, we see the same argument being used two hundred years later as to why 
prostitution should be legitimised in England, but in the eighteenth century, this idea did 
not appease those who wished to see prostitution eradicated completely. The solution 
advocated by Mandeville was never brought into effect; fortunately, however, the 
political landscape was soon to present a possible alternative solution.  
 
4.2.2 The Political Agenda 
The monarchy was not the only institution that underwent a transformation throughout 
the long eighteenth century, as the political economy of the country also shifted as 
increases in industry and the corresponding creation of new wealth simultaneously 
created a new class of citizen, the middling sort. A definition of this class of person has 
been stated earlier in this thesis, but it is important in relation to this chapter to recognise 
the role of the middling class in effecting social responses to prostitution, notably through 
their investment in politics and their desire to establish themselves as a reputable 
political force. The middling sort used the extensiveness of prostitution as grounding for 
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the promotion of their political campaign.350 For those who did wish to see the problem 
of prostitution solved once and for all, the middling sort offered a political remedy for 
this, and one which could also be used to promote their ascent up the political ladder.  
 
Voting Qualification 
It is no surprise that with an increase in the promotion of morality throughout this 
period, the emergence of the middling class, which grew alongside, would seize upon this 
to begin to establish themselves as a respectable political entity. Only during the reign of 
Queen Anne was a system of two-party politics established: the Tories, who typically 
received support from the landed classes, and the Whigs who represented emerging 
commercial interests. With a middling class who encapsulated these commercial 
interests, there suddenly became a means by which this class of person could have a voice 
in politics. One issue, however, was that the middling class did not yet have this political 
standing, only after 1832 did the franchise extend to the middling sort. It must be 
remembered that at this time, prior to the 1832 Reform Act, the voting qualification was 
particularly stringent. In the counties, the system was relatively straight-forward; any 
man351 possessing freehold land worth 40 shillings or more secured a vote. In the 
boroughs, the situation was a lot more complicated as a consequence of the growth of 
these areas, and there were several ways in which a vote could be secured. Usually, these 
were reserved for those who had the requisite wealth, as there remained a qualification 
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of land ownership. What must be understood is that prior to 1832 the voting qualification 
in the boroughs was complicated, out-dated, and undemocratic.  
 
The consequence of this archaic system was that there existed a considerable section of 
society prior to the Reform Act whose voting right depended upon the classification of 
their resident352 borough. Some boroughs were effectively in the hands of one MP and as 
such it is easy to see how these ‘pocket boroughs’ were undemocratic. In addition to this, 
as the voting system had not been reformed, there existed boroughs which still obtained 
the ability to return two MP’s to Parliament, but whose population had long since 
dispersed. As there was no differentiation between boroughs of varying size, each still 
sent 2 MP’s regardless. These ‘rotten boroughs’ presented an anomaly which somewhat 
reduced the efficiency of the political system. An example of this was the borough of Old 
Sarum, which in its final election in 1831 prior to being abolished under the reforms of 
the 1832 Act, had zero inhabitants but still continued to have an MP sitting in Parliament. 
Whilst there had been boundary changes as certain areas grew, this resulted in smaller 
boroughs still existing, and thus still returning the requisite number of Parliamentary 
members and therefore proportionally, there was an inherent unfairness. There also 
lacked a residency requirement attached to ‘freeman boroughs’ wherein all those who 
were freemen of the borough were entitled to vote. In a ‘burgage borough’ however, the 
right to vote was firmly dependent upon residing in a property known as a burgage plot; 
this was land which was owned by the king or a lord. By purchasing a burgage plot, the 
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owner acquired a right to vote, however these tenements could be bought and sold easily, 
and therefore during elections burgage boroughs permitted the king or lord to secure a 
vote for whomever he so wished, simply by ensuring that his tenants voted in his favour. 
It is not difficult to see why these boroughs soon transformed into pocket boroughs, given 
the overt control exercised over the property by the landowner. Added to this, a more 
obscure voting qualification was given to those residing in ‘potwalloper boroughs’ whose 
right to vote depended on owning a fireplace which was large enough to be able to boil a 
pot of water, or ‘wallop a pot’. Although it may seem that this franchise was merely a 
means of rendering the voting qualification dependent upon wealth and sufficient home 
ownership, despite common conceptions, a large number of those who we would deem 
to be the working class were able to secure a vote in this way.  
 
Overall, however, the result of this haphazard system was that fewer than 4% of the 
population possessed voting rights in the period 1688-1832.353 Proportionality was 
evidently not the only shortcoming to this system as prior to 1832 the vast range of voting 
qualifications in the boroughs rendered the system confused and outdated, some reform 
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The Drive for Reform 
The Representation of the People Act,354 commonly known as the Great Reform Act, 
achieved Royal Assent on 7th June 1832. Amongst other things, the Act removed rotten 
boroughs and reduced the number of MPs in some smaller towns, whilst also attempting 
to reinstate the balance by ensuring that larger towns returned two MPs. Its importance 
for this thesis, however, is that the Act also extended the franchise to include the middling 
class. Uniformity across all boroughs was also achieved; no longer was there a hap-
hazard system across the boroughs, instead, one single voting qualification was installed, 
this being that the ability to vote rested upon a man residing in a property worth £10 a 
year. As Hunt has acknowledged that ‘most middling people had incomes between £50 
and £2000’,355 it is clear that this extension would therefore incorporate this social class. 
Yet one perhaps unforeseen effect of the 1832 Act, and certainly one that is rarely cited 
by historians, is that as a consequence of the £10 property qualification a considerable 
number of those men who could vote prior to the Act lost this ability; according to Fisher 
‘in almost two fifths of English boroughs the number of electors either fell or stayed the 
same’.356 This was especially the case in freeman boroughs, which had previously allowed 
those not resident in the borough to vote. One rather stark example which Fisher gives 
of this change is the borough of Maldon whose electorate fell dramatically after the 
passing of the 1832 Act, ‘by 79%’.357  
 
                                                          
354 2 & 3 Will IV c45 
355 Hunt (n30 in ch 1) 15 
356 D.R. Fisher, The History of Parliament. The House of Commons 1820-1832: Volume I, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2009) 391 
357 ibid 394 
145 
 
This is not to say that the reform that came about with the enactment of the 1832 Act 
was not also pursued by the landed classes who had their own motivations for wanting 
to widen the franchise to include the middling class. It was a widely held belief that the 
franchise ought to be extended only to those who could be trusted. It was not felt by those 
who already had the vote that the working class possessed sufficient intellect to 
determine who ought to run the country; the middling class, on the other hand, with 
their respectable occupations, did. ‘Reform that you may preserve’358 was a phrase used 
by the Whig politician Thomas Macaulay in arguing why the 1832 Act should be enacted 
and is evidently based on the notion that by making small amendments to appease, those 
who gained a vote would be so grateful that they would not pose any further demands 
and the government would avoid revolution;359 in this way, the wealth and standing of 
the current landed classes would be preserved.360 Reaching this point, however, required 
the middling sort to establish themselves as a class to whom extending the franchise was 
necessary.  
 
It has already been stated in previous chapters that in referring to the middling sort, this 
encapsulates the professions that were created as a consequence of the expansion of 
industry and commercialisation. These were persons such as artisans and civil servants, 
who were not as wealthy as the landed gentry, but not as poor as the working class361 
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and who formed the vast majority of reform groups which created the impetus for 
instigating political reform. The first of such groups was that of the London 
Corresponding Society, which was founded in 1792, but had outlets in various cities 
across England. The Society was created by John Frost and Thomas Hardy, both of whom 
were part of the middling class (Frost was a lawyer, whilst Hardy a shoemaker) and 
campaigned for the extension of the franchise. The Society was rather aggressive in the 
promotion of its cause, with the consequence that its founding members were tried for 
treason in 1794. Although they were found to be not guilty, with the passing of the 
Corresponding Societies Act in 1799,362 the meeting of such groups became illegal and so 
the Society was forced to disband.  
 
The fervour for reform did not desist, however, and one important group who petitioned 
passionately for reform leading up to the 1832 Act was the Birmingham Political Union, 
whose members were formed mostly of the middle class, as well as some working class 
men. The Union was significant in gaining popular support for political reform, with 
Thomas Attwood founding the movement and giving speeches rousing public opinion. 
To give an impression of the popularity of the cause, the first official meeting of the Union 
attracted between 12-15,000 people.363 The Union argued for the widening of the 
franchise and the removal of a property qualification, and as a consequence of its peaceful 
                                                          
362 39 Geo III c79 
363 http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/chartists/case-
study/the-right-to-vote/thomas-attwood-and-the-birmingham-political-union/birmingham-political-
union/ Accessed 16th November 2015 
147 
 
methods, gained the respect of a growing number of the middle class. The Union 
separated after the passing of the Reform Act, only to re-emerge briefly in 1838.  
 
Throughout this political growth, it is important to acknowledge the ideals of the 
middling class and consequently what their introduction into politics really meant for 
morality and the regulation of prostitution. By establishing themselves as a class who 
represented moral attributes, the middling sort were able to persuade the ruling class 
that they possessed sufficient standing to be able to exercise a vote correctly. By the time 
the 1832 Act was enacted, Wahrman acknowledges that ‘“middle classness”…was by now 
associated with domestic virtue…with social control; that is to say, with a morality which 
prescribed both public and private (or familial) behaviour’.364 The middling class had 
grown to embody morality and indeed, they formed a large proportion of those rallying 
against prostitution as far back as the Society for the Reformation of Manners. The 
dangers of not following this moral course of life were made all too aware to the middling 
classes through popular culture. Daniel Defoe was a prominent figure in the long 
eighteenth century who spoke out against vice, and in the novel Roxana, Defoe presents 
the downfall of a girl seduced into life as a courtesan for the aristocracy.  
 
A considerable means by which the middling sort therefore sought to remove themselves 
from the ruling classes and establish themselves as a class in their own right was to 
distinguish their virtues from those of the nobility who had long been held as 
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embodiments of sin and vice. Samuel Wright, in a sermon in 1715 illustrates this concept 
by denoting ‘men of the highest condition and fashion in the world, supporting and 
encouraging…by living in the same vices’.365 Therefore not only were the middling class 
distinguished socially through their occupations and family life, as has been noted they 
were undoubtedly tied to commerce, but underpinning all of this was the notion of 
morality. Hunt recognises the ‘centrality of women and issues of sexuality to middling 
notions of corruption’;366 a corruption which, of course, was vowed to be removed by the 
inclusion of the middling sort within politics.  
 
Ultimately, the effect of the 1832 Act in widening the franchise was the inclusion within 
politics, perhaps for the first time, of a group who embodied the concept of morality that 
had been so ardently promoted within society throughout this period. Although morality 
had achieved substantial support during the Commonwealth almost two hundred years 
previously, the effect of the 1832 Act was to monopolise on a resurgence in the drive for 
morality, which had been bolstered most considerably by the middling sort. This class 
now not only had a presence in influencing society through their encouragement of the 
establishment of social remedies to regulate prostitution, but their presence in 
Parliament now meant that they were to have a considerable say on it. 
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4.3 MORALITY RECONSIDERED 
Throughout the long eighteenth century there thus emerged considerable support for the 
promotion of morality not only as a social concept but one that was echoed in both politics 
and the law. The culmination of this was that a hallmark of the progression of this period 
was the increase in tolerance towards sexual relationships that accompanied the 
Hanoverian regime. Correspondingly with an increase in the concept of philanthropism 
also, attitudes towards prostitution began to change; this has been illustrated briefly in 
the proposal of public stews, but as this period progressed, liberal attitudes towards 
morality became much more widespread. This was, of course, the era of George II and 
his notorious extra-marital dalliances,367 yet whilst the proposals by Mandeville 
remained a little too radical even for the more progressive Georgian society; the notion 
that a prostitute required redemption as supposed to punishment took hold to an even 
greater extent. No longer was the control interest applied with the vigour that it had been 
at the beginning of the long eighteenth century which had seen prostitutes severely 
punished and instead remedies based upon their redemption took prominence. This is 
most greatly evidenced in the creation of hospitals which sought to assist the women 
affected by prostitution, most notably that of the Magdalen in London. 
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4.3.1 The Magdalen Hospital 
The Magdalen Hospital was founded in 1758 by Robert Dingley as a charitable 
organisation with the explicit purpose of aiding prostitutes. A key aim of the Magdalen 
was that it sought to redeem women who had fallen into prostitution as a consequence 
of destitution; entry was therefore to be determined by the position of the woman, the 
less time she had spent working as a prostitute, the more likely her admittance. It was 
felt that such women had a greater chance of redemption and therefore were given 
precedence over those who had spent many years working on the streets of London.  
 
Whilst at the hospital, the main purpose was not to aid in physical recovery, in fact, this 
was not provided at all, and should a woman seek admittance to the Magdalen whilst 
pregnant or diseased, she was sent away and would only be admitted once she had given 
birth or was cured of her illness.368 A search in the Oxford English Dictionary reveals an 
alternative definition of ‘hospital’ to be a ‘charitable institution for the housing and 
maintenance of the needy’.369 Given then that the Magdalen was foremost a charitable 
organisation, instead the women took practical training, such as needlework, and 
received religious teaching during their stay. Despite regimented days of work and 
education, this would have been preferable to most penitents than life on London’s 
dangerous streets. The sermons conducted at the Magdalen were particularly passionate 
regarding the redemption of the women; one address given in 1777 recalled that, ‘every 
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Christian grace is fled; and every Female Ornament is departed and gone, before they 
repair to this place of refuge’.370 Not only was it believed that strict religious education 
would ensure that the women followed a moral course of life, the sermons also clearly 
reinforced the benefits of the hospital; there is almost the sense in the addresses that the 
chaplain wished to make it known to the women that they were privileged in having been 
admitted. Whilst the Georgian era can be seen as more liberal, the influence of 
Christianity on society remained. Ultimately, it was hoped that the women would leave 
with a renewed virtue as a consequence of their religious training but would also be 
provided with the means to maintain themselves outside of the hospital by obtaining 
domestic work as a result of the practical skills which had been taught at the Magdalen.  
 
This structure based on education and training seemed successful; the Magdalen moved 
to larger premises in 1769 and other institutions were established following the same 
model. However, by the end of eighteenth century, grounds for admittance to the hospital 
began to change as officials were more stringent with regard to the women who were 
permitted entry. Lloyd describes the change in policy of the Magdalen Hospital in the 
1780’s, which ‘limited hope of recovery to those who had not yet become prostitutes and 
came closer to a belief that a “fallen” woman was beyond recovery’,371 this seems to 
conflict with the notion that such institutions sought to assist prostitutes and is very 
different to that which was advocated when the Hospital first opened only thirty years 
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prior. One possible reason for this change, however, could be the sheer number of 
prostitutes, which estimates for London in 1780 range anywhere from 3,000-40,000.372   
 
What may be of assistance at this point is to take a slight aside to explore the background 
and stories of women who were successfully admitted. The fictional accounts contained 
in Histories of Some of the Penitents of the Magdalen House373 are one of the best sources 
we have on the sort of women who sought admittance to the Magdalen. Although 
fictional, these accounts were taken in 1760 and were published for a popular audience, 
it is therefore likely that they pandered to the sympathies of the public and informed 
opinion as to why the Magdalen was so valuable. Before such an exploration is 
undertaken, it must be acknowledged that the extent to which the novel presents an 
accurate depiction of the women is debatable; accounts are likely to have been 
exaggerated to present the women as pitiable figures, whist the novel itself reads very 
much in support of the hospital, and so may have wished to ensure that it appeared 
indispensable. Thus a word of warning; though regardless of this, these stories do 
present a captivating picture of life as a working woman in eighteenth century London.  
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We are first introduced to Emily, who after the death of her father was sent to work for 
a landed family as domestic servant. Regrettably for Emily, the son of this family, Mr 
Markland, took a particular liking to her and she is soon installed in a separate house and 
kept as his mistress, where she gives birth to a son. This situation is not to last, however, 
as her lover soon finds employment overseas as a foreign ambassador and not long after 
his departure she is visited by bailiffs who demand payment for the rent and furniture, 
none of which, it transpires, has been paid for. Throughout this tale it is clear that the 
author does not wish to encourage such an immoral way of life, and there are constant 
references to the emotional state of Emily as being sad and forlorn, even whilst with her 
lover.374 The outcome of this terrible situation is that Emily is soon forced to take work 
in a brothel, as well as begging on the streets to attempt to sustain herself. It is during 
the former of these occupations that she is found and admitted to the hospital which was 
‘sought as a refuge from distress and misery’.375  
 
A common theme throughout the accounts in Histories is the idea that the women have 
fallen into prostitution having been ruined by a man. Another story depicts a young girl 
who was married clandestinely at the Fleet Prison, a popular choice for those who wished 
to avoid the formalities of a traditional ceremony. It was this choice, however, that proved 
to be her downfall, as her husband, Mr Monkerton, soon claims the marriage to be void 
by virtue of the Marriage Act, which had made all marriages void which did not adhere 
to the traditional formalities. Our protagonist soon recovers from this, however, and goes 
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on to become engaged to another man, Mr Senwill. But this marriage does not come to 
pass, as we discover he has already promised to marry another. Mr Senwill agrees to 
send money for the maintenance of the young lady, although, in a cruel twist of fate – 
and perhaps too much of coincidence – this money is stolen. With nowhere to go and no 
employment, the girl has no choice but to admit herself into the hospital. Also common 
throughout these stories is the idea that the women are from upstanding families, we are 
told by this young lady that her father ‘was a very rich trader in a country town’,376 and 
it is only as a consequence of their bad choices and corruption by the opposite sex that 
they fall into prostitution. Equally, the women are all presented as being beautiful and 
graceful in their appearance and well-mannered – they are the epitome of an eighteenth 
century lady. All of this thus culminates to invoke sympathy from the reader, as well as 
affirming the importance of the Magdalen.  
 
Of course, as has been mentioned, these stories are a fictionalisation, but it is likely that 
there is a semblance of truth to them adapted from the accounts of women who were 
actually admitted to the Magdalen. Whilst the accounts have been exaggerated here, they 
do go some way to inform of the background of the women who sought redemption in 
the hospital. Regardless of the truth behind these stories, they would have undoubtedly 
informed popular opinion as to the need for institutions such as the Magdalen and the 
value of redemption as a cure to the social ailment of prostitution. It is submitted that 
the purpose of Histories is potentially two-fold, that the book may have been published 
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as something of a fundraising initiative for the Hospital, with the stories included 
confirming the value of the hospital, or secondly, it may be that the stories merely wish 
to present a case for the women admitted so as to raise awareness of their cause.377 What 
is clear is that that the Magdalen wished to portray itself as a sanctuary for the women 
and Histories further suggests that the institution thus invoked a protection agenda to 
assist the women. However, despite the honourable intentions of the Magdalen in 
seeking to redeem the women, what has become clear is that fundamentally, such an 
institution only further provided for enhanced social control by seeking to keep 
prostitutes from the streets, as Nash argues, ‘the Magdalen was inherently a device for 
social control’.378 This contention is supported here, as it is argued that through the 
provision of education and training, which may on the surface appear to protect the 
women, the control of prostitution was achieved. Therefore, what we see is that whilst 
social attitudes towards prostitution could be seen as invoking an agenda based very 
much on protection, this was concerned more greatly with the protection of society as 
opposed to the women, against whom control interests remained exceedingly pertinent.  
 
4.3.2 Social Acceptance 
From the mid-eighteenth century, the concept of prostitution being something that ought 
to be severely punished was no longer pursued with the vigour that it had been a few 
decades earlier. The creation of institutions such as the Magdalen is illustrative of a 
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Georgian era which was much more enlightened in its ideals concerning sex and intimate 
relationships; this is further demonstrated by the acceptance amongst society that sex 
was not something that was merely to be used for pro-creation. This is not to say that 
the Georgian’s were sexually promiscuous or overly liberal, indeed, extra-marital sex 
remained shameful, but there was not the general feeling of prudishness towards 
intimate relationships that had accompanied the reign of both William and Anne. 
Prostitution was no longer to be confined to seedy taverns or back streets; whilst there 
remained a section of society who aimed to see the practice eradicated completely,379 it 
became something that was openly discussed.  
 
An excellent example of this recognition is in the creation of Harris’ List of Covent Garden 
Ladies. The pamphlet was created in the 1740’s, and distributed from the Shakespeare’s 
Head Tavern, but it was not until 1757 that the publication first reached a popular 
audience. The pamphlet, which can best be described as a directory of prostitutes, was 
sold for two shillings and sixpence, and items usually stated the physical description of 
the woman, as well as her location and rates. From what is stated in the pamphlet, it 
would seem that for a prostitute of the sort typically found in and around Covent Garden, 
the price could be as high as five guineas, although this could of course vary wildly 
depending upon the desirability of the woman, and was usually much lower. To give an 
impression of just what was included in Harris’ List, the following is an excerpt taken 
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from the 1773 edition of the publication, detailing a Miss Adams, who could be found by 
New Buildings, Marylebone: 
This lady is really superior to the usual run of come-at-able women; her form is not only very 
enchanting, her countenance bewitching, and her very ringlets the toils of love; but even her 
understanding has a bent of a kind very different from prostitution380  
Not all entries were positive, however, as Miss Urquhart, who could be found at the Jelly-
Shops, was to discover: 
This girl takes her name from a young fellow, a merchant’s clerk, in the city, who thro’ her 
extravagance was brought to the gallows; we wonder at his facination as she is a wretched piece 
altogether, a nasty, disagreeable… ill-made woman, without even one requisite or good quality; 
walks like a parrot and talks with all the cant of a Methodist preacher381 
Finally, whilst some, such as that above, were rather extravagant in their description, 
others were evidently more forthright – and brief; for one Polly Dixon of Brook Street, 
this was said: 
A sturdy wench, with great breasts, good eyes, good teeth, always ready to oblige, and an 
extraordinary good bed-fellow382 
 
The last pamphlet was published in 1793. This cessation in production was a consequence 
of the trial of John Roach and John Aitken; Mr Aitken was convicted of publishing Harris’ 
List and was ordered to pay a £200 fine whilst Mr Roach was indicted under the same 
offence but was sentenced to one year in prison. The seriousness with which the law 
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addressed immorality is evidenced not only in the punishments given to each of these 
men but also in the opinions of the presiding judges. Mr Justice Ashurst stated that ‘an 
offence of greater enormity could hardly be committed’,383 and in what is likely a 
reflection of social attitudes towards morality in this period, went on to make clear that 
‘a care of the growing morals of the present generation ought to be uppermost in 
everyman’s heart’.384 Mr Justice Ashurst is referring here to the revival of moral 
reformers. The Proclamation Society was founded in 1787 and continued the work of the 
Society for the Reformation of Manners, but the immediate impetus behind the creation 
of the Proclamation Society at this particular time was the issuing of a Royal 
Proclamation by George III. The Royal Proclamation for the Encouragement of Piety and 
Virtue and for the Preventing and Punishing of Vice and Profaneness and Immorality was 
issued in 1787 and sought to suppress, amongst other things, the publication of obscene 
or immoral literature.  The Proclamation Society was to merge into the Society for the 
Suppression of Vice under the guidance of William Wilberforce in 1802, but the drive for 
moral reform was clearly present in this period. It is argued that this is likely to have 
been as a consequence of the growth and seeming acceptance of immoral occupations 
such as prostitution. Whilst the law sought to suppress this, as we shall see, the 
weakening of traditional concepts of morality was to continue throughout the period.  
 
One consequence of Harris’ List, however, was the promotion of the women included in 
it, to extents which even its creators could perhaps not envisage. One notable figure that 
                                                          




was included in the pamphlet and who went on to achieve considerable fame is that of 
Kitty Fisher, who also demonstrates perfectly the extent to which the Georgian era came 
to acknowledge prostitutes. 
 
Kitty Fisher 
A prostitute in the long eighteenth century could achieve fame and something of a 
celebrity status; this was exactly how Kitty Fisher became a well-known figure in 
eighteenth century London. Whilst this acceptance would seemingly indicate that the 
general attitude of the public towards such women was not one of particular disdain, it 
must be remembered that women such as Kitty were prostitutes who were well-dressed 
and who could hold themselves in a typically elegant Georgian way. Their exposure to an 
aristocratic world which had been achieved through soliciting gentlemen resulted in an 
ability to emulate the traits of this class, and thus their appearance reflected this. They 
were not seen as akin to lower class prostitutes who would beg on the streets, filthy, 
unkempt and lice-ridden – these women were a burden on society and were those 
towards whom social remedies such as public stews and the Magdalen were primarily 
aimed at saving. This is a very obvious class distinction which illustrates the disparity 
amongst those in this profession in the eighteenth century.   
 
Kitty Fisher was one courtesan who mimicked what it was to be an aristocratic eighteenth 
century woman perfectly. Her elegant appearance and fashionable dress sense was 
achieved as a consequence of courting high class men, and subsequently earned her a 
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position as one of London’s most famed characters, with renowned artist Joshua 
Reynolds painting her portrait on more than one occasion.385 The life of Kitty, being 
particularly glamourous for the age, has been recalled by several historians, with Maria 
Pointon producing a revealing compilation of the life of this high class courtesan as 
represented in art and publication.386 One satirical pamphlet depicted Kitty as having an 
entire nation fawning after her and men of all rank wishing to spend the night with her. 
In The Adventures of the Celibrated Kitty Fisher,387 we are told of an ‘envied Kitty’,388 
who has men begging to pay to be with her. She is portrayed as having the entire city 
besotted with her charms, even for someone who we are reminded was not born with 
such wealth: 
 Look to her breeding, and you’ll see,  
 Of common whores, as good as she389 
Although reports of her early life are conflicting, some accounts recall her descending 
from a family of milliners, there is no certain information of her background or her life 
prior to being introduced to the London social scene. We do know, however, that Kitty 
was born Catherine Marie Fischer in 1741, and was acquainted with high society as a 
consequence her romantic involvement with Lieutenant General Anthony George Martin. 
It is commonly recalled that Kitty was carefree in her demeanour, but it is argued here 
that we are not to overlook the fact that behind this light-hearted persona was a girl 
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determined to rise. A courtesan who is able to increase her fame through associations 
with wealthy men is aware of the career path that she is choosing and it is submitted that 
Kitty was all too aware of her status, and how to make the most of her assets in order to 
achieve social recognition and the accompanying wealth.  
 
This is only further evident in the ability of Kitty to manipulate the press for her own 
ends; after falling from a horse whilst riding through St James’ Park, the popular press 
of course latched on to this, joking with remarks of a ‘fallen woman’ and the like. Yet this 
incident only served to increase Kitty’s fame further; a print entitled The Merry Accident 
was produced, depicting the accident, with Kitty on the floor, skirts strewn in the air, 
whilst a poem, On Kitty Fisher’s Falling from her Horse, also commemorated the event. 
Whether the accident was orchestrated is unclear; given the young courtesans ambitious 
nature, it would not be too unlikely to suggest this, but it is nonetheless remarkable how 
a prostitute could capture the attention of the public in such a way, especially when it is 
remembered that society at this time viewed women as innately inferior to men.  
 
Whilst street walkers could expect little more than their fee for their services, high class 
courtesans such as Kitty were commonly given objects of great value in exchange for 
their company; a diamond ring and gold snuffbox are two items which were given to 
Kitty as a gift, but are indicative of what was expected by such women. The commonly 
recalled story is that of Kitty swallowing a banknote worth one hundred pounds in 
distaste at being presented with such a measly sum. Given that a banknote was not 
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synonymous with immediate payment during this period, and instead promised some 
future payment, it is easy to see why Kitty, a courtesan accustomed to receiving rather 
more valuable gifts, would not take this promissory note in good grace. Such a high 
standard of living had its shortcomings however, as it also depended upon the women 
maintaining themselves to this standard. Casanova, upon meeting Kitty in 1763, recalled 
of her that, ‘she was magnificently dressed, and it is no exaggeration to say that she had 
on diamonds worth five hundred thousand francs’,390 however, Casanova refused an 
invitation to spend the night with Kitty for ten guineas as a consequence of her only 
speaking English.391 Given that the event with Kitty consuming a banknote occurred prior 
to this encounter, indeed, Casanova recalls being told of it,392 it would thus appear that 
Kitty had ideas of herself that were perhaps beyond her true worth. It is submitted that 
the incident with the banknote is more likely to have been a demonstration of her disgust 
at the giver of the note or, as mentioned, as a result of her rather loftier notions of her 
social position, rather than the sum itself. Whilst wealthy gentleman could provide the 
means of achieving this high-class appearance, a quicker and more efficient way was for 
the women to simply contract for the items themselves. The law, however, was to provide 
an obstacle to the women seeking to promote their profession in this way.  
 
The following section will discuss contracts for the facilitation of the trade of prostitution, 
which were void provided that certain elements could be established. Whilst control has 
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until now been the overarching interest demonstrated in this chapter, it is within the 
proceeding section that the protection interest becomes more apparent; just who it was 
that the law actually succeeded in protecting, however, will be of greatest interest.  
 
4.3.3 Facilitation of Trade 
The sale of goods or the provision of services to a prostitute was not completely 
prohibited, but anything that was to be deemed to be facilitating trade, or in other words, 
anything which was likely to be used during the practicing of prostitution, was held to 
be void. It is therefore easy to see why courtesans such as Kitty relied so heavily upon 
men for their sustenance.  
 
Similarly to contracts for the rent of premises, the courts imposed a two-part rule 
regarding when contracts which facilitated the trade of prostitution would be deemed to 
be void. This provided that such a contract would only be void on the basis that the seller 
knew that the buyer was a prostitute, and further, that the goods would likely to be used 
for that purpose. Immediately, we can see the similarity to the rule previously discussed 
in relation to the rent of premises, and this is no surprise, given that in formulating this 
rule in relation to the facilitation of trade, in Bowry v Bennet393 the court followed the 
case of Smith v White,394 which concerned a contract for the rent of premises. In Bowry, 
clothes were sold to a prostitute and when an action was brought to recover money owed 
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for the items Lord Ellenborough held that the sum was not recoverable. His Lordship 
stated the rule concerning these contracts, and the reason as to why the court was to 
deem them void, being that: 
It must not only be shewn that he had notice of this, but that he expected to be paid from the 
profits of the defendant's prostitution, and that he sold the clothes to enable her to carry it on, so 
that he might appear to have done something in furtherance of it395 
The court thus reasoned that as payment was taken from the prostitute for the clothes, 
not only did the ability to supply this payment result from prostitution, the provision of 
these items indirectly supplemented the profession by allowing the woman to continue 
practicing her immoral trade. The outcome of this was that the entire contract was to be 
declared void. The case of Williamson v Watts396 also applied this rule in finding that silk 
stockings and ‘other expensive articles of dress’397 were to be used for the purpose of 
prostitution, of which the seller was aware. The contract was in this instance also void.  
 
There was an exception to this rule, however, as Lord Ellenborough in Bowry stated. His 
lordship added that in finding such a contract to be void, ‘it was not to be considered of 
this description from the mere circumstance of the defendant being a prostitute’.398 
Again, we see a similar caveat to that concerning contracts for the rent of premises; 
merely being a prostitute was not enough in itself to prohibit the renting of a room, nor 
was it sufficient to render a contract for the sale of goods as void. What must be shown 
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was that the seller was aware that the items were being sold to a prostitute, but also that 
they would be used for the furtherance of her trade. It is argued, however, that it is 
perhaps difficult to draw the line as to what would be considered by the courts to be an 
article of clothing used for prostitution and one purchased for everyday use. Evidently, 
the disparity would be much clearer should the woman be a lower class prostitute, we 
would expect that in these circumstances the garment would be more extravagant and 
expensive in comparison to her everyday wear. But with respect to a high class courtesan 
like Kitty, who likely possessed a great number of luxurious items for use both in her line 
of work as well as every day, it would surely have been of greater difficulty for the courts 
to determine with any certainty the ultimate purpose of the clothing.  
 
This issue arose in the case of Lloyd v Johnson399 a decade earlier. In Lloyd, articles of 
clothing were sent by Johnson to the plaintiffs to be washed. Amongst this were 
‘expensive dresses’ as well as ‘gentlemen’s night-caps’. At trial, a servant for Johnson 
appeared as a witness for the plaintiffs and swore that the items were worn by her 
mistress in public, and that the male items were from men who had spent the night with 
her. Despite this, Buller J refused to find this contract void on grounds of immorality. He 
found that ‘this unfortunate woman must have clean linen, and it is impossible for the 
Court to take into consideration which of these articles were used by the Defendant to an 
improper purpose and which were not’.400 Clearly, the court was unable to determine 
with any certainty which items were used specifically for the facilitation of prostitution 
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and which were merely articles for everyday use and so the contract could not be deemed 
to be void. But further, it was also acknowledged that prostitutes themselves must have 
access to the same washing facilities as other members of society and so in this judgment 
too we see another instance of the courts recognising that a prostitute was a citizen with 
the same needs as the rest of society.  
 
Although in Lloyd the contract was found to be valid as it could not be determined with 
any great certainty which items were to be used for prostitution and which were not, in 
Pearce v Brooks,401 the courts found this task much easier. In Pearce, Ms. Brooks hired 
the use of a brougham from the plaintiffs who were coach-makers. The court looked to 
the case of Cannan v Bryce402 to address the issue of whether knowledge of the woman’s 
trade was sufficient to render the contract void or whether this depended instead upon 
the coach-having been paid from the proceeds. In Cannan, money had been borrowed 
which was invested in an illegal ‘stock-jobbing’ venture. Abbott CJ found that the entire 
contract for the loan of the money to be void as a consequence of the illegal purpose and 
it was not necessary that the lenders were to have known of this.  In applying this to 
Pearce, Pollock CB found that it was not necessary for the coach-makers to be paid from 
moneys earned as a result of prostitution, merely knowing of the prostitution and the 
purpose to which the coach was to be put was enough, the result of which would be that 
the contract ought to be declared void, ‘if, therefore, this article was furnished to the 
defendant for the purpose of enabling her to make a display favourable to her immoral 
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purposes, the plaintiffs can derive no cause of action from the bargain’.403 Pigott B agreed 
but further reasoned that ‘if a woman, who is known to be a prostitute, wants an 
ornamental brougham, there can be very little doubt for what purpose she requires it’.404 
The jury thus found the contract to be void, rendering Ms. Brooks free from having to 
pay for the hired brougham.  
 
Cases such as Pearce are difficult to align with the overall incentive of the courts and their 
attitude towards immorality, as it is clear that the outcome of this case was more 
favourable to the prostitute. It is likely that the courts were attempting to dissuade 
persons from contracting with a prostitute, and thus further their trade, but it is 
submitted that the damage in Pearce had already been done; Ms. Brooks had obtained 
the benefit from the contract in that she had already had the use of it for her immoral 
purpose and so finding the contract to be void in this instance did little to stop 
prostitution from occurring. It is more likely that the courts found as they did in these 
cases as a warning to those who may contract with a prostitute in the future of the 
possible outcome of doing so. As far as this thesis is concerned, there is a clear control 
interest being applied against the women in the courts attempt to deter future contracts 
with them, yet can also be read conversely, in that the law was attempting to protect 
those with whom a prostitute may contract from obtaining a disbenefit from a contract 
that is held to be void. It is within this dual application that areas of contention arise.  
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The issue comes when we assess just how far this protection interest extends in relation 
to the provision of goods to a prostitute. Evidently, in Pearce the law was attempting to 
protect the contracting party from losing out by entering into a contract which was 
deemed void for an immoral purpose. In Lloyd, however, the rationale is slightly different 
as the court was acknowledging that a prostitute had the same needs as other members 
of society but was simultaneously also holding the contract to be valid, thus rendering 
the woman liable to pay for the goods. In finding that such a contract was not void the 
court was ultimately holding the prostitute accountable by forcing her to pay for the 
goods. This accountability is for the benefit of the other contracting party, or if we take 
this wider, for the benefit of any person with whom a prostitute may contract. The 
protection interest is therefore evident here but this is firmly for the advantage of the 
public as opposed to the prostitute herself. Thus, it is submitted that for contracts for the 
facilitation of trade, both the protection and control interests are present but as has been 
shown by examining the cases, these are to be applied to the respective parties.  
 
Ultimately, whilst women such as Kitty may have faced a slight obstacle in obtaining 
items of clothing and the like, the law also presented them with a possible solution.405 
Only if it could be proved conclusively that the items were to be used for prostitution and 
that the seller was aware of this, would the contract be deemed to be void. Similarly to 
contracts for the rent of premises, a prostitute was not to be punished for merely seeking 
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to maintain herself in the same way as other persons in society; the law required that a 
substantial link be established between those things for which the woman was 
contracting and her profession. There thus remained some control applied by the law 
against these women, and this also resulted in some protection being afforded to the 
public to the detriment of the women, as in Lloyd v Johnson, but the social reality forced 
the judiciary to reach a compromise. The extent of prostitution did not allow for the 
resolutely punitive agenda invoked at the beginning of the period, and indeed it is 
doubtful as to whether society would have reacted kindly to such an approach, given the 
popularity of women such as Kitty and the disapproval shown against the methods used 
by groups such as the Society for the Reformation of Manners. The two-part rule 
therefore attempted to strike some sort of balance between regulating the practice of 
prostitution and adhering to social norms.  
 
Despite the good fortune of these women as far as the law in this area was concerned, in 
that the courts were willing to overlook their profession to instead treat them as equal to 
any other person in society - provided that these items were not directly promoting their 
trade - the luck of these women was not to last. A common feature of the individual 
accounts of prostitutes is that none fared especially well in the end, which can of course 
be partly expected, these women had exposed themselves to all manner of diseases 
during their exploits, and had built a career based upon their looks, once these faded 
along with their health their downfall was usually imminent. This is the fate which befell 
Kitty. During her heyday, Kitty Fisher was one of the most well-known and famed 
London courtesans, however after marrying in 1766, she died only 4 months afterwards. 
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Whilst there is contention over the exact cause of her death – smallpox may have been a 
cause – poisoning caused by whitener containing lead which was used as makeup is one 
possible reason that has been suggested. If this is true, it would be ironic that the very 
thing that assisted in achieving Kitty’s success also contributed to her demise. Kitty was 
buried in Benenden, Bath on 23rd March 1767406 in her favourite ball gown; in what was 
perhaps a most fitting end for a milliner’s daughter who became one of London’s most 
glamourous courtesans.  
 
4.4 A NEW AGENDA 
Whilst the promotion of morality became a significant hallmark of the long eighteenth 
century, this was often at odds with the social reality; prostitutes such as Kitty Fisher 
continued to be a feature of London society, but not only this, there existed a 
corresponding movement of sexual liberation and freedom. As has been mentioned, no 
longer was prostitution confined to secrecy, and with the Hanoverian regime sexual 
autonomy became increasingly pertinent. This was represented in literature, notably in 
120 Days of Sodom407 which was published in 1785, which depicted, in horrific detail, 
sexual deviances, but also emulated an era in which traditional Christian values of sexual 
relationships centring on pro-creation were being eroded. This publication by the 
Marquis de Sade was thus something of a satirical representation; whilst the period had 
begun with William and the advancement of morality and adherence to sexual purity, as 
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the long eighteenth century progressed, not only do we see a move away from this, but 
there simultaneously emerged an opposing concept, what was perhaps the first sexual 
revolution.408  
 
With the dominant religion of the country now returned to Protestantism as a 
consequence of the accession of William, it is no coincidence that from the eighteenth 
century onwards, with the growth of other branches of Protestantism, attitudes towards 
sex which had been promoted by orthodox Christian ideals began to collapse. This is not 
to say that the country underwent a dramatic shift in religious belief throughout the 
century but the various other facets of Christianity which emerged throughout the era 
went some way to weaken the traditional grasp of the Church on intimate relationships. 
These alternative branches of Christianity emerged as a result of one further outcome of 
the Glorious Revolution, the Toleration Act.409 Enacted in 1689, the Act stated that other 
branches of Christianity were permitted to practice free from interference provided that 
they swore an oath of allegiance; this applied to alternative limbs of Protestantism such 
as Nonconformists, but as mentioned earlier in this thesis, the legislature was careful not 
to extend this freedom to Catholicism. It was hoped that by extending religious freedom 
in this way albeit with an oath of allegiance, William could achieve a compromise and 
avoid the rebellion instigated against the previous monarch as a consequence of the 
adoption of a single-minded approach to religion.  
                                                          
408 Dabhoiwala provides an excellent account of this concept in The Origins of Sex, (Penguin Books, 
London: 2012) 




Of these Nonconformists, the establishment of Quakers in the mid-seventeenth century 
coincided with a growth in Congregationalists, who believed that central regulation of 
religion was wrong, and instead spiritual autonomy was preferred. With these changes 
in the religious landscape there was not such a tie to the traditions of the Church as there 
had been earlier in the period and so social attitudes towards sexual relationships became 
much more progressive. Samuel Johnson encapsulated this change in 1750, by stating, 
‘every man should regulate his actions by his own conscience’.410 There was thus a move 
away from a centralised notion of sexual purity and morality that had been so forcefully 
advocated by the Church of England, and instead the idea that sexual freedom was 
permissible took hold. Alongside this, social attitudes towards prostitution became much 
less punitive, as has been demonstrated in the social remedies which were advocated to 
regulate prostitution. In much the same way as was mentioned in the previous chapter, 
no longer were women viewed as inherently sexually deviant. After centuries of holding 
this belief, based on the notion that it was Eve who had seduced Adam in Eden, as the 
long eighteenth century progressed, the roles somewhat reversed; it was now men who 
were seen as being in constant pursuance of sexual gratification.  
 
This shift was epitomised in literature by popular figures such as Casanova and the Earl 
of Rochester documenting their exploits not only with prostitutes but with women in 
general. Even the King was acknowledged to have kept a mistress and so the idea that 
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sex was not simply something to be saved for marriage became widespread. Perhaps one 
of the most notorious men was James Boswell, who recalled his associations with 
prostitutes in his journal. His familiarity with prostitutes is apparent in his entry of 
Saturday 4th December 1762, in which, during a walk through St James’ park, a well-
known haunt for working women, Boswell and his friend came across a young lady who 
offered her services. Boswell reports that ‘there was one in a red cloak and a good buxom 
person and comely face whom I marked as a future piece, in case of exigency’.411 A short 
time after this Boswell obtains a mistress, Louisa, an actress in Covent Garden, however 
this romance is short-lived after he discovers her to have inflicted him with a venereal 
disease.  The rest of the journal is sprinkled with meetings with prostitutes:  
I sallied the Streets and just at the bottom of our own, I picked up a fresh agreable young Girl 
called Alice Gibbs. We went down a lane to a snug place; and I took out my armour, but she begged 
that I might not put it on, as the sport was much pleasanter without it; and as she was quite safe. 
I was so rash as to trust her, and had a very agreable congress412 
 
Unsurprisingly, Boswell was crippled with gonorrhoea throughout his life, and yet he 
garnered such a reputation from his associations with prostitutes that in a letter to a 
friend, it is recalled of his latest conquest, ‘a whore worthy of Boswell’.413 The attitude of 
Boswell was indicative of a large section of society at this time who felt that sexual 
relationships were resolutely personal; sex was a natural incidence of human nature and 
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prostitutes only aided in satisfying this innate male desire. It was thus also something in 
which the Church, and to an even greater extent, the law, had no right to be implicated.   
 
It was not only in biographical literature that we see this attitude represented, whilst 
Defoe is most commonly cited as portraying immorality in his novels Roxana and Moll 
Flanders, the poetry of Rochester is most compelling in its illustration of sexual intimacy. 
The metaphysical poetry that dominated the previous century with its depictions of 
wholesome love was emulated in the poetry of Donne, but even this had allusions to 
eroticism. In The Flea Donne compares the act of a flea biting himself and his lover to the 
sexual intimacy that the pair has encountered: 
It sucked me first, and now sucks thee, 
And in this flea our two bloods mingled be414 
Then in To His Mistress Going to Bed Donne describes his lover undressing and goes on 
to describe her body and their intimacy, ‘license my roving hands’.415 By the long 
eighteenth century, these affixations with eroticism became a much more predominant 
theme, and we see an unequivocal recognition of extra-marital intimacy. John Wilmot, 
the Earl of Rochester, encapsulates this most significantly in his poem A Ramble in St. 
James’ Park, in which he recalls an encounter with a prostitute in the most explicit detail. 
Whilst Rochester was renowned for his provocative style, his poetry is representative of 
                                                          
414 J. Donne, The Flea (1633), Lines 3-4 
415 J. Donne, To His Mistress Going to Bed (1654), Line 25 
175 
 
an era in which the topic of sex, but what is more, actually openly discussing sex, became 
much more acceptable.  
 
St James’ Park was a common site for meeting working women, and Rochester recalls 
his disgust at the women soliciting there:  
May your depraved appetite, 
That could in whiffling fools delight, 
Beget such frenzies in your mind 
You may go mad for the north wind416 
Despite the abhorrence that Rochester displays towards these women, it is clear that the 
prostitutes are exceedingly popular and so we see in literature also an illustration of the 
way in which an acceptance of prostitution had found its way into mainstream society 
and simultaneously into intellectual thinking. Earlier in the period the miseries 
constituent upon prostitution and in pursuing an immoral course of life were made clear 
in literature as well as in art; Hogarth presented a pitiable chronology of a young girl 
seduced into a life of vice in The Harlots Progress – the full set of engravings have been 
annexed to this chapter (Appendix 6) – and Defoe’s novels are explicitly critical of 
working women. However, what is further apparent is that by the end of the long 
eighteenth century no longer was the societal attitude towards sex one of upmost disgust 
or prudish suppression, instead sex was recognised as a natural occurrence of human 
nature and so it is argued that prostitution came to be seen as assisting in the fulfilment 
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of that natural desire.  Whilst this acceptance resulted in social remedies as opposed to 
harsh punishment being advocated by some as a means to regulate the profession, it also 
required the law to respond accordingly to such an extensive practice.  
 
4.4.1 Vagrancy Act 
Prostitution was wrong in the eyes of the law, but regulating this against the tide of 
sexual liberation and freedoms was an unenviable task. The law therefore had a choice; 
to control the practice with the vigour that had been attempted – and failed – earlier in 
the period with the harsh sentences initiated by the Society for the Reformation of 
Manners, or to adopt a new means of tackling the problem. The common law with regard 
to the rent of premises and facilitation of trade had already attempted this, with a 
recognition that prostitutes ought to be able to contract in the same way as any other 
citizen, provided that they were not doing so in an attempt to enhance their profession. 
It was not long before the legislature followed suit, in changing tact with regard to the 
statutory regulation of prostitution. This is most exemplified in the enactment of the 
Vagrancy Act in 1824.  
 
The Vagrancy Act was not directed only at prostitutes; rather the Act covered a range of 
offences aimed at punishing those who were deemed to be a nuisance on the streets. 
Section 3 contained a provision relating to the punishment of a prostitute as an ‘idle and 
disorderly person’,417 but this was only to be on the basis that she was ‘behaving in a 
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riotous or indecent manner’.418 Should a prostitute thus position herself in the street, 
without attracting any attention to herself – and remember, Harris’ List had made the 
location of prostitutes much easier, and the sheer number of prostitutes working in 
London had made it relatively easy to spot a working woman anyway – it would thus be 
right to assume that she would not be considered to be doing anything unlawful under 
the 1824 Act. Therefore, similarly to that which was decided in Bowry, the law was only 
interested in punishing the prostitute herself should she engage in some positive act or 
behaviour, in this case it must be acting ‘riotous’ in public, or in Bowry, purchasing items 
explicitly for the promotion of her profession. 
 
It would appear that the law was less concerned with the prostitute herself, so much as 
regulating the profession in general. Furthermore, it would seem that provided that the 
prostitute was not explicit in her intentions, the law was willing to overlook punishing 
her personally. This motivation based upon maintaining social order as opposed to 
invoking moral ideals is further evidenced when the wording of the Act is analysed. 
Indeed, nowhere is there any reference made to the immorality of the prostitute; instead, 
she is classed amongst other ‘idle persons’ and receives a mention which can be found 
between unlicensed street sellers and beggars. It would seem, therefore, that like 
landlords of public houses and the vast majority of society as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the law saw prostitution as a common, if unfortunate, incidence. Prostitution 
was to be controlled and regulated, but this was only the case where the explicit practice 




was occurring, and as far as punishing the woman herself was concerned, the law 
refrained from doing so unless it was absolutely necessary, such as had the woman 
drawn explicit attention to herself.  
 
Indeed, this had been raised in a case more than a century earlier at a trial for three 
soldiers accused of murdering a policeman. There, Holt CJ remarked ‘must not a woman 
though she be lewd have the opportunity to walk quietly about the streets… a light 
woman hath a right of liberty as well as any other to walk about the streets’.419 This 
earlier dictum reflects the attitude of the judiciary that although prostitution must be 
regulated, this was not to be with the unnecessary vigour that had begotten the downfall 
of those such as the Society for the Reformation of Manners. It was this less stringent 
attitude that was deemed the most appropriate and which ultimately made its way into 
the statute book in 1824 as an effective means of combatting prostitution. Only a few 
years prior to the long eighteenth century we saw the enactment of the Adultery Act and 
it’s incredibly punitive effect on prostitutes, the provisions included in the Vagrancy Act 
are indicative of a period in which prostitutes came to dominate the streets of London 
and sexual license became much freer. Whilst morality was brought to the fore, the ideal 
had to compete with the reality, and this resulted in a recognition that prostitution ought 
to be regulated, but the vigour with which this had been attempted earlier in the century 
was abandoned and replaced with a considerably less severe approach. The treatment of 
prostitutes within the Vagrancy Act epitomised this new agenda.  
                                                          





The beginning of the long eighteenth century signified a move away from Catholicism 
towards the re-adoption of Protestantism and with this change a moralistic agenda came 
to dominate social attitudes. This is most exemplified by movements such as the Society 
for the Reformation of Manners which sought to promote morality through harsh 
punishment aimed at prostitutes. With the accession of the Hanoverian regime, however, 
social norms regarding how best to regulate prostitution became much more progressive, 
as evidenced by the notion of public stews as advocated by Mandeville. It is argued that 
these were particularly necessary given the response of the law with regard to the rent 
of premises to a prostitute where such contracts were held to be void if the lessee was a 
practicing prostitute. Alongside this, however, was an acknowledgement that a prostitute 
was a citizen and should thus be treated as such as far as possible in the eyes of the law, 
hence the two-part rule which can also be found in cases concerning the facilitation of 
the trade of prostitution. This two-part rule which rendered a contract void only upon 
some knowledge by the other contracting party of the fact that the woman was a 
prostitute, as well as having to establish that the premises or the goods in question were 
to be specifically used for prostitution, was indicative of a change in social ideals 
concerning the practice. Indeed, as has been recognised, ‘by the mid-century the notion 
of the prostitute as victim had become firmly entrenched, even in judicial circles’.420 
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However, it must also be recognised that within the facilitation of trade judgments there 
lay an inherent protection being afforded to the public, given that such contracts were to 
be void only upon satisfying both of the above criteria. Thus, was a contract to be valid 
or contain items some of which were to be used for prostitution and some not, the courts 
held the prostitute to be accountable to the agreement and the woman would be forced 
to pay for the goods. The same rationale is not used in the rent of premises cases given 
that although it could potentially have been used as a means to evict a prostitute from 
the premises, the cases concern the repayment of outstanding rent. Thus, rendering the 
contract void in these instances simply permitted the woman to withhold payment. The 
overlapping of the control and protection interests is significant in that it is submitted 
that these two agendas often do not occur in isolation and it is merely who they are 
applied to which differs.  
 
The entrenchment of the idea that a prostitute could be seen as a victim was not simply 
apparent within the judiciary as the political landscape during this period also developed 
with the extension of the franchise following the Reform Act, as a result of which, the 
middle class were given the power to exercise a vote. It is significant that the middling 
sort aspired to differentiate themselves from the current ruling class by their adherence 
to a strict moral code, in fact, a good portion of the members of the Society for the 
Reformation of Manners derived from this class. As a consequence of the 1832 Act, this 
morally upstanding group in society were now given a say in politics and were thus given 
a means by which moral issues, and most specifically those pertaining to prostitution, 




The cumulative result of this change in both the monarchy and politics resulted in 
responses to prostitution centring more greatly on the redemption of the women. Whilst 
the Magdalen Hospital sought to redeem the women who had fallen victim to the 
profession, this was an institution that remained particularly religious in its teachings, 
and so it is clear that the dominant theme throughout this era has been the effect of 
religion on social remedies. Correspondingly with emerging redemptive social attitudes 
to prostitution was a partial acceptance of the women. As has been discussed, the 
judiciary came to view prostitution as something of an unfortunate incidence of society, 
and this was only echoed in popular culture with the creation of Harris’ List and even 
extended so far as viewing high class courtesans such as Kitty Fisher as akin to a celebrity. 
This new agenda has been deemed the sexual revolution as a consequence of these liberal 
attitudes, and was reflected in literature, notably in the work of Rochester as well as 
receiving some critique by Defoe in his novels Roxana and Moll Flanders.  
 
The influence of religion as the catalyst for this change is clear, and following the 
Toleration Act and the emergence of new modes of religion, the grasp of orthodox 
Protestantism on intimate relationships was loosened. This came to be reflected not only 
in society but in the response of the law, which becomes all the more evident when the 
provisions of the Vagrancy Act in 1824 are contrasted with those of the Adultery Act 
enacted in 1650. It is therefore argued that less severe modes of dealing with the problem 
of prostitution were borne from this change in social ideals, driven by changes in the 




Ultimately, by the end of the long eighteenth century, prostitutes came to be treated by 
the law in the same way as other citizens, provided that they refrained from explicitly 
practicing their profession. This is exemplified most significantly in the response of the 
law in relation to the rent of premises and the facilitation of trade cases. From putting 
adulterers to death at the beginning of the period, the law was now willing to overlook a 
prostitute in the provisions included in the Vagrancy Act, lest she should draw attention 
to herself, and society had even arrived at a point whereby prostitutes were positively 
celebrated, as evidenced by the fame of Kitty Fisher. The control interest embodied by 
the law towards prostitution still remained in the advent of this new legislation as well 
as the common law judgments; however, the social context in which this took place went 
some way to dilute the particularly punitive agenda invoked earlier in the period. Added 
to this, within the facilitation of trade cases most significantly, we see a law which, as 
well as controlling the practice of prostitution, also wished to protect society from such 
an immoral profession. Overall, the doctrine of immorality survived the social change 
away from viewing prostitution as resolutely sinful, but its application was hindered in 
practice by a judiciary who came to see prostitution as a mere incidence of society; 
simultaneously, the seducing harlot was replaced by the fallen woman and the control 
interest applied by the law was thus reduced accordingly.  
 
Having addressed immorality, the thesis shall now turn to  the legal treatment of women 
in the area of incapacity.   
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Incapacity: Married Women and Widows 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Widow Blackacre in The Plain Dealer by William Wycherely observed that ‘matrimony to 
a woman is worse than excommunication in depriving her of the benefit of the law’.421 It 
is true that in the long eighteenth century, upon marriage a woman lost her legal 
autonomy, and this was only regained should she outlive her husband. This chapter will 
explore the extent to which this contractual capacity was removed and whether the law 
in doing so sought to invoke control or protection interests.  
 
The first section will form the majority of this chapter and will explore the contractual 
capacity of married women. A chronology of the life of a married woman will be charted 
and the legal issues at each stage will be presented and discussed. The section will begin 
by analysing the position of a woman immediately prior to marriage; the tradition of 
providing a dowry will be discussed here, and it will be shown that in this way, a woman 
maintained some leverage with regard to her future husband. Next, the chapter will 
explore the change in legal position of a woman upon marriage; notably her new status 
as a feme covert and what this meant for her ability to contract. The opposing argument 
will also be presented. It will be revealed that contrary to popular thought, the provision 
of pin-money, and later, jointure, allowed wives to retain an element of independence, 
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despite the legal consequences of coverture. Ultimately, this section will show that the 
belief that a married woman in the long eighteenth century lacked contractual capacity 
just does not hold true.  
 
This theme will continue in the second section of this chapter, where common 
misconceptions surrounding widows and unmarried women will be dispelled. The legal 
position of a widow presented further issues, as these women were given contractual 
capacity upon the death of their husband. With regard to unmarried women, the picture 
is less clear. Although their legal rights were not subsumed into those of a husband, social 
norms dictated that these women had to remain in the family home until marriage. In 
this way, they did not possess the same legal independence as a widow as they continued 
to be financially dependent on another male, often a father or brother. A case study of 
Jane Austen will be presented, being a famous example of this. Ultimately, it will be 
shown that there was a juxtaposition between the social ideal of an eighteenth century 
woman and her actual legal position. Whilst legal doctrines such as coverture sought to 
quash any legal autonomy that a woman possessed, it is clear that in practice this was 
not the case. The image of a meek, subordinate female which is commonly attributed to 
an eighteenth century woman is an inaccurate depiction, whether she was married or 
not, and this chapter will aim to demonstrate that. Furthermore, the control that the law 
sought to exert over these women by removing their contractual capacity was limited in 




5.2 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WOMAN 
Although addressed in Chapter Three, before any discussion of the contractual capacity 
of women is undertaken, their role in eighteenth century society ought to be revisited. 
Conduct books from the period give us an idea of what was expected of a respectable 
woman at this time. Qualities such as meekness, modesty, and obedience were integral 
for any woman,422 but advice was also given specifically, depending on the woman’s 
status as a wife or a widow.  Of a wife, it was expected that she was able to run the 
household, as stated in The Lady’s New Year’s Gift: 
The Government of your House, Family and Children, which since it is the Province allotted to 
your Sex, and that the discharging it well, will for that reason be expected from you, if you either 
desert it out of Laziness, or manage it with want of skill, instead of a help you will be an 
Incumbrance to the Family where you are placed423 
In The Ladies Calling, the author divided the position of a wife into two further roles, 
these being a mother and a mistress – mistress in this sense referring to the management 
of the home. Contractual responsibilities were also noted and it was warned that a wife 
must not ‘waste and embezzle her husband’s estate, but…confine…expences within such 
limits as that can easily admit’.424 We shall see later in this chapter how the law reinforced 
this social ideal through the doctrine of necessaries.  
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The social position of a wife in the long eighteenth century was supported by the legal 
definitions attributed to women at this time. A woman could be a feme sole or a feme 
covert. The nature of a feme sole meant that a woman was able to retain her legal 
autonomy, and so she was able to contract for items without reliance on a male. A feme 
covert, on the other hand, gained this position by way of marriage, upon which her legal 
rights became subsumed into those of her husband. The basis of this was rooted in 
religion and the dominance of the church on the marriage ceremony, specifically the 
notion that by marrying two persons became one. This is illustrated in the Book of 
Common Prayer from 1662, in which the Solemnisation of Matrimony contains the 
following words:  
So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies; he that loveth his wife loveth himself: for 
no man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the 
Church: for we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man 
leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife; and they two shall be one flesh425 
This idea of ‘one flesh’426 was reflected in the legal position of a woman as a feme covert, 
but the dominance of a husband over his wife is made clear in Corinthians in which it is 
stated, ‘I want you to understand that the head of every man is Christ, and the head of 
the woman is man, and the head of Christ is God’.427  
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Despite the seeming legal disadvantage to being a wife, marriage continued to be the 
ultimate ambition for a woman in the long eighteenth century.428 This is further 
illustrated by the way in which unmarried women in literature at the time were usually 
presented as unhappy. Miss Bates in Emma429 seems always to be crying and, although 
slightly beyond the time period of this thesis, a literary discussion of unmarried women 
could not refrain from mentioning Miss Havisham, portrayed by Dickens in Great 
Expectations430 as perhaps the epitome of a pitiable spinster. Marriage, it seemed in the 
eighteenth century, was the key to happiness.   
 
Widows did not fare any better as far as literature was concerned. At the beginning of 
the period, they were portrayed as lustful and sexual predators, notably the Duchess of 
Malfi in Webster’s play of the same name431 and Lady Booby in Henry Fielding’s novel, 
Joseph Andrews432 who tries to seduce the protagonist. One also cannot fail to spot the 
insinuation inherent in her name here. Later however – and it would not be too unlikely 
to suggest that as a result of the trend of sensibility in literature433 – widows are 
presented as more distressed and pitiable figures, examples being Clara Lennox434 in the 
novel by Margaret Lee and Mrs Jervis in Moll Flanders.435 This trend was also apparent 
in law, as by the start of the long eighteenth century, no longer was it deemed inevitable 
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that a widow would remarry and indeed probate documents positively discouraged it, as 
Todd has acknowledged: 
The wills of men in the mid-sixteenth century who referred to the possibility of remarriage make 
it clear that they viewed it calmly as a predictable, even desirable, event….after about 1570 an 
interesting change began to occur…rather than depending on the good offices of a future husband, 
these testators made certain that their wives should take none of their wealth into a new marriage 
by inserting a penalty withholding or reducing the wife’s share of the estate if she remarried436 
 
This view is echoed in The Ladies Calling in which a second marriage is deemed 
unnecessary, ‘marriage is so great an adventure that once seems enough for the whole 
life’.437 A widow disrupted the natural order of things in that as a woman she maintained 
her contractual autonomy in a way that even an unmarried women did not. In this way 
she was an anomaly and so it is not surprising that she was portrayed in novels and the 
like as a figure of ridicule or fear. Carlton explains the propensity to depict widows in a 
negative light as being a consequence of this anomaly, ‘men were afraid of widows 
because they did not fit into the age’s concept of a hierarchical cosmic order. Being 
without a man to guide them they were, so to speak, a weak link in the great chain of 
being’.438 A widow held a different legal position, which did not accord with the social 
norms of a woman surrendering her independence to a male; she instead maintained 
this, and this difference was accentuated in the literature of the time.  
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5.3 MARRIED WOMEN 
With the social expectations of an eighteenth century woman in mind, this chapter will 
begin by analysing the contractual capacity of married women. The provision of a dowry 
will be discussed first, before the legal status of a married woman and the consequences 
of coverture for her ability to contract will be addressed. It is intended that by analysing 
the position of a woman immediately prior to marriage, this will give a fuller picture of 
the exchange that took place in anticipation of marriage that rendered her without 
contractual capacity as a wife. Finally, the section will explore the additional benefits 
obtained by a woman upon marriage, notably pin money and the payment of jointure 
upon the death of her husband. This will provide a preface for the second section of this 
chapter which will discuss widows and unmarried women.  
 
5.3.1 Dowry 
In the provision of a dowry the economic incentives attached to marriage are abundantly 
clear. A dowry was a monetary sum given to the family of the groom by that of the bride, 
and was intended to reflect her character and social standing. In return, the groom 
assigned a jointure to his wife, which provided for her upkeep upon his death – the legal 
significance of this will be discussed later in the chapter. There was, then, something of 
a trade-off. The family of a bride provided a dowry at the outset and in return the groom 
supported his wife financially throughout the marriage, was liable for her debts during 
marriage, and provided a jointure for her use upon his death. The size of the dowry was 
proportionate to the size of the jointure that would be available for the bride, and thus 
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marriage inevitably incorporated financial considerations.  Historians have been quick to 
criticise the provision of a dowry as being degrading to women, Chan and Wright have 
stated that this tradition reduced a woman to ‘an “object” to be transferred’.439 However, 
when it is understood what a bride sought to gain in return for this initial financial gift, 
it becomes clear that she was not in such an unfortunate position, and rather conversely, 
the provision of a dowry gave the bride and her family an element of bargaining power.  
 
Rather than demeaning, it is argued here that this actually gave a woman an element of 
leverage. In addition, what a woman sought to gain in marriage by way of financial 
security and the liability of her husband towards her expenditure, it is submitted, 
outweighed the drawback of having to provide a suitably large dowry. Thus, there were 
advantages to this system for both the family of the groom as well as that of the bride. 
The provision of a monetary sum to the estate of the groom ultimately increased its 
worth, whilst the jointure given to the bride provided for her future and any heirs. As 
well as this, in the same way as a husband could seek to advance his family through 
marriage, the family of a bride were also able to increase their social standing through 
the connection of their family name to that of a groom with sizeable wealth. 
 
A dowry was not always a substantial sum, however, and this of course depended upon 
the social class of the family of the bride. Whilst those of the aristocracy could amount to 
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considerable sums – Lady Anne Clifford came to her marriage with a dowry of £17,000 
in 1609440 – these tended to be around £1000 to £5000.441 Below this, sums for daughters 
of the gentry ranged between £100 and £1000, whilst those of the ‘middling sort’ were 
typically between £100 and £500.442 For those from the working class, it was not 
uncommon for a daughter from a poorer family to provide her own earnings as her 
portion.443 The importance of a dowry is noted in chapter three of this thesis, in reference 
to the story of St Nicholas of Myra who was said to have dropped three bags of gold 
through the window of a poor man to enable his daughters to marry and thus not become 
a burden on the parish– the same three bags used on the sign of a pawnbroker today. 
This tale dates back more than a thousand years, and so in the long eighteenth century, 
whilst romantic attraction became more popular following the rise of sensibility in the 
middle of the period, the predominant motivations for marriage remained financial as it 
was in this way that advancement could be assured.  
 
Ultimately, a dowry assisted in this progression as it indicated the beginning of marriage 
and signified what a woman could bring to the union. The financial consequences which 
have been said to objectify the woman actually gave her the leverage to ensure her own 
advancement and in this way gave her and her family an element of control. When 
considering also what she sought to gain from marriage from her husband by way of 
security and the like, a dowry becomes a mere practicality on the road to achieving this. 
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A woman did not lose her autonomy in the traditions surrounding marriage; rather 
instead she was able manipulate these legal rules which on the surface appeared to 
constrain her contractual capacity, to her advantage. This is never more evident than 
during her marriage, in relation to the doctrine of coverture.  
 
5.3.2 Coverture during Marriage 
Where issues surrounding women’s contractual capacity were really brought to the fore 
was after marriage, as it was then that the legal rights of a wife became subsumed into 
those of her husband. It was expected that until marriage a daughter would continue to 
live in the family home. In this way she did not have financial independence as she 
remained dependent upon her father or guardian, but the nature of being a wife and thus 
a feme covert meant that she surrendered any legal autonomy to her husband.  
 
However, the lot of a wife was not as negative as has typically been envisaged. Although 
a woman lost her contractual capacity upon marriage, this did not prohibit her from 
contracting absolutely. To explain, although a woman could not enter into contracts in 
her own name, as these would be rendered void,444 she was able to pledge the credit of 
her husband to purchase items, as long as these were necessary for her, such as food and 
clothing.445 What was necessary was in accordance with the ‘degree’ of her husband, as 
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stated in Manby v Scott,446 and so the wealthier the family, the more likely it was that 
extravagant items would be deemed to be necessary. In Manby, an action was brought 
by the plaintiffs, who were mercers447 in London, for the recovery of £90 owed to them 
by the wife of Edward Scott. Katherine Scott had contracted with the sellers for ‘divers448 
wares and mercandize [sic.]’449 on the 1st September 1658 and payment had yet to be 
received. In 1662, the case came before the court of the King’s Bench who heard how, in 
1646, Edward had issued a declaration forbidding the plaintiffs from dealing with his 
wife.  
 
The question before the court was whether the outstanding sum ought to be recoverable 
by the plaintiffs, who contended that the items were necessary for Katherine and thus 
constituted a valid contract. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were put on notice 
to prohibit any sale to Katherine regardless of whether it could be deemed to amount to 
a necessary item. Regarding whether the articles constituted necessaries, Bridgman CJ 
was of the opinion that they most certainly were; he stated that ‘silks and velvets are not 
unfit for a lady’.450 However, what was of greater concern to the court were the 
circumstances in which the sale had taken place. As the sellers had been put on adequate 
notice to refrain from dealing with Katherine, Bridgman CJ found that the contract was 
void. The voidability of this contract resulted from the lack of consent given by Edward 
to his wife as, ‘the wife had neither a legal will, nor power to contract without her 
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husbands consent’.451 Mr Justice Hyde agreed with this finding, he also held that ‘the 
same wares were necessary for her, and suitable to the degree of her husband’,452 but as 
the husband had withdrawn his authority, the contract could not be upheld. It was 
reasoned that ‘when the husband forbids a particular person to trust his wife, this 
prohibition is an absolute revocation… of the general authority which the wife had 
before’.453 As a result, the plaintiff’s action for the recovery of the outstanding sum failed.  
 
The judgment in Manby v Scott supports the proposition that in order for an item to be 
deemed necessary to a wife, this was to be judged in accordance with the state and degree 
of her husband. There was a presumption that any items deemed to be necessary to the 
wife or the household were purchased with the authority of the husband.454 However, 
Manby also demonstrates just how far the control of a wife by her husband extended, as 
should he withdraw his authority for any purchases, his wife was to be immediately 
‘disabled’455 from contracting and any subsequent contract would be declared void. It is 
this difference that renders the contractual capacity of a married woman different to that 
of an infant and it could be argued that her lot was worse. Whilst both lacked full 
contractual capacity, a contract with an infant for anything beyond necessaries was only 
to be deemed voidable and not void ab initio. Indeed, the infant could choose to affirm 
the contract himself when he came of age. However, a husband could withdraw consent 
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and order a complete prohibition on his wife’s contracting, leaving her without recourse. 
Indeed, this distinction was addressed in Manby by Bridgman CJ. Although initially 
reducing the legal capacity of a married woman to that of a child: 
A difference hath been endeavoured to be made between the necessities of a wife, and of a child… 
I see no difference in reason: the man is bound by the law of God and men to maintain both wife 
and children456 
 
His Lordship went on to emphasise four distinct differences. 
1. The infant of the age of discretion is not a person disabled to contract as the wife is.  
2. His actual contracts, if for unnecessaries, are but voidable.  
3. He contracts for himself, and not for another.  
4. He chargeth himself, and not another.457 
In this way, in the judgment of Manby v Scott and indeed in all cases concerning the sale 
of goods to a married woman, the woman is reduced to an agent of her husband. Only 
with his authority could she contract and were this to be withdrawn, her contractual 
capacity was null. In the following chapter we shall see further explanation of how the 
legal status of a married woman and an infant were akin, in a discussion of the 
contractual capacity of an infant for necessaries.  
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Yet despite this lack of contractual autonomy, the lot of a wife could be used to her 
advantage, certainly given that her status was to be defined by the degree of her husband. 
Finn has recognised the possible manipulation inherent in this by wives who were ‘intent 
to wrestle generous maintenance settlements from husbands from whom they wished to 
separate’.458 As what was necessary to a wife depended on the status of her husband, the 
wealthier and the higher status of her husband, the more likely it was that more 
extravagant items would be deemed to be necessary, and thus, Finn contends, should the 
spouses separate, a higher maintenance payment would be awarded.  
 
In addition to receiving beneficial maintenance payments from their husbands upon 
separation, the legal status of a married woman as an agent did not render her as 
disadvantaged as has commonly been thought and shopkeepers regularly contracted with 
wives beyond those items that were necessary. Despite the scorn with which such 
transactions by ‘haughty’459 wives were viewed by the judiciary in cases such as Manby, 
this was perfectly permissible should a husband be willing to pay for the goods, but issues 
arose when the outstanding debt was not paid, as shall be demonstrated in an analysis 
of the cases below.  
 
Debts were able to accrue in this way as a result of the method of payment in this period. 
Unlike today where immediate payment is given for the purchase of goods, in the long 
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eighteenth century items were commonly purchased on credit with the final bill to be 
settled at the end of the month or often much later, as decided by the parties themselves. 
Considering this, it is easy to see how a wife could accumulate large debts easily. This 
was the situation in Etherington v Parrot,460 in which Mr Parrot informed the sales boy 
of a pawnshop that his master ought not to trust his wife any longer and should refrain 
from allowing her to pawn items there. This came after his wife pawned clothes worth 
£7 for a mere £1 8s in order to buy alcohol. After Mr Parrot recovered his wife’s items, 
she simply took the clothes and pawned them again and it was this that prompted the 
defendant in the case to seek to prohibit the shopkeeper from dealing with his wife in 
future. The case came about as this did not occur, and further dealings were made with 
Mrs Parrot, for which the shopkeeper demanded payment. 
 
In delivering judgment, Holt CJ reminded the court of the doctrine of coverture, ‘the wife 
has no power originally to charge her husband, but is absolutely under his power and 
government’.461 This referred to the principle that a wife was only able to enter into such 
contracts with the permission of her husband, given that her legal rights were subsumed 
into his. Despite the husband warning only the sales boy and not the master himself, Holt 
CJ was of the opinion that this was sufficient notice, ‘notice to the defendant’s servant 
usually employed by him in his trade, [is] a good notice to his master the plaintiff; and 
he cannot charge the defendant’.462 In applying this principle generally, his Lordship 
explained that ‘if the husband have solemnly declared his dissent, that she shall not be 
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trusted, any person, that has notice of this dissent, trusts her at his peril after’.463 
Consequently, Mr Parrot was not liable for the latest debts accrued by his wife as his 
warning to the sales boy was deemed to have put the master on sufficient notice to refrain 
from dealing in future with Mrs Parrot.  
 
But what was to be done when no notice was given but the seller ought to have known 
that the goods could not possibly be authorised by the husband? These facts arose in the 
case of Montague v Espinasse.464 In Montague it was argued that items of jewellery were 
not necessary items for the wife of the defendant and thus he ought not to be liable for 
payment for them. A total debt of £83 6s was outstanding for items which included 
‘diamond rings, necklaces and bracelets’465 and in addition it was argued that the 
purchase had been made without the knowledge of the defendant. When it came to the 
question of whether the goods were necessary, the court reasoned that they were not, 
‘for if they had been so, she would have worn them’,466 and furthermore Mrs Espinasse 
was already in possession of a number of similar pieces. Despite this, when determining 
whether the outstanding sum ought to be paid, Abbott CJ put it to the court that ‘if 
tradesmen wish to run no risk on the question, whether the purchase is made by the 
authority of the husband or not, it is their duty, in all cases, where the order is large, to 
ask the husband, before the goods are supplied, whether the order was given by his 
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authority or not’.467 Although authority could be implied from the circumstances,468 to 
protect themselves it was suggested that explicit authority should be sought. In support 
of their argument the defence stated that staff of the plaintiff’s shop only visited the home 
when Mr Espinasse was out. In addition to this, when the bill was delivered, the servant 
who took delivery was said to have commented, ‘“how could Mr Montague trust my 
mistress so much? I am sure my master does not know it”’, to which the sales boy 
responded ‘“we are quite aware of that”’.469 Despite this apparent admission, as the goods 
were not necessary items, the question as to whether the sale was authorised became 
somewhat redundant. As previously stated, a married woman could only contract for 
those items which were necessary or authorised by her husband, if they were not, as in 
this case, then the contract was void and the seller could not recover payment.  
 
The two cases above are examples of coverture and the liabilities that a husband 
undertook as a consequence of the provision of a dowry from his wife prior to marriage. 
Thus, although a married woman lost her legal autonomy in name, she did not 
completely lose her contractual capacity in practice as she simply contracted under her 
husband’s title. Any liability that was incurred by way of this was shouldered by her 
husband and so the idea that a woman was greatly disadvantaged by marriage, in the 
sense that she lost her ability to contract, simply does not align with the reality. The 
opposing side to this, however, was that the legal status of a wife rendered her 
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significantly reliant upon her husband, and should he fail to fulfil his obligations to her, 
it was notoriously difficult to prove neglect.  
 
This is exemplified by the experience of Lady Mary Coke, who, after tiring of her 
husband’s gambling and alcoholism, sought a separation.470 This in itself was scandalous 
at this time, but was further aggravated by the supposed behaviour of Lord Coke towards 
his wife. He was said to be controlling and to have subjected her to mistreatment. To add 
to these rumours, when asked to attend court, Lady Mary did so in a state of poor dress.471 
A divorce was sought by Lady Coke in November 1749 but this was refused and the actual 
divorce was not granted until her husband instigated the mediation and separation.472 
Divorce was not common in the eighteenth century and in combination with social 
attitudes towards women it is clear why it would be so difficult for a woman to institute 
proceedings. The humiliation for any petitioner was bad enough, but the practical reality 
of doing so as a woman made the process exceptionally difficult and near to impossible 
for those from the lower classes who lacked the financial support. What separation meant 
in terms of the continuation of coverture depended upon the circumstances. An 
adulterous woman who left the marital home was not able to continue to pledge her 
husband’s credit, but could do so if she continued to reside with him.473 As explained by 
Holt CJ in Robinson v Greinold, ‘though the wife be ever so lewd, yet while she cohabits 
with her husband he is bound to find her necessaries and pay for them, for he took her 
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for better for worse’. 474 Likewise, a wife who had been forced to leave the marital home 
as a result of cruelty on the part of her husband maintained the right to pledge his 
credit.475 It is thus evident why Lord Coke was eventually keen to seek a separation, with 
a stipulated payment to his wife, as opposed to being found to have caused her 
maltreatment with the consequence of her desertion and the possibility of her continuing 
to accrue debts in his name. There was a string of cases before the courts determining 
the operation of coverture and whether a wife maintained the right to pledge her 
husband’s credit even after separation.  
 
5.3.3 Coverture after Separation  
One such case is Corbett v Poelnitz476 in which the validity of a bond was brought before 
the courts. Ann and Lord Percy separated and a maintenance payment of £1600 was 
secured on Ann for life as a consequence. After the separation, but before her divorce 
from Lord Percy, on the 29th November 1776 Ann entered into a bond of £1800 with 
Abraham Chambers. She was granted a divorce after this and went on to marry Baron 
Poelnitz in March 1780. On the 29th August 1780, £262 10s became payable to Abraham 
Chambers as a condition of the bond and an action was brought by him to recover this 
from Ann and her new husband. The question before the court was whether Ann was 
able to contract and thus bind herself in such a way having only separated from her 
husband. If it was found that coverture was maintained even after separation, the 
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contract would be void as Ann would not have been legally entitled to make such a 
contract in her husband’s name. At court, great weight was given to the fact that a 
maintenance payment had been settled upon Ann and she had conducted her affairs as a 
single woman. Lord Mansfield alluded to this, stating that the question was 
Whether a woman married, but living separate from her husband by agreement, having a large 
separate maintenance settled on her, continuing notoriously to live as a single woman, 
contracting and getting credit as such, and the husband not being liable, shall be sued as a feme 
sole?477  
He concluded that ‘I think she should’.478 He further stated that ‘where a woman has a 
separate estate, and acts and receives credit as a feme sole, she shall be liable as such’.479 
Given that Ann had received a separate maintenance from her husband, which was 
intended to support her, and from which she entered into other contracts, it followed 
that this placed her in a position akin to that of a feme sole. Ashhurst J agreed and 
reasoned that ‘where a woman has a separate maintenance and the husband cannot be 
charged it follows naturally that she must’.480 Thus Ann and her new husband were liable 
for the payment to be made on the bond.  
 
The question in Todd v Stokes481 differed in that it concerned the duration of time that a 
husband could remain liable for the debts of his wife following separation. An action was 
brought for the recovery of a debt accrued as a result of the purchase of medicine from 
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an apothecary. As stated earlier in this section,482 this would amount to a necessary item 
and so was something for which a husband would be liable. The issue in the case, 
however, was that the husband and wife had been separated for five years, and 
maintenance had been paid to the wife during this time. As a consequence of these 
factors, Mr Stokes argued that he was not liable for the debts of his wife and additionally, 
their separation was well-known in the area and as such the apothecary ought to have 
known that his wife was no longer able to pledge his credit. The court agreed and 
explained that, ‘if the wife had come immediately from her husband after the separation, 
before it could have been publicly and generally known, and had taken up necessaries 
upon credit, the husband would have been liable’483 but since the separation was well 
known in the area ‘for five years past it was enough to exempt the defendants wife from 
being capable to charge the defendant’.484 Mr Stokes was therefore not liable for the debt 
accrued by his wife.  
 
It is thus clear that the operation of coverture continued even after separation, but this 
came with certain restrictions. For instance, the provision of a maintenance payment 
with the result that the wife was able to live effectively as a feme sole released both parties 
from the bonds of coverture. Yet a contract undertaken by a wife immediately following 
separation would continue to render a husband liable, until this separation became 
general knowledge. Instances of coverture being discharged completely include divorce 
(when a financial settlement would be given to the wife anyway) and upon separation 
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when the wife was provided with a maintenance payment which enabled her to live 
effectively as a feme sole. So from this, it should be understood that there were benefits 
to a wife during marriage, such as her ability to contract but without liability on her part, 
as well as upon separation, where she obtained a financial settlement and was 
additionally able to contract as a feme sole. Thus, the control that the law sought to place 
on women, through their legal status as a feme covert was not strictly applied in practice. 
It is hoped that this section has dispelled some common misconceptions surrounding the 
lot of a wife in the long eighteenth century. It has been shown that there were advantages 
for a woman within marriage and the operation of coverture, and these should not be 
overlooked.  
 
5.3.4 Pin-money and Jointure 
The advantages inherent in marriage for a woman were not simply to be found in the 
manipulation of coverture. This section will address pin-money and jointure as a means 
by which married women could achieve an element of independence.  
This chapter has focused upon marriage in the long eighteenth century as an economic 
exchange, and fundamentally, this was so. Whilst romantic love became important in the 
middle of the period, financial motivations remained, and securing an economically 
advantageous match continued to be prevalent. When speaking of the ‘trade-off’ that a 
woman undertook, it has been shown that the provision of a dowry and the subsequent 
marriage rendered a wife a feme covert, but this was in exchange for her husband 
shouldering the burden of debts that were to be accrued by her in his name. Additionally, 
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pin money was paid to a wife during her lifetime and a jointure payment was assigned 
to her upon the death of her husband.  
 
It is in the payment of pin-money that we see a direct disruption of the control interests 
that were so inherent in the legal mechanisms surrounding marriage. Pin money was 
money paid to a wife throughout marriage, by her husband, for her own personal use. 
This could be for ‘clothes, amusements, charities and such other out-of-pocket 
expenses’.485 Whilst coverture was overridden in practice, and did not place the woman 
at a considerable disadvantage, this legal mechanism was intended to control the woman 
as it placed assets and property into the hands of her husband. Pin money, on the other 
hand, ran directly counter to this control that the law had sought to place on women, as 
it gave them explicit autonomy outside of their husband’s regulation. What is more, this 
payment was made by her husband, the one person for whom the control interests of the 
law sought to act in favour. This inconsistency explains why pin-money was deemed to 
be unacceptable by some commentators. A rather comical account was published in The 
Spectator in 1804 which includes the letter of a disgruntled husband and the response of 
a journalist to his qualms. The letter states that women were so concerned about the 
payment of pin-money and the financial benefits of marriage, that this superseded all 
other concerns, ‘I could not bring her close with me before I had entered into a treaty 
with her longer than that of the grand alliance’.486 Upon providing his wife with £400 a 
year, which at this time was a considerable sum, and one which gives an idea of the class 
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from which the author hailed, he goes on to state that ‘finding me a little tardy in her last 
quarters payment, she threatens me every day to arrest me’.487  
 
These primary sources provide considerable insight into how marital traditions were 
viewed by people at this time. Whilst we must bear in mind that the publication itself, 
The Spectator, was a great advocate of morality, it does assist in understanding what a 
certain section of society felt about the provision of pin-money. Given the exaggerated 
tone of the letter - indeed, it borders on satirical - it is the opinion of the current author 
that it is not a genuine account, but rather an instance of the publication trying to prove 
a point. Whilst the provision of pin money may have been a victory for the woman in 
securing some legal autonomy distinct from that of her husband, it is important to 
acknowledge that there were alternative perspectives to this, as advocated in the 
response to the letter. The publication replied, ‘pin money is furnishing her with arms 
against himself and in a manner becoming accessary [sic.] to his own dishonour… 
separate purses between man and wife are in my opinion as unnatural as separate 
beds’.488 Not only did some see pin money as counter to the traditions of marriage, as in 
The Spectator, this point is only strengthened when it is acknowledged that pin money 
was paid in addition to the operation of coverture. It was thus perfectly possible for a 
man to shoulder the liabilities of his wife for necessaries as well as pay her an additional 
annuity for her own separate use. In placing this within the period, it is clear why The 
Spectator deemed pin money to be ‘furnishing her with arms’ as pin money 
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unintentionally risked giving the wife autonomy from her husband, and thus some 
contractual capacity. It also rendered a husband doubly liable to his wife; providing her 
with an allowance whilst also paying for debts accrued by her. This was recognised in 
the case law, as Lord Brougham in Howard v Digby noted: 
It is… clear that no nobleman or person of however high and honourable degree, being in ever so 
wealthy circumstances, would ever dream of making an allowance to his wife for pin money, if 
he were at the same time to be paying all her bills year after year… over and above her pin 
money.489 
 
It should be noted that pin money was not essential to marriage, but as we can see in The 
Spectator article, it was something that came to be expected. Pin money, like liabilities 
for debts, continued to be paid should the wife desert her husband as a consequence of 
his ill-treatment of her. Such was the situation in Moore v Moore490 in which £100 per 
year was given to a wife upon marriage in 1707. By 1728, the wife resided in France and 
an action was brought for arrears of the annuity, to which her husband responded that 
as she had broken her marriage rights by leaving him, she had no action. The court made 
it clear that pin money was not to encourage a wife to leave her husband as such an 
interpretation ‘would destroy the very end of the marriage contract and be a public 
detriment’.491 It went on to state that where criminal misconduct had occurred on the 
part of the wife, separate maintenance was irrecoverable, but such a thing had not 
happened here. In concluding, the court held that as the husband had continued to pay 
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the annuity for six months following his wife’s desertion, ‘this is a strong presumption 
that he thought at least she was excusable in separating herself from him’492 and so the 
arrears were payable. Clearly, pin money was another way in which a woman could 
benefit from marriage and this assists in countering the idea that a woman was greatly 
disadvantaged as a wife. The control interests that were applied by the law were 
circumvented by the manipulation of coverture, as has been mentioned, and this 
circumvention was only furthered in the payment of pin money which granted explicit 
autonomy to a wife.  
 
Jointure 
Jointure, on the other hand, was a payment made to a wife after the death of her husband. 
There were two ways that jointure could be assigned to a wife. The first was prior to 
marriage, where a husband settled property on his wife for her use after death, this was 
usually in proportion to the dowry that was provided and is a further example of the 
financial gains each side sought to make from the union. The second way, however, can 
be seen as less advantageous to a wife. It was possible to settle a jointure after marriage 
but a wife was not to receive both her jointure as well as any other money that was settled 
on her by her husband prior to the union. This was laid down by the Statute of Uses493. 
The potential to exploit this system, however, having entered marriage and secured a 
jointure payment, was acknowledged in the literature of the time. Writing in Tatler in 
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1710, Sir Richard Steele made explicit reference to ‘jointures and settlements’, 494 as being 
‘the frequent causes of distrust and animosity’.495 However, given the widespread nature 
of the practice, securing a jointure was as commonplace as providing a dowry in relation 
to the traditions surrounding marriage.  
 
The prominence of this and the familiarity of marriage settlements in society are 
apparent in fiction during this period. For instance, in Samuel Richardson’s Pamela,496 
published in 1740, a great number of pages are devoted to a discussion of what financial 
settlement is to be made on either side, after Pamela finally succeeds in taming the 
ruthless Mr B. and secures her marriage to him.  What is interesting is that conduct 
manuals497 contributed to a considerable amount of the work undertaken by Richardson 
both prior to and following the publication of Pamela. At this time, of course, the book 
was not published as a single entire volume but was released periodically – much to the 
disappointment of those eager to read the next instalment, such was the popularity of 
Richardson’s debut novel. To give an impression of the reception of Pamela, Knight 
recalls the following anecdote: 
The blacksmith of the village had got hold of Richardson's novel of Pamela… and used to read it 
aloud in the long summer evenings, seated on his anvil, and never failed to have a large and 
attentive audience.... At length, when the happy turn of fortune arrived, which brings the hero 
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and heroine together, and sets them living long and happily... the congregation were so delighted 
as to raise a great shout, and procuring the church keys, actually set the parish bells ringing498 
This assists an exploration of the capacity of women as it gives an idea of exactly what 
literature people at the time were being exposed to. Pamela and Mr. B go to great lengths 
to cumulatively enter into a settlement that is pleasing to both parties and this imitates 
something that was common practice at the time. The submissiveness but resilience of 
Pamela is a reflection of a novel written by an author of conduct manuals, and is certainly 
in keeping with what would be expected of a woman at this time.499 But whilst the 
outcome may have been something of a fairy-tale and out of reach for most women, as 
Pamela marries above her class, the practicalities and the motions followed prior to the 
marriage were exactly those which couples were doing in reality. What we are left with, 
then, is a picture that presents a much more favourable position for a married woman.  
 
This section has sought to analyse the contractual capacity of a married woman. It has 
been shown that although she lost her legal autonomy under the doctrine of coverture, 
in practice she retained her capacity to contract. The only real issue that arose with this 
would be when the debt was not paid, or the husband refused to honour her purchases. 
Although a dowry was required to be paid to the family of the husband prior to marriage, 
it would seem that the trade-off that has been spoken of was particularly advantageous 
to a woman, especially when taking into consideration the other settlements that she 
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could potentially receive. Pin money and jointure were given to a married woman in 
addition to her husband shouldering the burden of the debts that his wife may accrue. It 
is clear that a woman had much to gain from marriage, as did her family in securing 
social advancement, however, ultimately, whilst on paper a woman lost her contractual 
capacity upon marriage it is hoped that this section has demonstrated that this in practice 
was not the case, and in combination with other legal settlements that were available to 
her, the lot of a married woman was not as unfortunate as has been envisaged. The 
control that the law intended to apply to women by reducing their legal status to akin to 
that of an infant did not actually hinder their legal status to such a great extent as has 
been typically attributed by academics.500 Furthermore, should she outlive her husband, 
not only would she benefit from the jointure payment, but she would regain her 
contractual autonomy. The reasons for this, and what this meant for a woman, are 
discussed in the following section.  
 
5.4 WIDOWS AND UNMARRIED WOMEN 
A widow held a curious position in contract law. As a married woman, her contractual 
capacity had been subsumed into that of her husband, but upon his death she suddenly 
regained this capacity as a feme sole. This meant that as a widow, a woman was able to 
maintain ownership of land, deal with property, and contract freely. This legal status 
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gave her a unique position and one which saw a widow presented as a figure of ridicule 
and fear in literature of the time, as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
 
The legal autonomy of a widow began soon after the death of her husband, as she was 
usually appointed his executrix,501 and, should her husband die without leaving a will, a 
wife was automatically entitled to a proportion of his estate.502 Beyond this, however, a 
widow was then free to contract as she wished and it is argued that in this way, she 
disrupted the control that the law was seeking to place on women. As Todd has 
recognised, ‘a married woman was legally and personally subject to her husband. A 
widow was free from such control. Even if she was poor, she was her own woman and 
could run her life as she saw fit’.503 Throughout her life, a woman was subjected to an 
element of control by men, and this control was reinforced by the law, by removing her 
legal capacity. As a single girl, she was under the guardianship of a father or male relative 
who ran the household, and then as a married woman she effectively became the 
property of her husband. Suddenly upon widowhood, a woman was presented with 
complete contractual and legal autonomy often for the first time in her life. This 
disrupted the social norm of a submissive, obedient female, and so it is understandable 
why authors and playwrights presented these women in an unfavourable light.  
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Of course, these literary depictions were not entirely accurate.  When Lady Mary Coke,504 
although separated, outlived her husband, she was entitled to a considerable jointure, 
lived the rest of her life in her own estate, and never remarried. Whilst a wealthy widow 
was a lure for men, the women themselves were all too aware of the potential for a new 
husband to squander their estate and so often did not remarry at all. Katherine Austen, 
a widow from Abingdon, stated of her decision to remain unmarried, ‘if my children 
should find lose [sic] in their estates, by God’s blessing [I] should be able to make a 
supply to them… which I could never do by ingaiging [sic.] myself away from them’.505 
Those who did enter into another marriage often placed their property on trust, to 
protect it from their future husband.   
 
An unmarried woman, on the other hand, did not possess this contractual autonomy to 
the same extent. As has been demonstrated, in the long eighteenth century social norms 
dictated that a woman ought to marry. However, contrary to this, Erickson notes that 
‘the proportion of the population never marrying fluctuated between 10% and over 
20%’.506 Of course this takes into account unmarried males too, but when we compare 
this to 1970, in which 5% remained unmarried, the difference is clear. Wrigley estimated 
the population of England to be 11.5 million in 1821,507 whilst the Office for National 
Statistics estimates that the population size in 1971 was 46,411,700.508 Thus, whilst the 
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figure for unmarried persons was only 5% fewer in 1971, the greater population size 
meant that, relatively, more women remained unmarried in the eighteenth century, 
despite social norms dictating otherwise. 
 
The desire to ensure that a daughter was married to a husband from a suitable family 
extended beyond merely securing the social advancement of her family name, as it was 
a concern that a woman who remained at home would be a drain on the finances of her 
brothers and thus their economic advancement.509 Despite this, social norms continued 
to dictate that until marriage a woman was to remain within the family home, essentially 
under the protection of her father. Whilst she was technically a feme sole, and thus able 
to contract, her finances were at the discretion of her guardian and so again we see the 
control that was inherent in the law’s treatment of women in this period. But the idea 
that a single woman was to be a burden on her family, again, is a misconception as some 
women had their own income. A perfect example of this is Jane Austen, who lived with 
her father until his death after which she resided with her brother. Not only is Jane an 
illustration of the self-sufficiency of single women, her letters also give an impression of 
the sort of items that a single woman was contracting for at this time.  
 
The actual life of Jane Austen presents a sharp contrast to many of the heroines in her 
novels. Jane never married, and although she was linked to a pupil barrister, Tom Lefroy, 
this relationship was brought to an end by his parents. Jane was the daughter of a 
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Clergyman and so was unable to provide an economically advantageous match for a 
lawyer who was to go on to be Lord Chief Justice of Ireland.510 Whilst she received a 
proposal when she was 27 from Harris Bigg-Wither, an old childhood friend, she declined 
his offer.511 After her father’s death in 1806, Jane moved with her family to Southampton, 
before settling in Chawton at a cottage provided by her brother. It was during her time 
at Chawton that Jane published her novels;512 a discussion of which further assists our 
understanding of social norms in this period. 
 
Sense and Sensibility513 provides a much more realistic account of romance, in contrast 
to the heavily sentimental novels that had been written earlier, but there are references 
to the formalities surrounding marriage littered throughout her publications. Pride and 
Prejudice514 is particularly helpful with regard to this. Lady Catherine alludes to the 
notion that a single woman ought not to live apart from her family prior to marriage, 
‘young women should always be properly guarded and attended’,515 whilst Mrs Bennet, 
upon learning of Elizabeth’s marriage remarks, ‘what pin money, what jewels, what 
carriages you will have’.516 Again, these excerpts provide us with an insight into society 
at this time, and indeed these literary references provide an excellent example of the legal 
mechanisms which have been discussed in this chapter.  
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It is within the personal correspondence of Jane, however, that the contractual capacity 
of an unmarried woman is apparent. The letters are unsurprising in their content, as 
they include the purchase of items that would be typical of an eighteenth century woman 
– clothes and material to fashion her own garments. On November 25 1798, Jane recalls, 
‘the Overton Scotchman has been kind enough to rid me of my money, in exchange for 
six shifts and four pair of stockings… it cost me 3s. 6d.’517 Jane speaks of the purchase of 
stockings on a number of occasions, as well as the purchase of ‘flannel’ (for ‘2s 3d a 
yard’)518 and ‘bugle trimming’ (‘2/4d’).519 On purchasing yet another pair of stockings in 
October 1800, Jane states, ‘my father… finds no fault with any part of Mrs Hancock’s bill 
except the charge of 3s 6d for the packing box’.520 Whilst it is perhaps too much to state 
that this was a recognition by Jane of her adherence to her father for her purchases, we 
can certainly view this as an example of the continued protection of an unmarried woman 
by her father, whether he had capacity over her affairs or was simply warning her of 
unscrupulous tradesmen.  
 
It should then be clear that a single woman did not have to be a burden on her family. 
Jane earned a total of £684.13s from the novels that were printed in her lifetime;521 she 
was an unmarried woman who was able to earn her own living and thus contract as she 
so wished – albeit with the slight limitation of her father’s guardianship. It has been 
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shown that although an unmarried woman and a widow disrupted social norms as a 
consequence of their ability to contract, because the position of a married woman was 
not as restrictive as typically envisaged, the position of an unmarried woman or widow 
was not in practice so markedly different. It was merely that they had an explicit 
autonomy that was not given to a married woman, despite the fact that a married woman 
may circumvent the restriction placed on her legal rights in other ways, such as has been 
explored above in relation to coverture and pin money. It is submitted that this attitude 
came about because both a widow and an unmarried woman explicitly contradicted 
society’s view of a weak, dependent woman, and simultaneously the control that the law 
had placed on women’s capacity.  This is what the law and society objected to – a woman 
stepping outside of the subordinate role that was assigned to her. Regardless of whether 
married women retained their contractual autonomy in other ways, a widow and an 
unmarried woman explicitly defied this convention and it was this that rendered them 
unusual and consequently open to criticism in literature, this being a mere reaction to 
their legal irregularity.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that the law sought to restrict the contractual 
capacity of women in an effort to control, but counter to this were the women themselves 
who pushed against this restriction of their legal rights. Although it has commonly been 
said that the law was unfair towards women in that they lost their capacity upon 




When the portions allocated to women in the form of a dowry are examined, and this 
chapter gave an impression of what could be expected from each social class, it is clear 
that women contributed significantly towards marriage. In exchange for this, whilst her 
property and legal rights were subsumed into those of the husband, any debts 
accumulated by the wife were borne by her husband throughout the marriage and even 
upon separation, should she abscond as a consequence of his mistreatment of her. This 
often coincided with an additional payment of pin money, which ran counter to the 
control mechanisms invoked by the law as it gave a wife an element of autonomy, much 
to the despair of writers such as those in The Spectator. This was paid even following 
separation, as in Moore v Moore,522 and so there was a considerable advantage to a 
woman securing this from her husband. A jointure was also available for a wife upon the 
death of her spouse, upon which she was released from this legal subordination to him 
and regained her contractual capacity. Thus the idea of a wife being ‘kept’ by her husband 
as a consequence of her inability to contract is simply not borne out on the facts, as it has 
been shown that tradesmen such as those in Montague v Espinasse523 were all too willing 
to trade with a married woman, even beyond those items that would be deemed to be 
necessaries.  
 
As a widow, a woman regained this contractual capacity and it has been show that as a 
consequence of this she was viewed as a figure of ridicule. Despite a widow being a prime 
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target for men who wished to marry for wealth, women were aware of this danger and 
either refrained from marrying, such as Lady Mary and Katherine Austen, or placed their 
property on trust to protect their children and keep it away from their new husband. An 
unmarried woman, whilst remaining in the family home, was often not the burden that 
has been suggested, particularly, as in the case of Jane Austen, if she was able to retain 
some contractual capacity by having her own mode of income.  
 
Ultimately, the control that the law attempted to place on women was overcome by 
married women who contracted anyway, such as in Montague and Etherington v 
Parrot,524 as well as other formalities surrounding marriage such as the provision of pin 
money. Additionally, a widow and an unmarried woman explicitly countered the social 
ideal of a woman being subordinate to a man, and by retaining a status as a feme sole, 
they were able to directly contradict the control element that the law was attempting to 
place on women. It has been argued that this is why such women were criticised so 
heavily in literature. This chapter has not sought to pursue a feminist discourse in the 
discussion of the contractual capacity of these women; rather a more balanced account 
has been attempted. It is clear that the law sought to control women by mechanisms such 
as coverture; however, it has been shown that in practice such subordination did not 
occur, for the variety of reasons stated above. Thus, whilst there was a control agenda 
applied by the law in relation to the contractual capacity of women, this was countered 
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in practice by married women, and was not apparent at all with regard to those 
unmarried women and widows who were able to retain the status as a feme sole.  
 
The judgment of Bridgman CJ in Manby v Scott regarding a woman’s contractual 
capacity, reduced her position to that of a child. The following chapter of this thesis shall 
explore the contractual capacity of infants and will determine how successfully the law 
protected this contractual actor, in contrast to the control agenda applied to women in 






In the long eighteenth century, the age of majority was twenty one. This stemmed from 
the role of a knight in medieval England; it was felt that at this age a young man was 
sufficiently physically able to maintain a lance and a suit of armour whilst on horseback 
and it is from this historic platform that the age of twenty one as the age of majority 
remained.525 Such a high age of majority relative to educational and social developments 
proved problematic for the contractual capacity of infants, however, and this will be 
explored in this chapter.   
 
The chapter will begin by presenting the social position of infants in the long eighteenth 
century. Their depiction in popular culture as well as developments in education will 
provide the context to an exploration of their contractual capacity. The law regarding 
necessaries will be discussed, in relation to the sale of goods to an infant. Most 
challenging were those cases concerning boys under the age of twenty one who attended 
university or enlisted in the army; the problems associated with living apart from parents 
whilst lacking complete contractual autonomy will be evident. The section will seek to 
determine to what extent the law sought to apply a protection interest to the contractual 
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capacity of infants, and further, what this meant for the interests of the trader with whom 
they contracted.  
 
The second half of the chapter will focus on apprenticeships. It will be shown that an 
apprenticeship contract carried alternative legal considerations and issues. Whilst a 
contract was entered in to by the father of the child as well as the apprentice himself, the 
removal of children from the family home exposed their vulnerability to harsh and cruel 
masters. The unfortunate cases of Susannah Archer and Mary Clifford are included as an 
example of the potential ill-treatment faced by apprentices at the hands of their master. 
Legislation aimed at protecting the infant will be analysed, and its success in employing 
the protection interest which was so ardently pursued by the common law will be 
determined. This section will conclude with a discussion of those apprenticeship 
contracts rendered void by way of illness or death, misbehaviour on the part of the infant, 
or because the contract itself was found not to be in the interests of the child. 
 
It becomes clear that in whatever position in life of the infant, and in whatever career he 
or she sought to pursue, the motivation of the law to protect infants by way of the rules 
surrounding contractual capacity had to be balanced against the legitimate interests of 
those who sought to contract with them. Determining the extent to which the law 





6.2 POSITION OF INFANTS 
A child of the long eighteenth century conformed very much to the adage of ‘seen and 
not heard’; a child was pure, innocent, and capable of being moulded into an upstanding 
member of society. Popular fiction and art of the period reinforced these social ideals. 
Wearing a white dress, with bare feet, and hands clasped to her chest, the young girl 
depicted by Joshua Reynolds in his portrait Age of Innocence (figure 3) encapsulates the 
pure nature of the child perfectly.  
Figure 3 
 
In literature also, there were a number of novels which depicted the desired traits of a 
child, and it was commonplace to reinforce these ideals by presenting an infant in the 
novel who embodied quite the opposite. The works of Daniel Defoe have been a recurrent 
source of research for this thesis and this chapter is no exception. As an advocate of 
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morality, Defoe depicts not only debauched women in his novels, but children also 
feature. Colonel Jack526 tells the story of a young boy who is left without a mother or 
guardian and who turns to criminal activity to survive. There is certainly an air of sadness 
to the tale, and indeed, the reader is inclined to pity the existence of the protagonist, but 
this only further assists Defoe in presenting his argument. By describing the child as 
disobedient and wayward, Defoe manages to reaffirm traditional eighteenth century 
ideals of the child; the reader is aware that these naughty children are condemned and 
viewed negatively, and thus the well-behaved, polite infant is confirmed as the desired 
norm. This is echoed by William Blake in Songs of Innocence,527 a book of prose published 
in 1789. The contrast in Blake’s work between innocence and debauchery is abundantly 
clear and again this confirms the virtuous ideal. In The Lamb Blake reiterates what is 
expected of a child in the lines: 
He is meek & he is mild,  
He became a little child528 
This can then be contrasted with darker poems such as London in which childhood 
innocence is replaced with real-world despair: 
How the youthful Harlots curse  
Blasts the new-born Infants tear529 
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The distinction between infancy and adulthood is drawn clearly in this collection of 
poetry; the inclusion of real-world pessimism only heightens the reader’s appreciation 
for a childhood that is withdrawn from the anguish of growing up. Yet we shall see later 
in this chapter how these romantic ideals were somewhat at odds with the practical 
reality of life as a child apprentice, as growing industrialisation rendered work for 
children increasingly necessary. 
 
The desired traits as expressed in art and literature give the reader some impression of 
characteristics that an infant ought to possess. Yet quite aside from the moral teachings 
contained in popular culture, the typical activities and lifestyle of an infant at this time 
tell us much of the position of children in everyday life. It is clear that a child was to be 
engaged in activities in-keeping with the social position of his parents; intellectual and 
cultural stimulation were to prepare the infant for his assent into adulthood. Plumb 
discusses the way in which ‘children…had become luxury objects upon which their 
mothers and fathers were willing to spend larger and larger sums of money’.530 This 
included trips to visit new scientific discoveries, music concerts and cultural events.531 Of 
course these treats were solely the reserve of a child of the middle to upper classes, those 
of the lower class could not afford such luxuries, nonetheless, improvements in education 
at the beginning of the long eighteenth century sought to narrow the educational divide 
between rich and poor.  
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Whilst much historical research has been devoted to the growth of public schools,532 
charity and ‘dame’ schools that were established in the long eighteenth century aimed to 
bring a level of education to the poor. Charity schools could come about in one of two 
ways; either a wealthy benefactor of the parish would fund the institution, or, from 1696 
onwards, the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge533 sought to establish these 
schools in parishes across the country. The schools taught the ‘three R’s’, and by 1707, 41 
had been established in London alone.534 Dame schools, on the other hand, got their name 
from the elderly women who taught there, usually retired teachers, and for a ‘few pence 
a week’535 children were exposed to a basic level of literacy and numeracy skills. Public 
schooling was reserved for those of the middle and upper classes,536 who could afford to 
send their children to the best institutions. For those of the lower classes, as Bayne-Powell 
has acknowledged, the lure of childhood apprenticeship drew children away from gaining 
an education from the free schools, ‘when wages were so low it followed, as a matter of 
course, that children were sent out to work as soon as possible’.537 The effect of these 
apprenticeships on children and what this meant in relation to contractual capacity will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  
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6.2.1 Sale of Goods 
Despite tentative steps being made to bring education to the poorest in society, a 
considerable legal issue concerned boys who went on to study at university. As a result 
of the higher age of majority, boys attended university whilst still legally an infant, and 
so for the purposes of contracting, they continued to be bound by the same rules 
regarding an infant’s contractual capacity. It is here that we see the law in conflict with 
the social context, as clearly there was a need for the students to contract themselves for 
items. However, the law drew a distinction between an infant contracting in his own 
right, and an infant who pledged his father’s credit and thus acted essentially as an agent. 
The protection afforded by the law to infants was much stronger should they contract 
themselves, as for those contracting as an agent, the core motivations of the law in this 
area were different, with the courts instead being much more concerned with controlling 
how the contractual rights of the agent were exercised. In this way, we see the law 
treating children in much the same way as married women; rather than protecting these 
parties, in this instance the law sought to control their legal rights. This in turn resulted 
in protection being applied instead to the father or the husband, to ensure that his wealth 
was safeguarded. This point is reinforced by the dictum of Abbott CJ in Blackburn v 
Mackey.538  
 
This case notes that parents were not liable for the debts of their child unless the infant 
contracted as their agent. In Blackburn, Blackburn, a tailor, brought an action against 
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Mackey for clothes that his son, Patrick Mackey, had purchased. The transactions took 
place on two separate occasions, amounting to £7 8s 6d and £6 6s respectively. It was 
stated at trial that his father, who was a surgeon in Essex, did not provide Patrick, earning 
only one guinea a week as a clerk to a lawyer in London, with any clothes. A fellow lodger 
at the house in which Patrick stayed testified Patrick to be ‘in great want’539 of clothing. 
The court heard that the defendant sent a letter to Blackburn after his demand for 
payment of the second sale of goods; in this letter Mackey warned the tailor against any 
future dealings with his son, though he noted, ‘“I have no great objection to paying your 
first bill”’.540 In summing up, Abbott CJ stated the case to be a ‘question [which] deeply 
affects society’.541 His directions to the jury focused on purely financial considerations 
and the potential ruin of families should children be permitted to spend their fortune, 
whilst their parents maintained liability for these debts. He reasoned that, ‘if persons in 
trade are allowed to trust young men, and compel their fathers to pay them, any man 
who had a family might be ruined’542 and as such, ‘a father is not bound to pay for articles 
ordered by his son, unless the father gives some authority, express or implied’.543 Here, 
explicit reference is made to the protection of family wealth, and the treatment of ‘young 
men’ as an agent echoes very much that of married women in the previous chapter. In 
particular, the warning made by Holt CJ in Etherington v Parrot,544 that ‘if the husband 
have solemnly declared his dissent, that she shall not be trusted, any person that has 
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notice of this dissent trusts her at his peril after’.545 As such, express authority was 
required. But in this case, the jury found the letter by the defendant to amount to an 
admission of liability for the first receipt and so Mackey was ordered to pay £7 8s 6d. The 
outstanding sum for the second sale was not recoverable. It must be stressed that this 
finding was only because the letter constituted Mackey ‘giv[ing] some authority’546 for 
the purchase; this case continues to be authority for the rule that a parent was not liable 
for the debts of his child.  
 
Despite an infant having to contract for his own goods, the only contract that was to be 
valid, and for which he would be liable, was one for ‘necessaries’. This concerned those 
items which were necessary for the maintenance of the child; articles such as food, 
lodging, and clothing all amounted to a valid contract. Earlier cases such as Makarell v 
Bachelor547 and Dale v Copping548 confirmed the rule which was to apply throughout the 
long eighteenth century. In Makarell, although it was agreed that clothing could amount 
to necessaries, in this case due to the extravagant nature of the articles, ‘suits of sattin 
and velvet cannot be necessary for an infant’ and as such the contract was void.549 In 
Dale, the courts extended the principle to include medicine; it was held that:  
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For that this shall be taken as a contract, and that to be for a thing in the nature of necessity to be 
done for him, and the same as necessary as if it had been a promise by him made for his meat, 
drink, or apparel, and in all such cases his promise is good, and shall bind him550 
 
In 1690, Huggins v Wiseman551 similarly held that a cure for illness ‘of a distemper’552 
would also amount to a necessary article and thus a valid contract. Later in Clowes v 
Brooke,553 the court found that money owed for the care of horses did not amount to a 
contract for necessaries, and as such the infant was released from his obligations under 
it. It was held that, ‘the work might be necessary for the horses, yet non constat the horses 
were necessary for the infant’.554 Clowes also demonstrates that infancy was used as a 
defence to an action for the recovery of debts, ‘in assumpsit for a farrier’s bill, the 
defendant pleaded, that the testator was an infant’.555 In response to this, it was then up 
to the party seeking to recover money from an infant to show that the items were 
necessary and thus establish a valid contract rendering the infant liable. Yet merely 
proving that the items constituted necessaries was not enough; it must also be shown 
that the article in question was necessary for the infant in his position in life.556  
 
Whilst students at university faced difficulties in contracting, those who chose to enlist 
in the army were met with similar issues and many of the cases concerning the position 
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in life of the infant regard a young man who was in the armed forces. Britain was engaged 
in a number of conflicts in the long eighteenth century, both on the continent and in the 
colonies.557 It is therefore not surprising that with a total of 201,000 men enlisted in 
1762,558 and the age of enlistment being sixteen, 559 contractual problems for those 
soldiers yet to reach the age of majority would arise. The extent of the inclusion of the 
upper classes and gentry within the armed forces also meant that those below the age of 
the majority possessed the means to enter into contracts for the sale of often expensive 
articles. Such was the case in Coates v Wilson560 in which a tailor brought an action to 
recover debts owed for a regimental uniform. The social context is apparent here as Lord 
Ellenborough, in summing up, refers to the Napoleonic wars which were occurring at 
this time. Britain had entered the war with France a year previously, thus His Lordship 
stated that, in ‘perilous times, when young men had enrolled themselves…for defence of 
the country…clothes so furnished were necessaries’.561 
 
It is interesting to note that Lord Ellenborough here equates the interests of the child to 
those of the country at war. Yet it is argued that such items were deemed necessary based 
on the child’s position in life; as a member of the armed forces, his station required a 
military uniform, to find otherwise and thus deprive the infant of this, would be absurd. 
Yet given the low age of enrolment relative to the age of majority, it is clear why problems 
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such as these arose for a young man having to maintain himself whilst living away from 
home, and this is also apparent in cases such as Hands v Slaney562 and Berolles v 
Ramsay.563 Both of these cases are also illustrative of the way in which contractual 
problems were more pertinent for those of a higher social class; the infants in Hands and 
Berolles were a Captain and Lieutenant respectively – roles traditionally dominated by 
men of the upper class.564  
 
Hands concerned goods which were sold to an infant who was a Captain in the army; the 
items consisted of livery for his servant and cockades565 for the soldiers in his company. 
When an action was brought for the recovery of money owed, the defendant pleaded his 
infancy. Lord Kenyon held that the cockades could not amount to necessaries and as such 
the defendant was not liable for these. For the livery, however, his Lordship found that 
were it necessary for ‘a gentleman in the defendant’s situation to have a servant’566 then 
the livery would amount to a valid contract and the infant would be bound. The jury 
concluded that the servant was necessary and the infant was therefore liable for the 
outstanding sum. In Hands, the rule regarding necessaries was confirmed by Lord 
Kenyon who stated that, ‘the general rule is clear, that infants are liable for necessaries, 
according to their degree and station in life’.567 But this case goes further and refers 
explicitly to the rationale of the law regarding necessaries, this being ‘to protect infants 
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against improvident contracts’.568 The later case of Berolles confirms the principle that 
the law deduced what was necessary for an infant taking his station in life569 into account. 
 
In Berolles, a chronometer was sold to the defendant who was a lieutenant in the Royal 
Navy. The watchmaker brought an action for the recovery of £68 that was owed to him 
for the goods and contended that the article was necessary for a naval lieutenant. At trial, 
the court stated the importance of the second part of the rule regarding necessaries, being 
that it must be necessary to the position in life of the infant. This was because there was 
a difference between an article merely being necessary and one which was necessary 
according to station in life; Gibbs CJ stated that, ‘certain things may be necessary, but not 
suitable to the condition of the parties’.570 In determining whether the jury ought to 
render an item necessary according to the situation in life of the infant, it was held that 
the item must be necessary for every infant possessing the same station. On the facts of 
the case, it was uncertain whether the lieutenant would be posted to where a 
chronometer would be necessary, but additionally, the court was of the opinion that ‘it 
would be most detrimental to the service, if it were laid down as a general rule that every 
lieutenant of the navy might contract for the purchase of a chronometer’.571 Accordingly, 
the item was not necessary to the infant and the contract was voidable.  
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The cases above are illustrative of the two facets of the test required to determine 
whether an article was a necessary and thus whether it constituted a valid contract. A 
contract with an infant was valid should it be a contract for necessaries, but it must also 
be proven that the item was necessary for the infant in the case, in his position in life. 
This two-part rule, it is argued, is particularly stringent towards the trader, as it adds 
another element of proof on the party seeking to establish a contract with a minor. For 
the boy himself, the issue of whether the contract was valid or not was not of great 
concern, as should the contract be deemed voidable as a result of his infancy, this would 
release the infant from his obligations under it and he would not be required to pay for 
the goods. The trader who contracted with the child, however, was not so fortunate, and 
stood to lose out should he enter in to a contract of this sort. The law therefore could be 
said to be on the side of the infant, as the balance between protecting the child and 
protecting the interests of the trader is tipped firmly in favour of the infant. 
 
In response to this perceived inequality, the law developed to try to ensure that a seller 
was put on notice to enquire as to the circumstances of the minor should he be in any 
doubt. Ford v Fothergill572 concerned an infant who contracted with a tailor, Ford, for the 
provision of a military uniform. When the outstanding sum was not paid, Ford brought 
an action for recovery of the amount in response to which the defendant pleaded his 
infancy. It emerged at trial that several debts with other tailors had been accrued by the 
infant during this time, though these had been paid by his father; Ford was unaware of 
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this, however. In directing the jury, Lord Kenyon held that the onus was on the plaintiff 
to prove that the goods were necessary to the ‘fortune and circumstances of the infant’.573 
He warned that ‘a person trusting an infant did it at his peril’,574 and the trader ought to 
make enquiries as to the circumstances of the infant. He concluded by stating that ‘if the 
infant had contracted other debts at the same time, for the same sort of articles for which 
the action was brought…such was good evidence to rebut the presumption of 
necessaries’.575 Despite this ruling, the jury in this case found in favour of the plaintiff 
and thus the infant was liable for payment of the goods – such was the danger of a jury 
trial. The rule in Ford attempted to shift the power balance back towards the trader, by 
stating that he ought to acquaint himself with the situation of the infant before entering 
in to the contract with him, and thus avoiding any potential loss from a voidable contract.    
 
This safeguard however did nothing to alter the rule in relation to the contractual 
capacity of infants, which remained the same. A contract with an infant was only valid 
in a select number of circumstances, for food, lodging and the like, and would further 
only be enforceable should those items be necessary for his position in life. Although the 
foresight requirement under the rule in Ford attempted to protect the trader from a 
losing contract, for those who found themselves pursuing an action against an infant, it 
is argued here that the protection of the infant by the law overrode any legitimate interest 
of the trader.  
                                                          






An alternative to university, the armed forces, or the Inns of Court as a means of securing 
a career was for a child to be sent to complete an apprenticeship. This involved the 
parents of a child paying a sum of money to a tradesman in order to secure training for 
their son or daughter. For those children of the poorest in society without parents to 
provide their premium, the parish would provide this to the tradesman. We shall see 
later how these children were the most vulnerable to abuses at the hands of their master. 
In exchange for the indenture, as well as training - usually for a period of seven years - 
the master would agree to provide food, lodging, and all the necessary provisions for the 
apprentice. The extent of the premium paid was relative to the chosen career; for 
instance, £1,075 was paid in 1713 to a City merchant.576 This is an extraordinarily high 
premium however, and sums for common trades such as tailoring and shoemaking were 
considerably less.577 Given this monetary exchange, the contract for an apprenticeship 
was between the child and the master, but parental consent was required.   
 
Typical of an eighteenth century apprenticeship contract, the agreement between James 
Hardy and The Lune Shipbuilding Company in Lancaster has been annexed to this 
chapter. The contract was entered in to by James with the consent of his father, Daniel, 
who is also a signatory to the agreement, and sets out the premium that has been paid. 
In this case ‘five shillings’ was deposited with the Company in return for them training 
James in ‘the Art and Business of a joiner’. James’s salary was also agreed upon, starting 
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at 4 shillings per week in year one, before increasing by a shilling a week until year six. 
During the final two years of the apprenticeship James was to be paid 10 shillings and 12 
shillings a week respectively. This increase in the final two years reflects the greater value 
of an apprentice in his last two years of service. The financial importance of year six and 
seven of an apprenticeship is stated by Gowing, ‘the economic bases of apprenticeships 
was that for each year of training an apprentice was worth more to the employers, so 
losing the last two years of labour was economically devastating’.578 This explains the 
increase in the remuneration paid to James in his final two years, who it was assumed 
would have gained considerable skills and thus be a greater asset to the Company. The 
contract also outlines the behaviour that is expected of the apprentice, the rules by which 
he is to abide, and the procedure surrounding absence. 
 
In reviewing this document, it is clear that although the contract was for the benefit of 
the apprentice, given his age, the agreement would take place with the express consent 
of his father. The ability of the apprentice to work, and thus be a party to the employment 
contract, mirrors the law discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to the sale of goods 
and liability of parents. Just as a contract for goods was valid should a father give explicit 
authority for the sale, an apprenticeship contract was binding at the consent of a father. 
Unlike the sale of goods, however, this consent was less about protecting the father and 
his wealth, so much as this consent was intended to protect an infant from entering a 
potentially unfavourable contract or being taken advantage of by a master. Despite this 
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safeguard, detrimental apprenticeships did occur and later in this section the 
circumstances surrounding this and the consequences of such an apprenticeship will be 
discussed.  
 
Whilst boys such as James were usually apprenticed to trades, it was not uncommon for 
a girl to undertake an apprenticeship, albeit in more domestic roles. Dunlop notes that a 
girl would occasionally be apprenticed to the wife of a tradesman, to learn how to fulfil 
more domestic tasks such as sewing and general housekeeping.579 A common means of 
finding an apprenticeship was through a personal connection, but for those who did not 
have this fortune, advertisements seeking apprentices were placed in the local paper, 
such as that from The Hampshire Chronicle in 1773,580 below: 
APPRENTICES WANTED. A STOUT LUSTY LAD, about Fourteen Years of Age, as an APPRENTICE 
to the PRINTING BUSINESS. Likewise, an APPRENTICE to the BOOKSELLING and BINDING 
BRANCHES. – A moderate Premium is expected. Apply to the Publisher of this Paper.  
 
The advert would state the physical characteristics as well as the size of the premium 
required. Clearly an apprenticeship was beneficial for the master who often secured a 
substantial premium in exchange for passing his knowledge on to a child. Beyond the 
premium, however, it was also expected that an apprentice would act with upmost 
respect and propriety towards the master. This was reinforced in pamphlets of the time. 
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A Present for an Apprentice581 amounts to a conduct manual for a bound child, in which 
the author advises the apprentice to ‘be careful of the secrets of the family’,582 ‘avoid the 
company…of female servants’,583 and take care with the master’s money.584 Less explicit 
is The Cheapside Apprentice,585 which recalls a fictional account of an apprentice’s ruin 
after he chooses a life of drunken debauchery over a respectable career. The pamphlet 
serves as a warning to apprentices of the dangers of failing to follow a moral course of 
life, which ends in the fictional apprentice’s imprisonment and execution. This moral 
message was promoted half a century earlier in 1747 by Hogarth in Industry and Idleness, 
the full set of engravings of which have been annexed to this chapter (Appendix 7).  
 
In Industry and Idleness, Hogarth presents a lazy apprentice, Tom Idle, who resorts to a 
life of debauchery which ends in his hanging. This life is contrasted with that of a dutiful 
apprentice who goes on to marry the master’s daughter and succeed in the business. 
Again, like Defoe and Blake noted at the beginning of this chapter, Hogarth depicts the 
ideal child by contrasting it with the very opposite. Whilst perhaps a rather severe 
outcome for Tom, in reality it was not uncommon for an apprentice to abscond. This 
could occur for a number of reasons, but maltreatment by the master has been cited 
frequently586 as a reason for cancelling apprenticeships. If the child did run away, or 
allegations of abuse arose, the case could end up before the court, and a common outcome 
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was the return to the family of the remaining premium and the release of the child from 
the apprenticeship. This remedy serves as a reminder that, as noted by Gowing, an 
‘apprenticeship was a legal contract so much as a social obligation’.587  
 
Cases concerning the abuse of apprentices were frequent. One instance concerned girls 
employed as apprentices to a tambour-worker588 in Hackney. It was recalled that the girls 
embroidered from 4am until midnight each day, including Sunday, should there be an 
influx of work over the weekend.589 They were fed bread, water, and potatoes, and 
occasionally rice which they ate at their frames.590 The extent of their maltreatment was 
such that their master, Jouveaux, moved work from Hackney to Stepney Green after 
neighbours complained of the treatment of the girls after hearing them ‘shrieking and 
hunting for food in the pig trough’.591 Jouveaux eventually faced trial, for ill-treating one 
of his apprentices, Susannah Archer, who it was noted was ‘extremely little, and 
emaciated, and did not look at all to be of the age she said she was – 15’.592 At trial, 
Jouveaux contended that the girls had been in a state of poverty for only three months, 
and this was a consequence of his own destitution. However, the court heard ‘evidence 
of the neighbours that great wails [sic.] appeared on [the girls’] backs, and their shrieks 
calling out for mercy were heard in the neighbourhood’593 on a number of occasions. 
Lord Kenyon sentenced Jouveaux to twelve months imprisonment ‘kept to hard 
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labour’.594 Whilst this is retribution for Susannah, it is clear that there were a number of 
girls whom Jouveaux abused and for whom he was not held accountable, such was the 
danger of a system which did not provide easy recourse for an apprentice to report their 
master.   
 
The problem concerning an apprentice’s inability to report abuse until it was much too 
late is exemplified in a case concerning Elizabeth Brownrigg, the wife of a decorator who 
employed three female apprentices. The extent of Elizabeth’s actions is extreme, and one 
cannot help but feel that Elizabeth was what we would today call a sadist. Her actions 
are certainly to the more extreme end of the spectrum of abuse which apprentices 
suffered. Thus, her actions are not typical, but they are illustrative of the potential abuses 
that children stood to face at the hands of their masters. Elizabeth was hanged at Tyburn 
on the 14th September 1767 for the murder of her apprentice, Mary Clifford. Brownrigg 
had beaten all three of her apprentices on numerous occasions, but had taken a particular 
dislike to Mary, who was ‘frequently whipped…stripp[ed] naked’595 and bound by her 
wrists in the kitchen. The abuse inflicted upon Mary is horrific; it was noted that after 
these beatings, her leather bodice would be reapplied, such that when it came to remove 
it, ‘it stuck so fast to her wounds that the poor creature cried out in the most terrible 
manner’.596 All three apprentices were kept in a cellar, where they were fed only bread 
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without water and their only drink came from liquid that could be gleaned from the hog 
trough. 
 
On the 31st July 1767, Elizabeth Brownrigg returned from travelling and scolded Mary for 
failing to do enough work; the girls were employed to grind chalk for Mr Brownrigg’s 
decorating business. Mary was subsequently tied to a hook in the kitchen - which Mr 
Brownrigg has installed at the request of his wife to assist in her beatings - and whipped. 
This occurred a further four times that day, after which Mary was chained in the cellar. 
On the 4th August, a neighbour discovered Mary after hearing her moans, and took her 
to St. Bartholomew’s Hospital, where it was said that she had ‘six wounds on her head…a 
large wound upon each of her shoulders…a number of cuts all over her body’597 and her 
‘flesh seemed putrified… [her] head swelled to an enormous size’.598 Mary died 5 days 
later. At trial, evidence was given by another apprentice of the Brownrigg’s who noted 
that Mary would be beaten to such an extent that her blood would pool on the floor.599 
She also noted one occasion where Mary had been punished for rising in the night to get 
some water; Elizabeth Brownrigg had placed a chain around Mary’s neck and attached 
the other end to a door, it was then ‘drawn very tight around her neck, as hard as it could 
be without choking her’.600 The coroner’s report was consistent with these accounts, 
adding that the chain was likely to be the cause of the damage to Mary’s neck, which had 
caused her to lose her speech.  
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There was considerable public outcry at the crimes of Elizabeth Brownrigg, which 
highlighted clear shortcomings in the apprenticeship system. Despite both parish officials 
and the stepmother of Mary visiting the Brownrigg’s to enquire of the young girl, the 
abuse was able to continue for months before Mary was discovered. It is unfortunate that 
for children of the parish, such abuses were more likely to continue unnoticed as it was 
all too easy for a master to mistreat a child whose parents were not readily contactable. 
In an attempt to combat these issues, three pieces of legislation were enacted in a fifty 
year period which sought to protect infants against this ill-treatment. The first Act 
provided recourse to an infant to report incidents of abuse. The Regulation of Servants 
and Apprentices Act601 in 1747 allowed an apprentice to bring his grievance before the 
court. However, it is submitted that the practical possibility of an apprentice being able 
to do this, without attracting the attention of his master and thus subjecting himself to 
greater mistreatment, is doubtful. Certainly, this legislation was available to Mary 
Clifford yet her circumstances prevented her from using it.  
 
Additionally, the Act gave justices the power to charge the apprentice himself with 
misconduct, should they deem his complaint to be of little substance. As a result, and 
because of these caveats, the legislation was not as beneficial to an apprentice as first 
envisaged. The two statutes following the 1747 Act were more punitive in purpose and 
as such provided better means for an apprentice to seek some reprisal for ill-treatment 
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by a master, yet it took almost fifty years for this increased protection to be enacted. In 
1792, the Parish Apprentices Act602 provided that a master could seek to remove his 
apprentice from his care into that of another tradesman, for a fee. The Act also set out 
the fine which was to be paid should the master fail to comply with an order. A year later, 
the Parish Officers Act,603 which it is argued provided perhaps the best means of 
punishing cruel masters, imposed a fine on those found guilty of mistreating their 
apprentice. Whilst these statutes aimed to assist the apprentice and to afford him greater 
protection, often, the nature of the work undertaken was inherently harmful, and one of 
the worst professions to which a child could be apprenticed was that of a chimney-sweep.  
 
Such was the danger inherent in this profession that even after the implementation of 
this legislation to increase the protection of infants, in 1817 a Parliamentary Committee 
produced a report on the employment of climbing-boys to this occupation. The Report 
from the Committee on [the] Employment of Boys in Sweeping Chimnies604 was 
published on the 23rd June 1817. The committee heard from several chimney sweeps, as 
well as surgeons and designers of machinery which it was hoped would alleviate the use 
of young boys. It was heard that the Act of 1788, An Act for the Better Regulation of 
Chimney Sweepers and their Apprentices,605 provided that no child under the age of eight 
could be employed as a climbing boy but this was not adhered to in practice and it was 
found that boys as young as four had been sent up flues.606  
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Beyond the physical injury that could occur to an apprentice, such as sores on his elbows 
and knees, deformities of the spine, and irritations to his eyes, the Committee heard 
evidence from a surgeon, Mr Richard Wright, who spoke of Chimney Sweepers Cancer.607 
This was cancer of the scrotum which was caused by soot irritating the area; the lack of 
washing facilities for a climbing boy – some went months without bathing – meant that 
a tumour formed which was fatal if not removed. Added to this, the boys were paid no 
wages, and were frequently forced up the chimney on fear of physical punishment by his 
master should he refuse. The Committee heard evidence of one boy who remained in the 
flue for two hours to avoid his master.608 After completing this gruelling apprenticeship, 
the boy would either continue as a chimney sweep or leave to seek work elsewhere. The 
nature of his work as a climbing boy, however, meant that the apprentice lacked the 
education and physical strength to succeed in any other trade and so many boys were left 
destitute or open to being taken advantage of by vagrants.609  
 
Due to the social stigma of a chimney sweep, only the lowest class in society apprenticed 
their child to such work, this was usually reserved for boys but it was not unheard of for 
a girl to gain such employment.610 A reflection of the danger inherent in the work is that 
contrary to the usual apprenticeship contract, the master paid a premium of two to three 
pounds to the parents of a child to secure the apprenticeship, though this did not counter 
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the lack of available boys, and so many were sent from the workhouse.611 It is unfortunate 
that even after this employment, it was likely that the apprentices would revert to a life 
of poverty, such was their physical health following years of shimmying up soot-filled 
flues. This harsh reality was certainly far removed from the childhood ideal promoted in 
popular culture and literature, noted earlier in this chapter.  
 
The Committee on the Employment of Boys Sweeping Chimnies also heard evidence of 
the use of machinery to assist in cleaning chimneys, but it was stated by the 
manufacturers that chimney sweeps themselves were reluctant612 to supersede the work 
of a boy with that of a machine, and even if they were open to the possibility, the servants 
in the houses in which they cleaned refused them entry with the machine as it was 
believed that the mess would be greater than with a child.613 Despite this, the Committee 
were of the opinion that such developments could enhance the work of a chimney sweep, 
and would not obviate the need for a boy, as the machine required two persons to operate 
it. Consequently, in their resolutions, the Committee stated their preference for a 
machine to be used to clean the chimney instead of a boy. Further resolutions concerned 
amending the Act of 1788 to better protect underage apprentices, but they also advocated 
increased regulation for chimney sweeps. The protection of infants intended by this 
report did not come into fruition until 1834 with the Chimney Sweepers Act,614 which 
prohibited the employment of a child under ten as an apprentice to a chimney sweep. 
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The Chimney Sweepers and Chimneys Regulation Act615 of 1840 followed this, and raised 
the minimum age of employment in this profession to 21. However, without the means 
of direct enforcement, it was not until 1875 with the enactment of provisions requiring 
registration and punishment for chimney sweepers hiring climbing boys under the age 
of 21, that this protection was fully enforced.616  
 
Consequently, regarding apprenticeships, it has been noted that an infant was protected 
by the law, just as he was when contracting for the sale of goods. An additional safeguard 
was applied to an infant contracting for an apprenticeship however, with the 
requirement that the contract was entered into with the permission of the child’s father. 
Such contractual safeguards were intended to prevent the infant from binding himself to 
a scrupulous master. Once bound, the law achieved over a period of fifty years further 
protection through a succession of Acts which gave the apprentice the means to complain 
to a magistrate of abusive behaviour by his master, and eventually gave courts the ability 
to fine a master for ill-treatment. The extent to which these provisions were successful 
however, is doubtful, as the cases of Susannah Archer and Mary Clifford demonstrate. 
Furthermore, for occupations that were inherently dangerous, such as that of a chimney 
sweep, specific legislative protection was slow to develop and even after its 
implementation, the law was often ignored in practice such as with the 1788 Act. 
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6.3.1 Void Apprenticeship Contracts  
The treatment of apprentices such as that documented above was horrific. In the event 
that similar cases concerning mistreatment should reach trial, this amounted to valid 
cause to release the infant from the contract. However, beyond this, there were other 
means by which an apprenticeship indenture could be rendered void.  
 
Bad Behaviour  
One way in which the parties could be released from their obligations under an 
apprenticeship contract was if the apprentice absconded or behaved badly. It was 
common for the apprenticeship agreement to contain a clause which would put an end 
to the contract should the apprentice behave in a way unbecoming of his status. Indeed, 
in the contract between James Hardy and the Lune Shipbuilding Company, addressed 
above, it was stated that: 
If he, as Apprentice aforesaid, shall behave in a disrespectful or unbecoming way… such conduct 
shall be held per se sufficient for expelling the said Apprentice from his employment and 
cancelling this present Indenture 
In these circumstances, the contract was voidable. The case of Gray v Cookson & 
Clayton617 illustrates the response of the law to an apprentice breaking his indenture 
agreement in this way. Gray was apprenticed to a woollen draper for a term of 3 years 
and 9 months. It was stated that during his period of service, Gray had ‘been guilty of… 
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misdemenors [sic.], miscarriages, and ill-behaviour’618 and had eventually ‘absented 
himself from the service…without his consent’.619 As a consequence of this, Gray was 
sentenced to one month in a house of correction, but regarding the apprenticeship 
contract Lord Ellenborough held that the indenture was voidable as result of ‘the act of 
delinquency on the part of the apprentice’.620 It was this same behaviour that rendered 
the contract voidable in the later case of Cuff v Brown.621  
 
In Cuff, the father of an apprentice brought an action against his son’s master for the 
return of the indenture premium when the master refused to readmit the boy to his 
service after he had run away. William Cuff was apprenticed to Brown in the business of 
conveyancer, and after three years, he was to be an articled clerk at their firm of 
solicitors. One hundred pounds was paid by William’s father to Brown, in the form of a 
promissory note payable after three years.622 Much like the contract between James 
Hardy and the Lune Shipbuilding Company, this agreement also contained the standard 
clause that William would serve Brown for the whole period of the apprenticeship and 
would not misbehave or absent himself without leave. However, two years into the 
apprenticeship William ran away to enlist in the army. His father appealed to Brown to 
consider taking his son back, but this request was refused and when Brown sought to 
indorse the promissory note, Cuff brought an action against him for the return of the 
premium.  
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The courts addressed this issue by taking a common-sense approach. It was stated that 
‘the youth…runs away of his own accord…he may or may not come back: he chuses [sic] 
however to come back’623 and in these circumstances therefore ‘it is not fair…that the 
young man should demand a return of the…money, because he chuses [sic] to run 
away’.624 As it was the apprentice who ‘put an end’625 to the contract, Brown was entitled 
to keep the indenture premium and both parties were released from the contract. This 
conclusion is simply the courts upholding the provisions of the indenture which 
protected the master from losing money should an apprentice abscond, particularly if the 
child was to leave later in the term of apprenticeship, where he would be more valuable, 
having gained greater skills. Just as much as an apprenticeship contract protected the 
rights of an infant, this was very much balanced against the interests of the master, hence 
the judgment in Cuff, which permitted the master to retain the premium.  
 
Illness and Death 
Interpreting the provisions of the apprenticeship contract was equally important to 
determine whether illness or death could result in the premium being returned – or 
retained, depending on the inflicted party – after the contract was subsequently declared 
void. When deciding a case in which illness had rendered the infant incapacitated or 
death had brought the contract to an end, the courts looked to what was explicitly 
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stipulated in the apprenticeship indenture to determine whether the premium could be 
returned to the apprentice or his family. In order to understand the way in which such 
issues were addressed, the cases of Derby v Humber626 and Whincup v Hughes627 shall be 
discussed and compared below. These cases have been chosen as opposing outcomes 
were reached by the courts, having examined the terms of the respective apprenticeship 
contracts.  
 
Derby v Humber concerned an apprenticeship indenture entered in to by James Derby 
and his father and Humber. James was to be apprenticed to Humber ‘in the practice and 
profession of a civil engineer for three years’.628 The contract contained a provision that 
should James become incapacitated by way of illness during the first 11 months of the 
apprenticeship, Humber would return the premium of 50 pounds to James’ father. This 
was on the condition, however, that the master was served with a medical certificate 
signed by two doctors, attesting to James’ ill-health and consequent incapacity: 
And the said William Humber (the defendant) further agrees, that, in the event of the health of 
the said James Derby failing, so as to incapacitate him from following the said profession of a civil 
engineer, before the 1st of April, 1866, he the said W. Humber will refund and pay over to the said 
J. T. Derby (the plaintiff) the sum of 50l.; in such case the indentures to become cancelled and 
null and void as and between the said parties; it being understood and agreed between the parties 
hereto that the production by the said J. T. Derby, his executors or administrators, to the said W. 
Humber, at any time before the said 1st of April, 1866, of a certificate signed by two duly-qualified 
medical gentlemen, testifying as to the fact, shall be conclusive evidence that the health of the said 
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James Derby has failed, so as to incapacitate him from following the said profession of a civil 
engineer629 
 
Only three months after entering the agreement, James’ health deteriorated, as a result 
of a ‘diseased heart and dropsy’,630 and he died soon after.631 Seven months after the 
death of James, Humber received a certificate signed by two medical professionals who 
confirmed that James’ health had failed during the first three months of his 
apprenticeship, and in addition, a request for the return of the 50 pounds premium. 
Humber refused to pay on the basis that the certificate was provided after the death of 
James, and to conform to the contract term concerning the return of the premium, the 
certificate ought to have been served during the time that James was still alive but 
incapacitated. As a consequence of this refusal, James’ father brought an action for the 
return of the premium.  
 
Bovill CJ in deciding the case turned to the construction of the contract, and the wording 
of the relevant clause requiring production of a medical certificate; in particular, the 
words ‘at any time before the said 1st of April 1866’.632 Bovill understood this to mean 
that the deciding factor upon which the return of the premium depended was the death 
of James prior to 1866, and a certificate confirming the illness. As a result, it did not 
matter that the certificate was produced after his death, as the time frame of April 1866 
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was adhered to both in the death of James and the production of the certificate. As such, 
it was held that there had been ‘sufficient compliance with the provisions of the deed’633 
and Humber was compelled to return the 50 pounds premium to James’ father.  
 
The above case demonstrates how the courts looked to the explicit terms of an 
apprenticeship contract in order to determine whether there were to be further financial 
consequences resulting from an indenture rendered void by the incapacity of a party 
suffering from illness or death. However, where the contract failed to expressly provide 
for ill health or death, the intention of the parties was more greatly scrutinised by the 
courts. The judgment in Whincup v Hughes is an example of the courts doing this. In this 
case, Whincup apprenticed his son to a jeweller for a term of six years, and paid a 
premium of 25 pounds. The action was brought against the executrix of the jeweller’s 
estate for return of the apprenticeship premium when the master died only one year into 
the apprenticeship. In deciding the case, the court looked at what was implied in the 
contract. It was found that ‘the contract is subject to an implied condition that both 
parties should so long live’,634 but Montague Smith J found that the implied term did not 
extend to the return of the premium upon death. He reasoned that, ‘if they had so meant 
there would have been no difficulty in expressly providing for such a contingency’635 and 
ultimately, with explicit reference to the intention of the parties, ‘if they had intended 
that there should be any return of the premium, [they] would have provided for it’.636 
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Ultimately, it was held that Whincup’s action to claim back his premium failed as there 
was nothing in the contract to expressly provide for such a return upon death.  
 
Therefore, it is clear that when a contract was rendered void by way of incapacity caused 
by illness or death, the cases of Derby and Whincup demonstrate that the consequence of 
such was that a claim for a financial return, such as the premium, would only be 
permitted if the contract explicitly provided for it. In this way, the master did not stand 
to doubly lose out, by having invested in training the apprentice for the period before his 
death or incapacity, and then also being required to return the original premium. On the 
other side, the family of the apprentice were equally protected from losing the entire 
premium paid when only a portion of the apprenticeship was served. This protection for 
both parties only arose, however, when they explicitly provided for it, and so again, the 
law was protecting the parties by ensuring that these financial consequences were agreed 
when entering in to the contract.  
 
Not Beneficial to the Infant 
The final category to be addressed with regard to voidable apprenticeship contracts are 
those which were not beneficial to the infant. As noted, a contract for the sale of goods 
was binding on a child only if it was found to be in his interest,637 and in the same way, 
an apprenticeship contract was binding only if it was beneficial to the apprentice. The 
                                                          
637 See Ive v Chester (1620) Cro Jac 56; 79 ER 480 and Peters v Fleming (1840) 6 H & W 42; 151 ER 314. 
See also, Coates v Wilson (1804) 5 Esp 152; 170 ER 769 
258 
 
protection of the infant is abundantly clear in this rule; the law was protecting the 
apprentice from being taken advantage of by a master. The question of what amounted 
to being in the interests of the child was addressed in the case of De Francesco v 
Barnum.638  
 
This case concerned an apprenticeship indenture entered into on 6th December 1886 by 
a 14 year old girl, Helen Maude Parnell, and her mother Elizabeth Parnell, and Giuseppe 
Venuto de Francesco. Helen was to be apprenticed for seven years in ‘the art of stage 
dancing’639 and her younger sister, Ada, aged 12, also entered into a contract with Mr De 
Francesco under the same terms. The contract provided that the apprentices were to be 
paid per engagement at a rate of 9d. in the first year, rising to 1s. per show thereafter. 
Should the company travel internationally, the girls were to receive food and lodging 
whilst abroad, as well as a payment of 5s. per week. However, there was nothing to 
stipulate that the master would maintain the girls whilst they were not employed in a 
show, or any guarantee of performances. As with many apprenticeship contracts, there 
was a clause which stated that the contract would be brought to an end should the girls 
behave in a way unbecoming of their status, but this provision went further than usual 
and provided that the master was at liberty to end the contract at any time. The action 
brought by De Francesco against Phineas Barnum hinged on this term.  
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Barnum had signed a contract with the apprenticed girls in August 1889, in which they 
agreed to perform as dancers at his Olympia show. They were to be paid 21s. a week for 
their services. On hearing of this, rather than exercising his supposed right under the 
indenture to end the contract, De Francesco sought an injunction to enforce the terms of 
his agreement with the girls, as well as damages for breach of contract. In response, it 
was contended by the defendants that the provisions of the apprenticeship contract were 
‘unreasonable and oppressive’640 and the contract was thus void.  
 
In hearing the case, the judgment of Fry LJ is of particular importance, as his Lordship 
explained how the courts determined what was for the benefit of the infant: 
It is obvious that the contract of apprenticeship or the contract of labour must, like any other 
contract, contain some stipulations for the benefit of the one contracting party, and some for the 
benefit of the other. It is not because you can lay your hand on a particular stipulation which you 
may say is against the infant's benefit, that therefore the whole contract is not for the benefit of 
the infant. The Court must look at the whole contract, having regard to the circumstances of the 
case, and determine, subject to any principles of law which may be ascertained by the cases, 
whether the contract is or is not beneficial.641 
Ultimately, there will not be an individual term which will control whether the contract 
is beneficial to the infant or not. Rather, the courts will look at the contract in its entirety, 
taking into account the circumstances of the parties in order to reach a decision. It is 
therefore clear that the question of what is beneficial to an infant contracting as an 
apprentice is determined in much the same way as the question of what is of benefit to 
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an infant contracting for the sale of goods; the courts take into account the context of the 
case and the surrounding circumstances.   
 
It was by looking at the entire contract in De Francesco v Barnum that the court ultimately 
dismissed the action brought by De Francesco. Given that the girls were only to be paid 
per engagement, which were not guaranteed to them, the court found that this gave De 
Francesco an unreasonable power over how much remuneration the girls were to 
receive. Additionally, it is ironic that the term on which De Francesco sought to rely in 
order to claim damages was one of the very same upon which the court found the 
contract to be unreasonably oppressive. In addition to the lack of remuneration, clause 
eight of the contract, which permitted De Francesco to ‘put an end’642 to the 
apprenticeship ‘at any time’643 was held to place the infant ‘absolutely at the disposal of 
the teacher’.644 The terms of the contract also permitted the master to take the girls to 
perform at any national or international show. This, combined with the lack of 
remuneration and maintenance whilst unemployed, and De Francesco’s absolute power 
to end the contract as he so wished, led the court to find that the contract gave him an 
‘inordinate power’.645 As such, the indenture could not be for the benefit of the infants 
and was void. The apprentices were subsequently not bound by the contract, and De 
Francesco’s action against Barnum failed.   
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De Francesco v Barnum is clear authority for the proposition that finding an 
apprenticeship contract to be unbeneficial to an infant resulted in the contract being 
declared void and the parties subsequently released from their obligations under it. 
However, the consequences could extend much further and this is made evident in the 
case of R v Lord.646 Lord concerned an appeal against conviction by an apprentice who 
was imprisoned for absconding from his master. Although a criminal case, in his appeal, 
it was argued that the apprenticeship contract was void, being too onerous on the part 
of the infant, and thus not of benefit to him. Having therefore no valid apprenticeship, 
he could not be imprisoned for running away from it.  
 
The contract was entered on the 29th July 1846 between James Lord, an infant, and John 
Mason, a machine-maker; Lord was to be apprenticed to Mason as an artificer.647 On the 
3rd August 1846 Lord absconded from his master and like the apprentice in Gray v 
Cookson & Clayton, was subsequently imprisoned under the provisions of the Masters 
and Servants Act 1823.648 This Act permitted a servant to be sent to prison for up to three 
months for absconding.649 On appeal, the court’s attention was drawn to two particular 
stipulations in the contract. The first was that ‘should the steam engine be stopped from 
accident or any other cause… J.M. may retain all weekly or other wages’.650 The second 
notable provision stated that ‘J.M. may dismiss and discharge the said James Lord from 
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his said service at any time’.651 Counsel for Lord argued that stopping the steam engine 
and thus withholding the wages of the apprentice was something completely within the 
masters control, and that this imbalance of power was only furthered with the provision 
that gave the master the right to end the apprenticeship as he so wished. It was therefore 
‘a one-sided contract’.652 Lord Denman agreed. In quashing the infant’s conviction, he 
stated that: 
an agreement to serve for wages may be for the infant’s benefit: but an agreement which compels 
him to serve at all times during the term, but leaves the master free to stop his work and his 
wages whenever he chooses to do so cannot be considered as beneficial to the servant.653 
The result was that the contract was declared void.  
 
The above two cases demonstrate that the validity of an apprenticeship contract very 
much depended on balancing the respective interests of the infant apprentice against 
those of the master. The extent to which one party’s interests prevailed over the other 
was to be determined by the courts taking into account all of the surrounding 
circumstances and the context in which the contract took place. Protection was in this 
way afforded to an infant who could be released from an unreasonably onerous 
apprenticeship contract. But it is argued that the process by which the courts determined 
whether a contract was to be declared void ensured that all circumstances were taken 
into account, and this meant addressing the interests of the master under the contract 
also. This was therefore not a one-sided protection aimed at protecting the infant above 
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acknowledging the interests of the master, but rather a careful deliberation of the rights 
of each party under the contract.   
 
6.4 CONCLUSION  
Ultimately, the notion that the protection of infants was reached at the expense of the 
interests of those with whom they contracted, is not accurate. In relation to boys at 
university or those who enlisted in the army, as in Coates v Wilson and the cases of Hands 
and Berolles, it was certainly the case that the law sought to apply further safeguards to 
their contractual capacity, and this is evident in the application of a two-part rule. The 
law which stated that the goods must be necessary for the infant, but also that they must 
be necessary in relation to his ‘station in life’,654 ensured that the protection was firmly 
on the infant. However, cases such as Ford v Fothergill do attempt to redress the balance 
by putting the trader on notice to enquire of the potential infancy.  
 
With regard to an infant pledging his father’s credit, and the potential liability of parents 
for the debts of an infant, what we see in cases such as Blackburn v Mackey is that the 
law sought to protect the wealth of the father. This was done by requiring a father to give 
explicit consent for items purchased in his name, by his child. Thus, rather than 
protecting an infant, an element of control was applied to their contractual capacity. 
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Similarly to a married woman who acted as agent for her husband, the law exerted this 
control mechanism in order to protect wealth and avoid the potential ‘ruin’655 of families.  
  
It is interesting that when addressing apprenticeship contracts, the interests of the 
respective parties were treated by the law in a much more balanced way. A level of 
statutory protection was intended for children undertaking apprenticeships, in the form 
of legislation which could cancel the apprenticeship and release the child from the 
indenture should mistreatment occur. A succession of Acts in the eighteenth century 
sought to provide the infant with recourse to report an abusive master, but as noted, the 
practical possibility of a child evoking the legislation and seeking recourse was uncertain, 
as shown in the cases of Susannah Archer and Mary Clifford. Even for those 
apprenticeship contracts deemed especially harsh due to the nature of the work, as were 
climbing boy apprenticeships, despite attempted reform of the system in the 1817 
Committee Report, the age of apprenticeship – and thus increased protection for these 
children – was not achieved until much later. Indeed, it would take almost sixty years656 
before children were completing banned from this inherently dangerous trade. It would 
therefore seem that despite the best efforts of the law, for apprentices, the harsh reality 
was that this statutory protection did little to protect them from abusive masters. The 
common law, however, developed in a way that sought to balance the interests of the 
infant against those of the master when determining the validity of an apprenticeship 
indenture.  
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This equality is evident when cases such as Cuff v Brown are analysed. In cases 
concerning bad behaviour on the part of the apprentice, should the contract be declared 
void, as well as both parties being released from the contract, the master was also 
permitted to retain the premium. Thus protecting his financial interests. In death and 
incapacity as a result of illness too, Derby v Humber and Whincup v Hughes are authority 
for the proposition that the premium would only be returned if this was expressly 
provided by the parties in the contract. This way, the master did not stand to lose any 
money invested in the apprentice, and equally, the family of the child did not forfeit their 
premium when only part of the apprenticeship had been served. Perhaps where it could 
be argued that the greatest protection of the infant was applied was to those cases 
concerning contracts which were void for not being of benefit to the infant. Yet here also, 
the courts looked at the entire contract, and the surrounding context and circumstances, 
in order to determine whether the apprenticeship was in the best interests of the child. 
There was a weighing up of competing interests, which took into account those of the 
master also, and so it cannot be said that the law addressed these contracts from a 
perspective that was biased towards the infant. It is clear in cases such as De Francesco v 
Barnum, that the courts also discussed what the master sought to gain from the contract, 
and indeed, it is argued that the question of what was of benefit to an infant in an 
apprenticeship contract cannot be determined without an exploration of interests of the 
other party. Only by comparing and balancing the interests of each, could the courts 
successfully determine the validity of the contract and subsequently seek to protect the 




It is therefore argued here that ultimately, the treatment by the law of infants’ contractual 
capacity was not purely one of protection. Regarding contracting for necessaries, it was 
certainly the case that the two-part rule and decision in Ford placed more onus on the 
trader, but when contracting as agent of his father, the law was much more concerned 
with controlling the contractual rights of the child and protecting the wealth of the family 
than it was to protect the infant himself. Indeed, legislative protection was attempted 
with regard to apprenticeships and the social dangers inherent in them, but again, for 
cases concerning potential void apprenticeship contracts, the law protected both parties 
by examining their respective interests. It is therefore not as simple to suggest that the 
law was wholly concerned with protecting infants’ contractual capacity over and above 
competing interests; instead, it was something that was to be achieved, but this was not 












































Appendix 8: Apprenticeship Contract between James Hardy and the Lune 




This Indenture MADE THE First Day of June One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty 
Five 
Between James Hayton Hardy of Lancaster in the County of Lancaster 
Daniel Hardy of Lancaster in the County of Lancaster of the one part, and THE LUNE 
SHIPBUILDING COMPANY LIMITED (hereinafter called the said Company) of the other 
part.  
 
Witnesseth that the said James Hayton Hardy of his own free will and with the consent 
of his said father, Daniel Hardy doth put himself Apprentice to the said Company, their 
Successors and Assigns, and with the said Company, their Successors and Assigns (after 
the manner of an Apprentice) to ____ from the first day of February 1865 to the first day 
of February 1872 to be fully completed and ended. During which Term the said 
Apprentice the said Company faithfully shall serve, their secrets keep, and their lawful 
commands everywhere gladly do and obey, by day or night, week-day or holy-day, in 
Lancaster, or in any City, Town or Place, in Great Britain or Ireland, to which the said 
Company, or their Manager, may think proper to send him in the course of business, the 
said Company defraying the Travelling and other extraordinary Expenses which may be 
incurred thereby.  
 
And the said Apprentice shall no time absent himself from his Work without leave 
obtained, unless in case of Sickness duly certified in writing under the hand of a Surgeon 
in proof thereof. That he the said Apprentice shall serve two days for each day’s absence 
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without leave as aforesaid, and day for day for whatever time he may be absent on leave 
owing to Sickness duly certified; the number of which days shall be liquidated and proved 
by word of the Manager of the said Company, or by a signed account from the Clerk 
without the necessity of further proof. And in case of absence the said Company shall 
have it in their power to stop such sum as they or their Manager shall think proper, not 
exceeding Two Shillings sterling for each day’s absence without leave or exhibition of the 
certificate by a Surgeon as aforesaid, in lieu of serving two days as aforesaid; and the 
same rate of deduction shall be allowed in case of the said Apprentice absenting himself 
for any less time than a day.  
 
And he the said Apprentice shall and will in all things strictly conform to, abide by, and 
submit to all the Rules and Regulations of the said Company, exacted from and observed 
by all Workmen and others employed therein, and affixed and set up, and hereafter to be 
affixed and set up in the workshops of the said Works, and a copy of which present Rules 
and Regulations is now signed by the said Apprentice, and the said Daniel Hardy his 
father do testify their consent to the said Rules and Regulations; and in the event of a 
breach of any of the said Rules and Regulations he the said Apprentice, with the consent 
of the said Daniel Hardy his father binds and obliges himself from time to time to abide 
strictly by the Fine or Punishment awarded; and further the said Apprentice shall do no 
damage to the said Company, nor see the same done by others, without informing the 
Manager of the Company thereof, but to his power shall tell or forthwith give warning 
to the said Manager of the same. He shall not waste the goods of the said Company, nor 
lend them unlawfully to any. He shall neither buy nor sell, nor haunt taverns nor 
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playhouses, but in all things, as a faithful Apprentice, he shall behave himself towards 
the said Company, their Manager and employers during the said term.  
 
And the said Apprentice declares and agrees that if he, as Apprentice aforesaid, shall 
behave in a disrespectful or unbecoming way to the Manager, Clerk, or other person or 
persons known to have power or authority from the said Company, such conduct shall 
be held per se sufficient for expelling the said Apprentice from his employment and 
cancelling this present Indenture.  
 
And the said Company for themselves their successors and assigns, in consideration of 
the sum of five shillings of lawful British money to them paid and satisfied by the said 
Daniel Hardy his father, and of the said true and faithful service of the said Apprentice, 
to be by him done and performed, doth covenant with the said Daniel Hardy that while 
and so long as the said Apprentice shall well and faithfully serve the said Company under 
this Indenture and conform to and obey the Rules and Regulations in manner aforesaid, 
they the said Company shall teach or cause to be taught the Art and Business of a Joiner 
to James Hayton Hardy the said Apprentice. And the said Company, in consideration of 
the services of the said Apprentice, so well and faithfully to be performed as aforesaid, 
and while and so long as he performs the same, and obeys and conforms to the said Rules 
and Regulations in manner aforesaid, doth agree to pay him after the rate of Four 
Shillings per week for the First Year; Five Shillings per week for the Second Year; Six 
Shillings per week for the Third Year; Seven Shillings per week for the Fourth Year; Eight 
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Shillings per week for the Fifth Year; Ten Shillings per week for the Sixth Year; Twelve 
Shillings per week for the Seventh Year. Provided always, and it is hereby declared and 
agreed, that if the Business which is now carried on by the said Company shall, at any 
time before the expiration of the mid term, cease to be carried on by them or if the said 
Company shall be wound up, then and in such case they the said Company shall be 
relieved from all future obligations or liability under their Covenants hereinbefore 
contained.  
 
And the said Daniel Hardy doth hereby for himself, his Heirs, Executors, and 
Administrators, covenant and agree with the said Company, their successors and Assigns, 
that the said James Hayton Hardy, the Apprentice shall and will faithfully, diligently, and 
honestly serve the said Company’s business during the said Term, in manner and 
according to all the stipulations hereinbefore contained. And the said James Hayton 
Hardy the Apprentice, binds and obliges himself to warrant free and harmless to keep 
the said Daniel Hardy his curety, from all Costs, Damages and Expenses, which he may 
in any way sustain or be put to being bound or obliged for him in manner aforesaid.  
IN WITNESS whereof the said James Hayton Hardy and Daniel Hardy, interchangeably 
have put their Hands and ___ and the said Company have ___ their Common Seal to be 
affixed this Day and Year first above written. 
 
Signed, Sealed and Delivered by the before named James Hayton Hardy  





This thesis began by postulating the advantages of an interdisciplinary methodology to 
challenge commonly held beliefs regarding the rationale of the law in relation to holding 
certain contracts void. It has subsequently been demonstrated that placing the law in its 
social context disrupts the rigid binary control-protection interest categorisation that the 
law sought to apply to the areas of illegality, immorality, and incapacity.  
 
It has been argued in Chapter Two and Chapter Three that when viewed through a purely 
legal lens, contracts concerning marriage rights were rendered void as being contrary to 
public policy, as the law sought to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Yet, whilst dicta in 
the judgments supports this, in referring to the notion that marriage be made on the 
‘proper foundation’,657 when analysed alongside social history, it is clear that there was 
an inherent desire to protect family wealth. This further protection is only revealed 
through an historical analysis of the background of the families in the cases, as well as 
knowledge of social norms such as the likely mode by which fortune would be invested 
at this time. The interdisciplinary methodology assisted here in that it confirmed existing 
notions of what the law sought to protect by rendering contracts for the restraint of 
marriage, marriage brokerage, and separation agreements as void, but it also revealed a 
further level of protection, which those conducting a solely legal analysis would overlook.  
                                                          




Additionally, the interdisciplinary methodology not only provides an alternative 
interpretation to legal reasoning, but can also assist in further understanding the 
motivations of the law. For instance, eighteenth century ideals of womanhood and the 
presentation of women in literature support the rationale of the law regarding breach of 
promise actions, in that it was felt that these meek, virtuous, women required protection 
and this was done through permitting actions for breach of promise. This was also 
revealed to be the case when contracts involving infants were analysed in Chapter Six. 
Clearly both the law and social history sought to protect a contractual actor deemed to 
lack the knowledge to enter contracts, but the extent of that protection is all the more 
noticeable when analysing the social context. Stories of abuse assist in understanding 
why statutory provisions were necessary, particularly in relation to apprenticeship 
contracts. Yet, the protection given to the master has often been commonly overlooked; 
the very same statutory provisions also protected the master, and so a much more 
balanced agenda of the law than has previously been envisaged is revealed. The 
protection given to contractual actors in the areas of illegality and incapacity has always 
been present, but it is only when viewed through a combined lens of law and social 
history that alternative protections, such as that of family wealth, and the extent of the 
protection applied, such as that towards infants, is revealed.  
 
Likewise, in Chapter Four it was stated that the law regarding prostitution sought to 
control the practice and, in order to do this, contracts for the rent of premises as well as 
the sale of goods were rendered void. This not only signalled that the law would not 
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support such an immoral practice, but also served as a warning to landlords and 
tradesman to prohibit them from future dealings with prostitutes and, in this way, the 
practice could be indirectly supressed. Analysing the cases in isolation suggests a staunch 
agenda of control through the conduit of the law, yet a concurrent historical 
understanding displaces this view. Whilst groups such as the Society for the Reformation 
of Manners campaigned actively against prostitution, social remedies moved away from 
punitive measures towards those of redemption. This is reflected in the establishment of 
the Magdalen Hospital, as well as the idea advocated by Mandeville for the creation of 
public stews.658 It is with this knowledge that the redemptive language in the judgments 
takes on greater meaning; the acknowledgement in Appleton v Campbell that prostitutes 
must have a ‘place to lay their heads’659 reflects the move in society away from viewing 
working women as requiring punishment towards, instead, seeking their redemption. 
From this combined methodology, not only is the notion that the law sought to control 
the profession weakened, but ideas of protecting the public as well as redeeming the 
women take greater hold.   
 
The weakening of the control interest was also present when the contractual capacity of 
women was examined through the combined methodology of law and social history in 
Chapter Five. The operation of the legal concept of coverture sought to control women, 
placing them under the guardianship of a male, and subsuming their legal rights upon 
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could occur was indicative of social acceptance of prostitution and a move away from punishing the 
women involved 
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marriage into those of their husband. Yet in practice, cases such as Manby v Scott660 
demonstrate that tradesman were often willing to contract anyway; such contracts would 
pass without issue and it was only should the bill be unpaid at the end of the month that 
questions concerning contractual capacity arose. Furthermore, social norms and 
practices developed, such as pin money and jointure, which countered their legal status 
as a feme covert. This historical context gives women in the long eighteenth century an 
element of independence, which legal doctrine sought to remove in the application of 
coverture. Once more, a solely legal analysis would result in one conclusion with respect 
to married women: they were controlled and lacked contractual capacity. However, a 
joint methodological approach counters this; the control interest is somewhat weakened 
and thus women take on a position of greater empowerment. 
 
It is therefore submitted that whilst the control-protection interest of the law holds true, 
the extent to which this is a rigid, binary, categorisation has been disrupted. This 
disruption has been revealed as a consequence of the use of a combined legal and 
historical methodology and therefore the present author considers that those carrying 
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7.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
This thesis has provided an original contribution to legal scholarship by submitting an 
alternative methodology for the area of void contracts. In analysing the law alongside 
social history, it has been determined that the motivations of the courts with regard to 
rendering contracts void was often misaligned with both the social reality and how these 
contracts operated in practice. This thesis has therefore challenged the interpretation of 
the law that a purely legal methodology has produced and, in the realm of void contracts, 
has resulted in the rigid division between the control and protection interests of the law 
becoming much more blurred. For instance, with regard to immorality, a purely legal 
analysis of the case law revealed a system which sought to control the practice of 
prostitution. However, placed in the social context, it revealed a level of protection aimed 
not only towards the public but a less punitive agenda towards prostitutes also. The 
implications of this research therefore extend to assisting future legal scholars and 
suggests a rethinking of how case law and legal theory is analysed. This supports the 
contention made by Sugarman in the introduction of this thesis that legal scholarship 
would benefit from greater ‘cross-fertilisation’.661 The conclusions reached in this thesis 
support this argument and it is thus submitted that there is room for an alternative 
methodology in legal study.  
 
                                                          
661 See D. Sugarman, ‘Promoting Dialogue Between History and Socio-legal Studies: the Contribution of 
Christopher W. Brooks and the ‘Legal Turn’ in Early Modern English History’, 2017 44 Journal of Law 
and Society 37, 41 
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Following from this, as mentioned briefly above, the second implication of this research 
has been to uncover the motivations of the law in rendering contracts as void or voidable. 
It is argued that the notion that the law sought to uphold the sanctity of marriage, with 
regard to illegality, or sought to restrict women’s legal autonomy in the area of 
incapacity, for instance, is an overly simplistic analysis of the law. In order to determine 
the true rationale, this thesis has abandoned the interpretation of the law in isolation of 
its social context. By doing so, alternative motivations can be revealed. Following from 
this finding, this research has thirdly discredited the traditional view that the law adopted 
a staunch agenda of control or protection when rendering contracts void or voidable. An 
analysis of the language of the judgments, alongside the social context in which the law 
was operating, has revealed that the division between the control and protection interests 
applied by the law was not a rigid one.  
 
7.2 FURTHER RESEARCH  
This thesis’ area of focus, namely voidability of contracts, was chosen in order to 
demonstrate the value of applying an interdisciplinary methodology to legal analysis. Yet 
it is acknowledged that an interdisciplinary approach to legal scholarship would benefit 
from application across a broader range of legal topics in order to demonstrate its ability 
to disrupt conclusions that the use of a singular discipline methodology has produced. 
The limitations of this research have been that it has been restricted to a singular area of 
contract law, and thus in order to fully determine the effectiveness of an interdisciplinary 
methodology, further application across other areas of law is required. The development 
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of research in other areas of civil law would complement the research conducted in this 
thesis. For instance, whilst this thesis has focused on those contracts which were personal 
in nature, the implications of commercial legislation in the long eighteenth century would 
be a useful research project. This is especially so given the role of Lord Mansfield in the 
extensive development of commercial law at that time and, indeed, throughout the 
industrial revolution; something touched upon in the Introduction of this thesis. Such a 
project would contribute to existing research by seeking to analyse the extent to which a 
tension existed between a law which attempted to regulate but also encourage large 
corporations, whilst protecting the consumers who dealt with them. Beyond this, the 
criminal law too would benefit from further interdisciplinary analysis. The advantages 
of pursuing such research lies in the comprehensiveness of historical sources relating to 
criminal law and the social developments, such as the creation of the Metropolitan Police, 
which occurred during the long eighteenth century. Whilst historical accounts of the 
criminal law exist, most notably in the seminal Albion’s Fatal Tree,662 there is a notable 
lack of literature critiquing the connection between law and social history and thus an 
original contribution to knowledge could be made here.  
 
It follows that whilst the focus of this thesis has been an interdisciplinary approach 
between law and history, it is argued that legal scholarship could indeed benefit from 
further subject ‘cross-fertilisation’. Subjects which may be beneficial to legal scholarship 
include politics, literature, and philosophy; these areas are cited as they lend themselves 
                                                          
662 D. Hay, P. Linebaugh, J.G. Rule, E.P. Thompson & C. Winslow, Albion’s Fatal Tree, (Pantheon Books, 
New York: 1975)  
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particularly well to bridging the gap between law and culture and, as this thesis has 
shown, this is important to aid in an understanding not only of the theory of the law, but 
also how it is applied, and received, in practice. Further, these disciplines have been cited 
by those such as Sugarman as complementing legal study.663 The conclusions of this 
thesis, in successfully discrediting beliefs that a purely legal analysis would otherwise 
have produced, suggests that such scholarship would indeed be beneficial to the wider 
academic research community.  
  
7.3 FINAL REMARKS 
Whilst it is acknowledged that further research in to the advantages of an 
interdisciplinary approach to other areas of law is required, this thesis has provided a 
baseline from which this research can be conducted, having revealed the benefit of such 
a methodology to contract law. Through the combined lens of law and social history, 
contractual actors once believed to lack legal power and status take on greater capacity 
and in turn, empowerment. The alternative methodology unlocks the empowerment in 
contractual parties once believed to have none and thus dispels with common myths such 
as that married women possessed no recourse from the binds of coverture, or that 
prostitutes were heavily controlled as being contrary to a morally upright society. More 
generally, the interdisciplinary approach causes a concurrent disruption in the 
traditional control-protection interest distinctions of the law, and has challenged the 
                                                          
663 See D. Sugarman, ‘From Legal Biography to Legal Life Writing: Broadening Conceptions of Legal 
History and Socio-legal Scholarship’, in L. Mulcahy and D. Sugarman, Legal Life Writing: Marginalized 
Subjects and Sources, (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford: 2013) 33 
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extent to which these labels hold true, if at all, and to what extent such interests could be 
said to overlap. An alternative approach to legal scholarship is thus proposed; one which 
challenges commonly held conceptions regarding the motivations of the law by forcing 
the scholar to look beyond the purely legal principles and to acknowledge instead the 
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